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This thesis considers whether the privilege against self-incrimination is engaged 
when a company is required to make a suspicious activity report which discloses criminal 
conduct committed by an officer or employee pursuant to section 330(1) of the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002. If the assertion of the privilege is not recognised, a company’s failure 
to disclose suspicious information will constitute a criminal offence punishable by 
unlimited fine. Whilst the scope of an individual’s obligation to self-report criminal 
conduct is relatively narrow, there is much wider exposure for a company which acts only 
through the conduct of its officers and employees. 
 
The research is doctrinal and addresses important theoretical issues. Locating 
mandatory reporting within a contemporary narrative which embraces criminal liability 
for omissions, the thesis develops a theoretical foundation for the law’s recognition of a 
company’s claim to assert the privilege against self-incrimination in response to the self-
reporting aspect of the mandatory requirement. As a fundamental civil liberty, the 
underlying rationales of the privilege are enlivened by the coercive force which the 
mandatory reporting requirement presents. The privilege serves to maintain evidential 
reliability, and protect dignity, autonomy, and privacy.  
 
To develop the claim that a company is entitled to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination, the basis on which a company may assert rights is comprehensively 
explored. Traditional approaches struggle to provide an adequate basis for the recognition 
of corporate rights. The research draws on consequentialist arguments which sustain the 
law’s acknowledgment of corporate rights and, in particular, a company’s right to assert 
the privilege against self-incrimination where the company is exposed to the risk of 
criminal investigation and prosecution. This line of contention engages with the work of 
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1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
The research question in this thesis asks whether the law should recognise a corporate claim 
to assert the privilege against self-incrimination in answer to a statutory obligation 
requiring a company to disclose information which gives reasonable grounds to suspect 
a company acting by its officers and employees has been engaged in money laundering. 
The thesis proposes an affirmative answer.  
 
The legal duty to disclose a suspicion of money laundering which is imposed by section 
330(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA 2002”) applies to persons working in 
the regulated sector in England and Wales. The person concerned may be an individual 
or, importantly for the purposes of the thesis, a company. The duty is established by the 
creation of a criminal offence which penalises a failure to make the disclosure. This 
offence is known as the “failure to disclose” offence. The offence is triable summarily or 
on indictment. The offence is punishable after trial in the Crown Court by a maximum 
of five years imprisonment in the case of an individual, and an unlimited fine in the case 
of an individual or a company.  
 
Where a disclosure made by a company involves a suspicion that one or more of its 
officers or employees is engaged in money laundering in the course of their work, a 
company may self-incriminate when the disclosure is made. 
 
Disclosure of involvement in suspected money laundering is made by the submission of 
a suspicious activity report (“SAR”) to a law enforcement authority, typically to the 
National Crime Agency (“NCA”). Money laundering is widely defined as involving the 
handling of property which represents the benefit from criminal conduct, details of which 
are described in the SAR. Where the substance of a disclosure involves a self-
incriminating acknowledgement of participation in criminal conduct on behalf of a 
corporate discloser, the disclosure is variously described in this thesis as “a mandatory 
self-report”, “mandatory self-reporting”, and “the mandatory self-reporting 
requirement”. Where reference is made more widely to the reporting requirement set out 
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in section 330(1) and the reporting of self-incriminating information is not involved, the 
terms “mandatory reporting” and “mandatory reporting requirement” are used.  
 
Also, the thesis refers generically to law enforcement authorities such as the NCA as “the 
State” and “the State authorities”. 
 
In addition to the legal duty to report in section 330(1), duties to disclose are imposed by 
sections 331(1) and 332(1) of POCA 2002. In both cases, the duty is imposed on a 
“nominated officer”, who is sometimes called a “Money Laundering Reporting Officer”, 
or “MLRO”. This thesis concentrates exclusively on the duty to disclose imposed by 
section 330(1) since it is this duty which applies to a company operating in the regulated 
sector and gives rise to an issue concerning self-incrimination. 
 
1.1.1 Additional questions 
 
Implicit within the research question is an assumption that a company can assert the privilege 
against self-incrimination in circumstances where the law acknowledges that the privilege 
may be engaged by an individual. This begs a question as to the basis on which a corporate 
claim to benefit from rights associated with the protection of an individual can be made. 
In addressing this question, the thesis explores theoretical foundations for the recognition 
of corporate rights in the modern age, which include the ability to assert the privilege 
against self-incrimination. Critically, the research question posits whether the law should 
recognise the engagement of the privilege against self-incrimination as a shield to exempt 
a company from criminal liability where it has failed to make a mandatory self-report. In 
seeking to locate the answer, the thesis develops an extensive critique of the various 
rationales underlying the privilege against self-incrimination. The mandatory reporting 
requirement is expressed to apply to “a person”, individual and corporate.  
 
By exploring the engagement of the privilege against self-incrimination with mandatory 
self-reporting through a corporate model, the thesis tests the rationales underpinning the 
privilege against self-incrimination at their outer edge, whilst simultaneously exploring the 
foundation of corporate rights and the justification for claims which may be made. Thus, 
the research question demands the attention of developing jurisprudential thought in two 
areas which have significant contemporary resonance.  
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In fact, the research question can be broken down into five distinct sub-questions. In the 
first sub-question, the thesis asks whether it is possible to conceptualise a coherent model 
for mandatory self-reporting by a company within traditional understandings of the 
criminal law. The thesis does not challenge the statutory establishment of a legal duty to 
disclose suspicious information as antithetical to an understanding of criminal law which 
countenances the punishment of conduct by omission as well as acts of commission. 
Rather, it presents a critique of the extent to which a mandatory self-reporting 
requirement can be assimilated within a developing theory of omissions liability in 
criminal law.  
 
After delineating the contours of the anti-money laundering regime (“AML regime”) and, 
particularly, the reach of the mandatory self-reporting requirement in section 330(1) of 
POCA 2002, the second sub-question enquires whether, as one of the core liberties at 
common law, the rationales underlying the privilege against self-incrimination are 
sufficiently broad to engage with the mandatory reporting requirement. The extent of a 
company’s ability to assert rights comes into sharp focus, in this instance, with reference 
to the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination in the protection of the 
company’s interests.   
 
This gives rise to the third sub-question, since it would be surprising if the corporate ability 
to assert the privilege against self-incrimination inhabited a hermetically sealed space, 
separated from the generality of other corporate rights which a company may wish to 
assert. The thesis asks how the law recognises the ability of a company to assert rights in 
the protection of its interests, and if so, on what basis. The thesis presents an approach 
to the recognition of corporate rights which focuses on the value which the right protects. 
The purpose of the exploration is to develop an understanding of the way in which the 
law’s recognition of corporate rights can be supported.   
 
In this respect, the substance of the third sub-question and the fourth sub-question are closely 
related, with the fourth sub-question asking whether it is possible to develop a narrative 
which argues that the law should recognise the ability of a company to assert the privilege 
against self-incrimination as one of these rights in a larger basket of rights. This is closely 
followed by the fifth sub-question which addresses the heart of the research question whether 
the privilege against self-incrimination is engaged by the mandatory self-reporting 
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requirement in section 330(1) of POCA 2002, and if so, how a corporate claim to exercise 




1.2.1 Chapter 2 (Mandatory Reporting)  
 
Chapter 2 explores the practice of self-reporting contextually. It begins by defining the 
notion of self-reporting as a practice distinct from the making of a plea bargain and a 
confession more traditionally associated with the effective operation of a mature criminal 
justice system. The chapter considers guidance on consensual corporate self-reporting by 
enforcement agencies and how corporate self-reporting operates in practice, with 
outcomes involving deferred prosecution agreements justified by reference to the public 
interest.  
 
The chapter is foundational and establishes the legal framework for the corporate self-
reporting of criminal conduct under the AML regime set out in Part 7 of POCA 2002. 
The legislation is complex, and the chapter explains that there are two reporting routes 
established by the legislation. The first involves a form of voluntary reporting. In order 
to avoid committing a money laundering offence (known as a prohibited act) contrary to 
sections 327(1), 328(1) and 329(1) of POCA 2002, the legislation provides that a person 
is exempt from criminal responsibility where information relating to the prohibited act is 
disclosed to the NCA before the act is committed. The second reporting route is set out 
in section 330(1) and is compulsory in nature. It involves the making of a SAR. Under 
this section, a person (individual and corporate) working in the regulated sector who fails 
to disclose information relating to another person’s involvement in suspected money 
laundering commits a criminal offence.  
 
The chapter focuses on the breadth of the mandatory requirement, and how it operates 
in the case of a company to capture the disclosure of self-incriminating information in 
certain circumstances. The scope for the legislation requiring the reporting of self-
incriminating information and the criminal exposure of a company, its officers, and 
employees, is fully developed. The chapter uncovers a company’s exposure to the risk of 
criminal prosecution in these circumstances. The origin of the obligation in section 330(1) 
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to self-report criminal conduct is traced from its international gestation into 
contemporary domestic law. The coercive nature of the statutory architecture is 
explained, and the legislative purpose underlying the reporting requirement is explored. 
 
1.2.2 Chapter 3 (Theoretical Perspectives)  
 
Chapter 3 addresses whether a mandatory reporting requirement to report suspicious 
money laundering conduct can be assimilated within the norms of omission liability in 
criminal law. This is the first sub-question to be considered in this thesis. Although the 
engagement of the privilege against self-incrimination with mandatory self-reporting 
supported by penal sanction is not dependent on its coherence with theoretical norms of 
criminal law, nevertheless the answer is relevant. A sound jurisprudential foundation for 
the mandatory reporting requirement assists the theoretician in gaining an understanding 
of the criminal peril against which the privilege against self-incrimination operates to 
protect.  
 
The chapter explains how a duty to report suspected money laundering is most 
appropriately located in the recognition of a person’s civic duty to support the State in 
the promotion of a just society by assisting in the detection of criminal activity. This duty 
is not limited to an individual. As a legal person, a company has duties too. It is, therefore, 
not difficult to locate mandatory reporting in the recognition of a person’s perceived 
moral obligation to promote the interests of justice by assisting in the identification of 
criminal activity. This obligation is influenced by policy considerations which 
underpinned the old common-law offence of misprision. The offence required proof of 
the deliberate concealment of a person’s knowledge of the commission of a felony, or 
where a person knowing of the criminal design refrained from disclosing it to a Justice of 
the Peace to prevent its commission.  
 
With the offence of misprision swept away, a more sophisticated analysis is now required. 
Andrew Ashworth has placed the theoretical foundation for mandatory reporting of 
suspected money laundering in the discourse around civic obligation, and he begins with 
the premise that the criminal law captures an omission where there is a failure to carry 
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out a duty, whether or not the duty is reinforced by the criminal law.1 Andrew Ashworth 
and Lucia Zedner posit whether mandatory reporting can be viewed as an example of a 
preventive criminal law since it serves to restrict future criminality involving the handling 
of proceeds of crime.2 The question arises as to whether Ashworth’s approach is valid 
where a self-report of criminal conduct is made by a corporate entity. In addition, the 
chapter considers whether coercive reporting of criminal conduct can be theorised 
through the prism of Hohfeldian rights and duties, common pool resources, the notion 
of nudges, and the economic theory of crime.  
 
1.2.3 Chapter 4 (Privilege against self-incrimination) 
 
This chapter addresses the second sub-question whether the rationales underlying the 
privilege against self-incrimination are sufficiently broad to embrace the criminal peril 
established by the mandatory reporting requirement in section 330(1) of POCA 2002. 
 
The chapter begins with a critique of the application of the privilege against self-
incrimination in the courts. Historically, the courts in England and Wales confined the 
application of the privilege to circumstances where a witness declines to answer questions 
either in court or during an investigation, in order to avoid real danger of prosecution for 
the commission of a criminal offence. Cases in common law jurisdictions are also 
reviewed. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and the European Court 
of Justice (“ECJ”) have tended to adopt a more liberal approach, and alongside the 
approach taken by the Supreme Court in the United States, an analysis of contrasting legal 
approaches forms a pertinent part of this critique. Whilst a narrow application of the 
privilege against self-incrimination suggests there is little engagement with the 
requirement for the mandatory self-reporting of criminal conduct, the chapter argues that 
this approach is too simplistic since it fails to acknowledge the rationales which support 
the contemporary recognition of the privilege. The boundaries of the privilege should be 
set by the perils against which it seeks to protect. 
 
In developing this argument, the various rationales for supporting the privilege are fully 
explored. The origin of the privilege against self-incrimination is rooted in the Judeo-
 
1 Andrew Ashworth, Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2013) 56–65. 
2 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice (OUP 2014) 100–101. 
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Christian tradition, and the objections to the continuing recognition of the privilege are 
thoroughly examined. The chapter discusses how contemporary academic and judicial 
thinking is more concerned about issues involving loss of privacy, individual dignity and 
personal autonomy than worries regarding the potential reliability of self-incriminating 
information.  
 
1.2.4 Chapter 5 (Traditional conceptions of corporate rights)  
 
In chapters 5, 6 and 7, the thesis interrogates the assumption embedded in the research 
question that a company has a right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination in 
appropriate circumstances. The assumption is easy to make but challenging to support. 
A company has multiple interests to protect, whether on behalf of itself, and on occasions, 
on behalf of others such as its officers and employees. The third sub-question explores the 
jurisprudential framework for the law’s acknowledgment of these rights. 
 
In addressing this topic, chapter 5 begins by reviewing the nature of corporate 
personhood and corporate personality. The chapter explores whether traditional 
conceptions of the corporate entity can sustain the recognition of corporate rights, and if 
so, on what basis. The chapter examines the relationship between rights and corporate 
personality with reference to the three theories which have customarily inhabited this 
space, namely corporate contract theory, corporate concession theory and corporate real 
entity theory. From a different perspective, the chapter examines whether the imposition 
of corporate criminal liability can contribute to an understanding of the nature of the 
corporate personality. Then, the chapter explores whether any intelligence can be derived 
from the judicial treatment of corporate rights in the United States, where corporate rights 
have been canvassed within the curtilage of constitutional rights.  
 
Traditional corporate law theories are challenged by the tension which emerges in the 
cases between recognising corporate rights based on corporate personhood on the one 
hand and utilising corporate personhood as a vehicle for the protection of individual 
rights on the other. It is axiomatic that recognition of a company’s rights cannot 
constitute a reflective image of individual rights, since certain rights – such as the right 
against torture guaranteed in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) – cannot be claimed by a corporate entity. The critique in this chapter makes 
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clear that traditional understandings of corporate personhood and corporate personality 
provide an insufficient platform on which a theory of corporate rights can be based. 
Whilst the existence of certain corporate rights (such as a right to property and a right to 
sue) are readily identifiable, in the absence of a thread which binds recognition of these 
rights, the basis on which a company can assert an entitlement lacks coherence and raises 
the risk of inconsistent outcomes. 
 
1.2.5 Chapter 6 (Moral conceptions of corporate rights)  
 
In this chapter, an alternative narrative for the formulation of corporate rights is 
presented. This narrative moves away from traditional notions of contract, concession, 
and real entity theories and delivers a coherent foundation for the recognition of 
corporate rights in a modern model which is fit for purpose. The declared intention is to 
provide a convincing basis for understanding why the law should extend its recognition 
of individual legal rights to a corporate person and enable a company to assert legal rights 
which facilitate the protection of its interests.  
 
The answer, it is suggested, lies in conceptions of value which flow from functions which 
companies perform. As a participant in the corporate sector, a successful trading 
company contributes to the strength of the economy. Companies are the vehicles through 
which economic growth is generated, and when the value of the beneficial contribution 
of each company is aggregated, the positive contribution of the corporate sector to the 
national economy is immense. In terms of individual value, a successful company 
provides value to its company’s officers and its employees by providing the means for 
their well-being. This approach posits that the State’s appreciation of value in the 
flourishing of the corporate sector is reflected in its recognition of corporate rights. The 
benefit from the preservation of a strong corporate sector, composed of a collection of 
successfully trading companies, redounds to the State. From this perspective, the State 
has a clear interest in facilitating the prospering of corporate activity. Moreover, if 
corporate rights are left unprotected by law, the standing of a company is undermined, 
and harmful consequences follow. The company has intrinsic value to its officers and 
employees, and it is this value, or interest, which an assertion of corporate rights defends. 
The argument is consequentialist, and by virtue of the value they deliver, the State should 




Although this narrative does not rest on the conception of a company as a moral agent, 
recognition that a company delivers benefits worthy of protection suggests that a 
company represents something more than an artificial legal construct through which 
business is conducted. In recent years, the increasing realisation of corporate personality 
has precipitated renewed academic interest in presenting a company as a moral agent, 
with implications for an understanding of the basis on which corporate rights can be 
founded. This represents a more controversial understanding of the notion of corporate 
personality, with an analysis which sees a company’s claim to assert rights as deriving 
from a company’s standing as a moral agent. The perceived status of a company as a 
moral agent provides a platform for the recognition of a basket of moral rights and 
catalyses a discussion about whether legal recognition should be afforded to some, or all, 
of these rights. An analysis of a corporate moral right through the prism of value assists 
in this determination. 
 
1.2.6 Chapter 7 (Corporate privilege)  
  
Having established a theoretical platform for the recognition of corporate rights, chapter 
7 addresses the fourth sub-question by asking whether a company’s ability to assert the 
privilege against self-incrimination should be recognised as one of these rights. 
 
The chapter advances a sound theoretical foundation for the recognition of a corporate 
right which is rooted in an acknowledgement of value which an assertion of the privilege 
against self-incrimination protects, viewed from the triple perspectives of the State, a 
company, and a company’s stakeholders. The chapter includes a critique of the judgments 
in the leading cases in common law jurisdictions where the ability of a company to assert 
the privilege has arisen. A study of the cases is interesting for three reasons. First, where 
a corporate right to assert the privilege is recognised, the cases illuminate the value of a 
company’s right to assert the privilege which the law is willing to protect. Secondly, in 
cases where a court has denied a company a right to assert the privilege, the outcome 
demonstrates the attendant risk of harmful consequences which flow for a company and 
its stakeholders. Thirdly, the critique reveals the sharply divergent judicial approaches in 
this area. The different views reflect the division between those who see a company as 
having an ontological existence, and those who view the corporate entity as no more than 
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an artificial legal construct lacking a moral component. The conflicting judgments bear 
out the concern that the absence of a coherent narrative leads to inconsistent decisions 
across jurisdictions in the orbit of the common law.  
 
Building upon the value-based analysis articulated in chapter 6, the problem of divergent 
outcomes is resolved if issues relating to the corporate ability to assert the privilege against 
self-incrimination is approached through a value-based analysis. The chapter argues that 
there is a sound basis for recognising that the privilege against self-incrimination falls into 
a basket of corporate rights which the law should acknowledge, within the terms of a 
modern morally based model focusing on the value which the exercise of a corporate 
assertion of the privilege protects. The chapter argues that a judicial approach which 
denies a company the ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination is 
misconceived, unfair and unsustainable. Where a corporate right to assert the privilege is 
recognised, a company can choose between exercising the right or making voluntary 
disclosure. The ability to make this choice reflects the company’s autonomy and its ability 
to determine how it should proceed. If the State denied a company’s right to assert the 
privilege, it would significantly damage a company’s standing and restrict its autonomy to 
act. 
 
1.2.7 Chapter 8 (Engaging the privilege) 
 
In chapter 8, the thesis addresses the fifth sub-question whether there is a sound theoretical 
basis for recognising the application of the privilege against self-incrimination to relieve 
a company from an obligation to make a mandatory self-report under section 330(1).  
 
To date, neither the legislature nor the judiciary have addressed the question, and the 
potential engagement between the privilege against self-incrimination and mandatory self-
reporting under the AML regime cannot be assumed. The chapter develops a sound 
narrative which supports this engagement and explains how the peril of criminal 
prosecution arises when a self-incriminating SAR is made. The niceties of the arguments 
are elegantly enlarged when the maker of a mandatory self-report is a corporate entity 
since the narrative in a SAR may incriminate both the company and its officers and 





The chapter contends that a corporate entity is entitled to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination in answer to the mandatory reporting requirement. As a preliminary step in 
the argument, the legislative purpose underlying the mandatory reporting requirement 
and its coercive elements are considered. Next, the chapter discusses the incriminating 
nature of the reporting process, and how a corporate reporter becomes exposed to 
possible, and on occasions, inevitable, self-incrimination. This is followed by a 
consideration of the factors militating strongly in favour of the law’s recognition of the 
privilege against self-incrimination. These factors demonstrate how, and why, the law 
recognises, and should recognise, an assertion of the privilege as a valid response to the 
mandatory reporting requirement. The counterarguments are reflected in a 
comprehensive discussion of the decision of the Supreme Court in Beghal v DPP3 and duly 
answered. Assuming the privilege against self-incrimination can be raised by a company 
in response to the mandatory reporting requirement, the mechanism by which the law 




The methodology of the thesis follows a classical model, developing the research in seven 
substantive chapters (chapters 2 to 8) covering distinct topics which combine to deliver 
a holistic consideration of the subject. These chapters are bracketed by introductory and 
concluding chapters. The introductory chapter (chapter 1) identifies the research question 
and sub-questions, and the concluding chapter (chapter 9) presents a summary response 
to the research questions which the thesis has posited, drawing together the conclusions 
developed in the preceding chapters. 
 
In terms of research method, the research is doctrinal, drawing on academic literature 
pertaining to the theorizing of criminal law, the privilege against self-incrimination and 
corporate rights. The legislative framework for mandatory self-reporting is illustrated by 
a review of some “hard law” and “soft law” sources. Although section 330(1) of POCA 
2002 also applies in Northern Ireland and Scotland, the focus of the research fixes on 
sources from England and Wales. Occasional references are made to international 
 
3 Beghal v DPP [2015] UKSC 49. 
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sources, either in support of an argument or to demonstrate a difference. Essentially, 
however, the thesis draws on the common law heritage of the tri-partite relationship 
between an individual, a corporate entity and the State which is firmly rooted in the 
jurisprudential physiology of England and Wales. 
 
Since the thesis focuses on the theorizing of criminal law, the privilege against self-
incrimination and corporate rights, an empirical exploration of the operational aspects of 
the mandatory self-reporting requirement has not been undertaken. Consideration of the 
theoretical issues raised in the thesis would not be advanced by an empirical study. 
Whatever the outcome of empirical work, whether it reveals there are numerous instances 
of corporate self-reporting or none, the theoretical challenges presented by the enactment 
of the mandatory self-reporting requirement remain extant. Assuming the privilege 
against self-incrimination is engaged in section 330(1), consideration of whether the 
application of the privilege should be abrogated or otherwise statutorily restricted by the 
legislature might be influenced by the outcome of an empirical study, but this is another 
matter. The thesis engages with the topic at a prior stage, focusing on whether the 




The scope of the research is narrow in the sense that it relates to companies, and not 
individuals, operating in the commercial sector in the UK, and their engagement with the 
AML regime in Part 7 of POCA 2002. These individuals and companies form part of 
“the regulated sector” to which the mandatory self-reporting requirement in section 
330(1) applies.4 The regulated sector is defined in Schedule 9 Part 1 of POCA 2002,5 as 
amended by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Business in the Regulated Sector and 
Supervisory Authorities) Order 2007.6 
 
Occasional references are made to jurisprudence in the United States where the term 
“corporation” is used. Typically, in the United States a corporation denotes a large 
 
4 POCA 2002, s 330(3) requires a disclosure to be made where suspicious information has become known 
‘in the course of a business in the regulated sector’. 
5 POCA 2002, s 330(12). 
6 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Business in the Regulated Sector and Supervisory Authorities) Order 
2007, SI 2007/3287, arts 1, 2. Amendments to the definition of the regulated sector are referenced in The 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/1511, reg 15. 
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company or group of companies, whereas in the United Kingdom the word 
“corporation” means any company of any size. In this thesis, the word “corporation” is 
employed in the British sense and is treated interchangeably with the word “company”. 
The words “shareholder” and “member” are used interchangeably to denote a person 
who holds a propriety interest in a company’s ownership.  
 
The word “stakeholder” is used generically to mean company directors, employees, 
shareholders, creditors, and debtors. More frequently, in the context of mandatory self-
reporting and the possibility of self-incrimination, company officers7 and employees are 
referenced.  
 
1.3.2 Other compulsory disclosure regimes 
 
The research is limited to the corporate application of the mandatory reporting 
requirement in section 330(1) of POCA 2002, and the thesis does not address whether 
the potential engagement of the privilege against self-incrimination with section 330(1) 
has broader implications for other disclosure regimes in the UK or elsewhere.8 
 
A review of these provisions would burden the thesis with an unnecessary consideration 
of differently worded legislation and the exercise has not been undertaken for this reason.9 
There are differences between the legislative objectives to be accomplished by 
compulsory disclosure regimes, the use to which disclosed information is put, the gravity 
of criminal exposure, and the evidential threshold for compulsory reporting which is 
applied. Also, there are differences in the category of persons to whom each reporting 
 
7 Companies Act 2006, s 1437 defines an “officer” of a company ‘as including a director, manager or 
(company) secretary …’. 
8 Mandatory reporting of suspicious information relating to terrorist property is required by the Terrorism 
Act 2000, ss 19, 21A, 38B and 39. Pursuant to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, 
delegated legislation can require professional and financial services providers to disclose knowledge or 
reasonable cause to suspect that there has been a breach of sanctions. The Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) 
Regulations 2019, SI 2019/792, reg 69(6) is an example. In Scotland, the Criminal Justice and Licensing 
(Scotland) Act 2010, s 31 criminalises the failure to report knowledge or suspicion that another person has 
committed an offence involving serious organised crime. In Ireland, under the Offences Against the State 
(Amendment) Act 1998, s 9(1), a person is guilty of an offence if he fails to disclose information which he 
knows or suspects will materially assist in the apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of another person 
for a serious offence, or in preventing the commission of such an offence. 
9 Additional reporting regimes may be established in due course. Luke Danagher has suggested the creation 
of a new offence of failing to report cartel activity, along the lines of the mandatory reporting requirement 
set out in the POCA 2002, s 330(1). See Luke Danagher, ‘Strict Liability and the Mens Rea of Cartel Crime’ 
[2020] Cr L R 789, 802. 
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requirement applies, the statutory language used in establishing the reporting 
requirement, and the extent to which exemptions and defences are acknowledged. In 
respect of each disclosure regime, a corporate ability to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination requires a discrete analysis. If a company is entitled to assert the privilege 
against self-incrimination in answer to the mandatory self-reporting requirement in 
section 330(1), it does not follow that an equivalent entitlement can be raised in response 
to a self-reporting requirement in a differently configured regime, and vice versa. For these 
reasons, this thesis does not travel beyond section 330(1) of POCA 2002 and the 
application of the UK’s AML reporting regime.  
 
The thesis does not make any assertion whether the engagement of the privilege against 
self-incrimination with the mandatory reporting requirement in section 330(1) is sui generis 
or not. 
 
1.3.3 Privilege against self-incrimination 
 
The burden of the thesis concentrates on the question whether a company can assert the 
privilege against self-incrimination in response to the mandatory reporting requirement 
contained in section 330(1) of POCA 2002. Although the narrative of a corporate self-
report may reference the criminal activities of a company’s officers and employees, the 
personal responsibility of a company’s officers and employees is not the focus of concern. 
The exposure of a company’s officers and employees may also arise in a case where a 
company makes a mandatory disclosure which is not self-incriminating, but nonetheless 
the narrative exposes the company’s officers and employees to criminal investigation and 
potential prosecution. It is not part of the thesis to argue that a company should be 
permitted, or required, to assert the privilege against self-incrimination to protect its 
officers or employees in these circumstances.  
 
Nor does the thesis address similar issues relating to the extent to which an individual 
may seek to assert the privilege where information incriminates an individual’s relative or 
friend.10  
 
10 In Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th edn, OUP 2010) 154–55, the authors 
questioned whether, in connection with the mandatory reporting requirement under the Terrorism Act 





These issues raise important questions concerning the place where the margins of the 
privilege against self-incrimination should be drawn. However, an exploration of the 
margins would distract attention from the central proposition in the thesis which argues 
that the privilege against self-incrimination is engaged where a company is required to 
make a mandatory report which is self-incriminating, in the strict sense of incriminating 
the company as a legal entity as opposed to officers or employees who represent it. The 
thesis is focused on a corporate right to assert the privilege, rather than any perceived 
right of an individual to demand that a company should act to protect their personal 
interests by asserting a claim to the privilege on their behalf. 
 
Further, the thesis resists a temptation to consider whether there are circumstances in 
which it is morally inappropriate for an individual or a company to assert the privilege 
against self-incrimination where there is a legal right to do so. Although these issues merit 
careful reflection, their consideration would distract from the core of the thesis and its 
concentration on the ability of a company to assert the privilege against self-incrimination 
as of right. 
 
Finally, in terms of methodology, the thesis has eschewed any consideration of the 
competing public interests which militate for and against the legislative abrogation of the 
privilege.  
 
In Chapter 4, contemporary judicial attitudes towards the continuing recognition of the 
privilege against self-incrimination are referenced. Similarly, in Chapter 7, circumstances 
in which the legislature has established a statutory framework for disclosure of 
information which abrogates the privilege against self-incrimination are considered. In 
these cases, the legislature has sought to strike a balance between the public interest in 
securing access to evidential material on the one hand, and balancing rule-of-law 
considerations such as privacy rights and the privilege against self-incrimination on the 
other. Whilst the competing public interests are acknowledged, they are not pertinent in 
the context of the thesis. There is no statutory abrogation or limitation of the privilege in 
section 330(1) of POCA. The sole question is whether the law should recognise a 
company’s entitlement to assert the privilege against self-incrimination at common law in 






The research has three aims. 
 
First, the research sets out to contribute to a developing understanding of the UK’s AML 
regime and its enforcement through the criminal law, with an especial concern to ensure 
that fundamental rights such as the privilege against self-incrimination are not 
compromised in an effort by the State to support the detection, investigation, and 
prosecution of financial crime. As an aside, the research highlights the increasing use of 
the criminal law to compel individual and corporate citizens to initiate the disclosure of 
information to law enforcement authorities giving rise to suspicious conduct, and its 
assimilation into an emerging theory of responsibility for omissions. 
 
Secondly, and integral to delivery of the first aim, the research seeks to show that multiple 
rationales support the privilege against self-incrimination and their application are not 
limited to the presentation of questions during legal proceedings or answering questions 
or producing documents in investigations under compulsion. The research aims to 
demonstrate that, notwithstanding some judicial scepticism over the place of the privilege 
against self-incrimination in a modern legal system, there is sound theoretical support for 
the contemporary application of the privilege where a corporate person is exposed under 
the UK’s AML legislation to criminal sanction for failing to divulge self-incriminating 
information.  
 
Thirdly, the research seeks to show that there is a strong conceptual foundation for the 
protection of corporate rights, to include the privilege against self-incrimination, which is 
materially strengthened when the corporate entity is perceived as a legal construct which 
delivers value to individuals as well as the State. The research sets out to establish that the 
law’s denial of a company’s claim to assert the privilege against self-incrimination in 
answer to the mandatory self-reporting requirement in section 330(1) of POCA 2002 
would be unfair and unjust and undermine a company’s autonomy to function.  
  
The thesis is innovative in its development of a coherent narrative which strongly 
supports the right of a company to assert the privilege against self-incrimination as a 
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shield in response to the mandatory self-reporting requirement in section 330(1) of 
POCA 2002. It is also innovative in its approach to the recognition of corporate rights 









The central theme of the thesis is that the law should recognise a corporate claim to assert 
the privilege against self-incrimination as a shield in response to the statutory obligation 
in section 330(1) of POCA 2002 requiring a company to report information to the State 
authorities which gives reasonable grounds to suspect the company (acting through its 
officers and employees) has been engaged in money laundering. Unless relieved by the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the law stipulates that a company must report 
knowledge or suspicion of its own criminal wrongdoing. The central question is whether 
the privilege against self-incrimination should be recognised as a shield to corporate 
mandatory self-reporting where money laundering is, or is suspected to be, taking place. 
 
The focus of this chapter is to establish the legal framework for the corporate self-
reporting of criminal conduct under the AML regime set out in Part 7 of POCA 2002. 
The legislation is complex, and a sharp distinction is drawn between voluntary self-
reporting of criminal activity and mandatory reporting. In addition to the detailed 
legislative provisions in Part 7 of POCA 2002, the chapter considers the mandatory self-
reporting requirement contextually, comparing and contrasting guidance on consensual 
corporate self-reporting by enforcement agencies and how corporate self-reporting 
operates, with outcomes involving a deferred prosecution agreement (known by its 
acronym, “DPA”) justified by reference to the public interest.  
 
In the first part of the chapter, the place of self-reporting in criminal and regulatory 
processes is reviewed. Requirements to self-report wrongdoing form a significant 
component of many professional regulatory regimes for individuals and companies alike. 
Moreover, in recent years, the practice of a company voluntarily self-reporting its 
involvement in unlawful activity has been integrated into the criminal justice system. 
Companies are incentivised to make reports disclosing self-incriminating information to 
the State authorities, and there is a strong perception that these arrangements promote 
the public interest in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of financial crime. An 
individual or company receives a lesser sanction for criminal wrongdoing as a reward for 
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co-operation, and the State authorities enjoy a reduction in investigative costs and the 
elimination of the risk-bearing element associated with a criminal trial.11 Plea negotiation 
and unforced confessions are also mechanisms by which self-incriminating statements 
enter the trial process. Under section 144 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a court is 
obliged to consider the fact that an offender has pleaded guilty when passing sentence. 
The Sentencing Guidelines make clear that the sentencing discount can be as much as 
one-third of the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed.12 In each of these 
instances, the self-incriminating admission is entirely voluntary.  
 
This form of voluntary self-reporting is different to the making of a mandatory report. 
The common characteristic is the disclosure of self-incriminating information, and cases 
can be envisaged where the making of a mandatory disclosure to one State authority (such 
as the NCA) may catalyse the submission of a voluntary disclosure to another organ of 
the State (such as the Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”)), but conceptually the two forms of 
reporting are inherently distinct. In law, voluntary self-reporting is an avowedly 
consensual activity, whereas mandatory self-reporting is unambiguously forced by 
imposition of law. The choice for a person legally obliged to self-report is binary, between 
obeying the law and breaking the law, at risk of penal sanction. In the absence of any 
circumstance which would excuse a failure to report, this is no choice at all. The public 
interest factors supporting voluntary self-reporting are also different from those which 
underpin the imposition of a mandatory disclosure requirement. In the case of voluntary 
self-reporting, the efficacy of the criminal process is the paramount consideration. The 
State authorities are concerned to ensure that the criminal justice system secures a desired 
result by encouraging those who break the law to address their offending behaviour and 
remediate. In the case of mandatory self-reporting, it is the ability of the State authorities 
to detect the commission of criminal activity which acts as the motivating determinant. 
Whilst the outcome is the same in both cases, the means by which it is achieved is quite 
different. 
 
The dichotomy between voluntary self-reporting and mandatory self-reporting is 
reflected in the framework which supports the UK’s AML regime. The framework is 
 
11 L Kaplow and S Shavell, ‘Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behaviour’ (1991) National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No 3822. 
12 Sentencing Council Guidelines, Overarching Guidelines, Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea 
 <www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/crown-court/> accessed 23 April 2021. 
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explored in the second part of this chapter, where the sharp distinction between voluntary 
reporting and mandatory reporting becomes apparent. The chapter demonstrates the 
width of the AML mandatory reporting requirement in section 330(1) and the exposure 
of companies to the possibility of reporting self-incriminating information.  
 
Accordingly, the chapter has two objectives. First, the chapter seeks to place mandatory 
self-reporting within the broader context of self-reporting in the criminal law. Secondly, 
the chapter seeks to critique the mechanisms for disclosure of self-incriminating 
information within the UK’s AML regime, and, in particularly, how a company can 
become exposed to the commission of a criminal offence where it fails to disclose 
information which is contrary to its interests. 
 
2.2 SELF-REPORTING  
 
2.2.1 Defining self-reporting 
 
The term “self-reporting” is not a technical phrase known to the legal lexicon. Rather, it 
is a phrase used in everyday language to describe a situation where a person makes a 
report in the form of a descriptive account of some particular matter to a third person 
and the substance of the account relates to the person who is making the report. It is the 
application of the reflexive pronoun which serves to identify the reporter as the subject 
of the account. 
 
In recent years, the UK has moved in the direction of imposing self-reporting obligations 
in certain situations.13 In some cases, the reporting obligation is derived from a “hard law” 
requirement in the sense that its origin is to be found in primary or secondary legislation, 
whereas in other cases the reporting obligation is a “soft law” requirement associated with 
the regulatory process. Invariably a “hard law” reporting obligation is supported by a 
criminal sanction whereas breach of a “soft law” reporting requirement triggers regulatory 
enforcement action, typically some form of disciplinary process resulting in the 
imposition of a civil penalty or other non-custodial measure.  
 
13 M Hall, ‘An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: Banks, Money Laundering, and the Suspicious 
Activity Report’ (1995–96) 84 Ky L J 643; Sandra Guerra Thompson, ‘The White-Collar Police Force: Duty 




An example of a “hard law” reporting obligation is found in the context of health and 
safety at work, under regulation 3(1) of the Reporting of Injuries, Disease and Dangerous 
Occurrences Regulations 1995,14 now replaced by Schedule 1 of the Reporting of Injuries, 
Disease and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013.15 Pursuant to this provision, 
Parliament has required an employer to report to the State authorities every occasion 
where a person died or suffered a major injury as a result of an accident arising out of or 
in connection with work. Failure to make a report constitutes a criminal offence contrary 
to section 33(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Parliament established a 
similar criminal offence in the Chemical Weapons (Notification) Regulations 199616 made 
under the Chemical Weapons Act 1996, where a company produces a listed chemical 
without obtaining prior authorisation. Another “hard law” example, mentioned in 
Chapter 1, is contained in legislation governing the imposition of financial sanctions. As 
already noted, Parliament has imposed a mandatory self-reporting obligation on a 
financial institution to inform the relevant law enforcement authority where it knows, or 
has reasonable grounds to suspect, that a natural or corporate person has committed a 
breach of financial sanctions.  
 
The provision of financial services is regulated by a combination of “hard law” and “soft 
law” provisions, with soft law requirements for self-reporting market irregularities. 
Sections 64 and 65 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 empower the Financial 
Conduct Authority (“FCA”) to issue a Code of Practice for the purpose of determining 
whether or not a person’s conduct complies with the statement of principle to which the 
FCA requires an approved person to adhere. Breach of a statement of principle triggers 
exposure to disciplinary action against an approved person for misconduct resulting in 
the imposition of a fine. The mandatory reporting obligation is foreshadowed in Principle 
2.11 of the FCA’s Principles for Business which requires an approved person to deal with 
its regulator in an open and co-operative way, and to disclose anything relating to the firm 
of which the regulator would reasonably expect notice.17  
 
 
14 Reporting of Injuries, Disease and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995, SI 1995/3163. 
15 Reporting of Injuries, Disease and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1471. 
16 Chemical Weapons (Notification) Regulations 1996, SI 1996/2503. 
17 FCA Handbook, 2018, PRIN 2.1 <www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook> accessed 27 July 2020.  
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Section 15 of the FCA’s Supervision Sourcebook offers more specific guidance on the 
reporting requirements as they apply to both individuals and firms. Paragraph 15.3.1 
requires an authorised firm to notify the appropriate regulator immediately it becomes 
aware of information which (amongst other things) reasonably suggests that it could have 
a significant adverse impact on the firm's reputation or could result in serious financial 
consequences to the UK financial system or to other firms. Paragraphs 15.3.8 provides 
further guidance on the types of matters which need to be reported to the FCA in 
accordance with the mandatory obligation established in Principle 2.11. These matters 
include, but are not limited to, giving the appropriate regulator notice of any significant 
failure in the firm's systems or controls, including those reported to the firm by the firm's 
auditor.  
 
Additional provisions contain guidance on the types of matters which need to be reported 
to the FCA. These embrace notification by a firm of a significant breach of a regulatory 
rule, breach of any requirement imposed by statute, awareness that an employee may have 
committed a fraud against one of its customers or a fraud against it,  the identification of 
any irregularities in its accounting or other records, whether or not there is evidence of 
fraud, and also where it suspects that one of its employees may be guilty of serious 
misconduct concerning his honesty or integrity and which is connected with the firm's 
regulated activities or ancillary activities.18 There is special provision where an investment 
firm or credit institution suspects transactions relating to market abuse. A mandatory 
report must be made to the regulator where are reasonable grounds to suspect that a 
transaction might constitute market abuse, with the firm or institution examining each 
transaction on a case-by-case basis.19 In these instances, the mandatory report may 
incriminate the firm as well as its employees. 
 
The law is replete with self-reporting “soft law” regulatory regimes. Another illustration 
of a “soft law” self-reporting requirement is the requirement in the National Health 
Service (NHS) Commissioning Board Standard Contract for 2020–21 where the 
Government has included a mandatory reporting requirement on all NHS and non-NHS 
providers of services to NHS patients to comply with an expanded duty of candour. The 
mandatory requirement is found in regulation 20 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 
 
18 FCA Handbook, 2018, SUP 15.3.11 and SUP 15.3.17. 
19 FCA Handbook, 2016, SUP 15.10. 
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(Regulated Activities) Regulations 201420 which requires a service provider to report to 
the regulator, amongst others, where a patient safety incident has occurred. Similarly, a 
barrister is obliged to self-report to his relevant regulatory body any circumstances in 
which he has been guilty of serious professional misconduct.21  
 
The fact that an individual or a company is required to make a self-report to a regulatory 
authority does not necessarily carry the implication that the maker of the report has 
committed a criminal offence. The level of culpability admitted by the maker of a self-
report depends on a series of variables, such as the nature and extent of the reporting 
requirement, as well as any nuanced language which the reporter may choose to use. 
Although there will be some cases where the content of the report has an inculpatory 
dimension for the reporter, to the point where the content amounts to an admission of 
criminal wrongdoing on the part of the reporter, this form of self-report is distinguishable 
from a written confession or the entering of a plea of guilty when charged with a criminal 
offence.  
 
Whilst conceptually it is uncontroversial to posit that a confession may be made 
voluntarily and without prompting, invariably a written confession is made in response 
to an accusation presented by a third party, typically an officer of the State, that a person 
has committed a criminal offence. By the time an accusation is made, an investigation will 
have revealed the existence of reasonable grounds for suspecting that the accused has 
committed a criminal offence, and the purpose of the accusation is to seek the accused’s 
response to it. As for a plea of guilty, this represents no more than a direct response to 
an allegation of criminal conduct put to an accused by a Court after a prosecutor has 
initiated the criminal process against him. In these respects, making a written confession 
and entering a plea of guilty contrast sharply with the making of a self-report following 
discovery of the existence of certain facts and not in response to an accusation. The role 
played by self-reporting is different. A self-report will often pre-date any external 
knowledge of an irregularity or wrongdoing, and the maker of the self-report will have 




20 Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2936. 
21 Bar Standards Board Handbook (2020, Version 4.4) r C65.7. 
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2.2.2 Incentivising corporate self-reporting 
 
Any review of the landscape for self-reporting of criminal conduct would not be complete 
without an appreciation of the encouragement afforded by the State to a company to 
make voluntary confession of its criminal wrongdoing. 
 
During the last sixty years, the Commissioners of Inland Revenue have been the most 
pervasive users of this approach, dating back to the practice which came to be known as 
“the Hansard Statement” (or “reading Hansard”) where the Commissioners would offer 
taxpayers suspected of committing fraud an opportunity to settle their outstanding 
liabilities and penalties without criminal prosecution in return for a full confession of 
previous wrongdoing. The language of the Hansard statement, which was drawn from a 
commitment given to Parliament in 1944 by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir 
John Anderson, was unmistakably clear: 
 
[T]he Commissioners have a general power under which they can accept 
pecuniary settlements instead of instituting criminal proceedings in respect of 
fraud or wilful default alleged to have been committed by a taxpayer. They can, 
however, give no undertaking to a taxpayer in any such case that they will accept 
a settlement and refrain from instituting criminal proceedings even if the case is 
one in which the taxpayer has made full confession and has given full facilities for 
investigation of the facts. They reserve to themselves discretion in all cases as to 
the course they will pursue, but it is their practice to be influenced by the fact that 
the taxpayer has made a full confession and has given full facilities for 
investigation into his affairs and for examination of such books, papers, 
documents or information as the Commissioners may consider necessary.22  
 
Today, HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”) offers a similar arrangement. The scheme is 
known as Code of Practice 9 and the Contractual Disclosure Facility.23 HMRC invites a 
taxpayer to admit to committing tax fraud, in return for which HMRC agrees not to 
criminally investigate and prosecute the taxpayer for the fraud he discloses in the 
Contractual Disclosure Facility contract. HMRC also offer several “disclosure facilities” 
 
22 HC Deb 6 July 1944, vol 401, col 1313. 
23 HMRC, Code of Practice 9 ‘HM Revenue & Customs investigations where we suspect tax fraud’ (06/14).  
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which enable a taxpayer to voluntarily disclose hidden assets with a view to making a 
financial settlement of outstanding tax liabilities and penalties with extremely limited 
exposure to criminal prosecution. HMRC makes clear that whilst it retains the right to 
pursue a criminal investigation in cases of tax fraud, “If you make a full disclosure of your 
deliberate conduct, we will not pursue a criminal investigation with a view to 
prosecution.”24  
 
The investigation and prosecution of cartels is another long-established instance of a 
prohibited economic activity where corporate self-reporting has been handsomely 
rewarded by the State. Leniency programmes are a major component of almost all anti-
cartel regimes internationally, and the UK is no exception. In March 2014, the 
Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) published guidance which indicated that it 
would offer automatic immunity to the first business cartel member who came forward 
with information relating to an infringement would be granted total immunity from 
criminal prosecution and payment of fines.25  
 
Today, the most influential self-reporting guidance for companies emanates from the 
SFO. Current guidance issued by the SFO indicates that a voluntary self-report of 
corporate wrongdoing will be “taken into consideration as a public interest factor tending 
against prosecution” where it forms part of a “genuinely proactive approach adopted by 
the corporate management team when the offending is brought to their notice.”26 
Voluntary corporate self-reporting is also highly influential when deciding whether the 
SFO should enter into a DPA with a company. The guidance makes clear that “a company 
would only be invited to enter … negotiations if there [is] full cooperation with [the 
SFO’s] investigations”.27 Under a DPA, the pursuit of criminal proceedings is suspended 
where a company agrees to abide by various terms and conditions which involve, amongst 
other things, payment of a large fine and corporate remediation.28  
 
24 ibid 2. 
25 CMA Guidance, ‘Cartels: Come Forward and Apply for Leniency’ (March 2014) 
<www.gov.uk/guidance/cartels-confess-and-apply-for-leniency> accessed 6 July 2020. 
26 Serious Fraud Office, ‘Corporate self-reporting’ (October 2012) 
<www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-protocols/corporate-self-reporting/> accessed 6 
July 2020.  
27 Serious Fraud Office, ‘Deferred Prosecution Agreements’ (undated) 
<www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-protocols/deferred-prosecution-agreements/> 
accessed 6 July 2020. 




In each case, a corporate entity cooperates with the State by abandoning any claim to 
assert the privilege against self-incrimination, in return for a significantly increased chance 
that its confession to corporate wrongdoing will result in a more lenient outcome. A 
company is heavily incentivised to confess to its wrongdoing by the offer of a reward, 
sustained by the justification that the public interest is best served by this disposal. The 
SFO is required to apply to the Crown Court for a declaration that the making of the 
DPA “is likely to be in the interests of justice”.29 In practice, the Crown Court has little 
difficulty in concluding that this threshold has been crossed. First, as a result of self-
reporting, the existence of corporate criminality has been exposed. Secondly, due to the 
making of a DPA, the high cost of an expensive criminal investigation and trial will have 
been avoided. Thirdly, the SFO has certainty of outcome and the State benefits from 
payment of a punitive fine. Fourthly, the miscreant company is compelled to remediate.  
As Sir Brian Leveson PC explained in the first case in the UK where a DPA was made 
between the SFO and Standard Bank: 
 
It is obviously in the interests of justice that the SFO has been able to investigate 
the circumstances in which a UK registered bank acquiesced in an arrangement 
(however unwittingly) which had many hallmarks of bribery on a large scale and 
which both could and should have been prevented. Neither should it be thought 
that, in the hope of getting away with it, Standard Bank would have been better 
served by taking a course which did not involve self-report, investigation and 
provisional agreement to a DPA with the substantial compliance requirements 
and financial implications that follow. For my part, I have no doubt that Standard 
Bank has far better served its shareholders, its customers, and its employees (as 
well as all those with whom it deals) by demonstrating its recognition of its serious 
failings and its determination in the future to adhere to the highest standards of 
banking. Such an approach can itself go a long way to repairing and, ultimately, 
enhancing its reputation and, in consequence, its business. It can also serve to 
underline the enormous importance which is rightly attached to the culture of 
 
29 ibid para 7(1). 
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compliance with the highest ethical standards that is so essential to banking in 
this country.30 
 
The development of this form of negotiated justice for the resolution of corporate crime 
cases has its critics, and anxieties have been voiced whether criminal justice is 
accomplished in this way. One key concern is whether there is differential justice in terms 
of equality and fairness in the treatment between wrongdoing committed by an individual 
and criminal activity committed by a company.31 A consideration of these issues falls 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to note that in any consideration of mandatory 
reporting under the AML regime, the contemporary incentivisation of a company to 
voluntarily self-report its criminal wrongdoing forms part of the wider narrative when 
assessing the place of mandatory self-reporting as an enforcement tool. 
 
2.3 ORIGIN OF MANDATORY REPORTING 
 
2.3.1 UK  
 
The voluntary reporting mechanism in the AML legislation was first introduced into the 
UK in 1986 and it applied where a person knew or suspected that another person was 
handling the proceeds of drug trafficking. Under section 24(1) of the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986, it became a criminal offence to assist another person (A) to retain the 
proceeds of drug trafficking, knowing, or suspecting that A is a person who carries on or 
has carried on drug trafficking or has benefited from drug trafficking. The offence was 
punishable by a maximum of fourteen years imprisonment on indictment. Section 
24(3)(b) contained a statutory defence which applied where a person disclosed to a State 
authority that he knew or suspected the monies were derived from drug trafficking. Under 
this legislation, there was no mandatory reporting requirement. Instead, reporting of 
knowledge or suspicion was utilised as an incentive to insulate a person against the 
criminal consequences of handling property where he knew or suspected it represented 
the proceeds of drug trafficking. The impact of the money laundering offence in section 
 
30 Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank plc, Case No U20150854 (Southwark Crown Court, 30 November 
2015) [66]. 
31 C King and N Lord, Negotiated Justice and Corporate Crime (Palgrave Macmillan 2018). 
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24 was limited since it applied only to knowledge or suspicion of drug trafficking and no 
other criminal activity. 
 
The position changed seven years later when sections 29 to 31 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1993 inserted three money laundering offences into section 93 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1988, namely, sections 93A, 93B and 93C. In each case, by virtue of section 93A(7) the 
money laundering offences were expressed to apply to the proceeds of criminal conduct 
“which constituted an offence to which this Part of this Act applies or would constitute 
such an offence if it had occurred in England and Wales or (as the case may be) in 
Scotland”. The criminal offences to which this Part of the Act applied were referenced in 
section 71(9)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 which specified that this Part of the Act 
applied to all indictable offences with the exception of drug trafficking and terrorism 
offences, and the offences listed in Schedule 4 to the Act, such as copyright and social 
security offences. In this way, money laundering offences were extended to cover not 
only the proceeds of drug trafficking, which were contained in the drug trafficking 
legislation, but also the proceeds of other serious criminal conduct such as fraud and 
corruption.  However, there was no mandatory reporting requirement for suspected 
money laundering in the early drug-trafficking legislation. 
 
Mandatory reporting was introduced in 1993 when section 18 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1993 was enacted. This section inserted a new section 26B into the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986 introducing for the first time a mandatory reporting requirement, the 
breach of which constituted a criminal offence punishable by a maximum of five years 
imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. The statutory rubric for section 26B(1) described 
the offence as “Failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering”. This 
provision remained in force for ten months between 1st April 1994 and 2nd February 
1995, when it was superseded in identical terms by section 52(1) of the Drug Trafficking 
Act 1994. There are two aspects to note about the mandatory reporting requirement in 
these statutory provisions. First, the mandatory reporting offence applied only where a 
person suspected that another person was laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking. In 
this sense, the legislation was asymmetrical since although there were separate money 
laundering offences for drug-trafficking and serious criminal conduct, the mandatory 
reporting provision applied only to the proceeds of drug-trafficking. Secondly, the 
reporting requirement was triggered by a person’s knowledge or suspicion that another 
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person was engaged in money laundering. The test was subjective, and there was no 
suggestion that a person would be guilty of the criminal offence of failing to report where 
he did not know or suspect money laundering but there were, objectively speaking, 
reasonable grounds for such suspicion. 
 
The introduction of mandatory reporting in the money laundering legislation was 
introduced into Parliament on a false prospectus. When the provision establishing 
mandatory reporting of drug money laundering was introduced into the House of Lords 
for its second reading on 3rd November 1992, the Minister of State for the Home Office, 
Earl Ferrers, made clear that clause 18 of the then Criminal Justice Bill had to be included 
in order to ensure that the UK fully implemented the requirements of the European 
Council on Money Laundering which had been agreed in 1990.32  In fact, this was not 
correct. What the European Council Directive on Money Laundering33 required was an 
administrative provision which established mandatory reporting. There is nothing in the 
Directive to suggest that a failure to report should constitute a criminal offence, and this 
remains the position in subsequent Directives. But more to the point, Earl Ferrers 
devalued the difference between voluntary reporting to avoid the commission of a money 
laundering offence, and mandatory reporting as a free-standing obligation. When winding 
up the debate for the Government, Earl Ferrers addressed a point made by Lord Nelson, 
saying:  
 
My noble friend also asked whether the reporting of suspicious transactions had 
to be mandatory. Institutions disclose information to protect themselves from 
existing money laundering offences. Only a small change is necessary to meet the 
terms of the Directive; in other words, to introduce a special offence of failing to 
disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering.34  
 
In actuality, the change from permissive reporting to mandatory reporting of money 
laundering suspicions could hardly be described as “only a small change”. On the 
contrary, there is a huge difference between voluntary reporting and mandatory reporting. 
With reference to any proper understanding of criminal law, the change was seismic. 
 
32 HL Deb 3 November 1992, vol 539, cols 1347–88.  
33 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purpose of money laundering [1991] OJ L166/77. 




2.3.2 Financial Action Task Force  
 
The origin of a mandatory reporting requirement can be traced to the establishment in 
July 1989 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) when the G7 leaders (United States, 
Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada) and the President of the 
European Commission met in Paris to discuss the threat which money laundering posed 
to the international banking system. This was followed in May 1990 by the FATF’s 
publication of a comprehensive programme of Forty Recommendations to fight money 
laundering.35 These Recommendations included the provision of a gateway for financial 
institutions to make a disclosure to an enforcement authority in circumstances where 
suspicious activity involving the proceeds of criminal conduct was suspected. At the 
outset in 1990, the FATF members could not agree between themselves as to the 
circumstances which should trigger a reporting requirement. The United States was keen 
to build upon its domestic system which required mandatory reporting of all currency 
transactions above a certain monetary threshold. However, most countries opposed the 
bluntness of this approach and instead argued for a suspicion-based system which would 
be more cost-effective and expose fewer citizens to the scrutiny of the law enforcement 
authorities.36. The Forty Recommendations were revised in 1996 when the reporting 
gateway was upgraded from a discretionary recommendation to a mandatory reporting 
requirement after the FATF concluded that some financial institutions were using the 
absence of compulsion as an excuse for ignoring suspicious behaviour.37 Reflecting the 
change, Recommendation 15 stated that “If financial institutions suspect that funds stem 
from a criminal activity, they should be required to report promptly their suspicions to 
the competent authorities”.38  
 
There were further revisions to the Forty Recommendations in 2003 and 2012, and today 
the mandatory reporting requirement is found in Recommendation 20.39 The 
Interpretative Note to Recommendation 20 advises the international community that the 
 
35 FATF, ‘Annual Report 1990–91’ (Paris 13 May 1991) 4. 
36 Guy Stressens, Money Laundering, A New International Law Enforcement Model (CUP 2000) 97–98, 161–62; S 
Mortman, ‘Putting Starch in European Efforts to Combat Money Laundering’ (1992) 60 Fordham L. Rev. 
S429, fn 55. 
37 FATF, ‘Annual Report 1995–96’ (Paris 28 June 1996) Annex 1, p 7. 
38 ibid Annex 1, p 26. 
39 FATF Recommendations, ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and The Financing 
of Terrorism & Proliferation’ (February 2012, updated June 2019). 
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reporting requirement must be a direct mandatory obligation. An indirect reporting 
requirement, where a report is made voluntarily to avoid prosecution for the commission 
of a money laundering offence, is not sufficient to satisfy the FATF Recommendation. 40 
 
Significantly, the FATF Recommendations remain silent as to how the mandatory 
obligation to report suspicion of money laundering is to be enforced. There is nothing to 
suggest that an administrative or regulatory requirement would not be sufficient, 
providing that the reporting was obligatory and not voluntary. The requirement to enact 
criminal offences are confined to offences relating to the handling of criminally obtained 
monies and not a failure to report a money laundering suspicion.41 Rather, discussion 
focused on the nature of serious criminal offences to be treated as predicate offences for 
the purpose of the money laundering offence. 
 
2.3.3 European Union Directives 
 
The European Union (“EU”) was alive to the important place of mandatory reporting in 
the anti-laundering regime when enacting the EU Directive on Money Laundering in June 
1991.42 The Recitals foreshadowed that the Directive would “institute a mandatory system 
of reporting suspicious transactions which ensure[d] that information [wa]s transmitted 
to the … authorities without alerting the customers concerned …”.43 More particularly, 
Article 6 required member States to ensure that financial institutions and their directors 
and employees cooperated fully with the authorities responsible for combating money 
laundering “by informing those authorities, on their own initiative, of any fact which 
might be an indication of money laundering”. However, the Directive was not 
prescriptive about the way in which the new mandatory system was to be enforced. The 
Recitals included a reference to combating money laundering “mainly by penal means”,44 
and applying the guidance set out in Recommendation 3 of the FATF Recommendations, 
Article 2 required member States to ensure that “money laundering as defined in this 
Directive is prohibited”. However, in so far as other requirements such as the reporting 
obligation were concerned, Article 14 left the matter open, requiring no more than each 
 
40 FATF Recommendations (2012) Interpretive Note 20(4), 80. 
41 FATF Recommendations (2012) Recommendation 3 and Interpretive Note 3, 32–33. 
42 Council Directive 91/308/EEC (n 33). 
43 ibid Recital 15. 
44 ibid Recital 3. 
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member State to “take appropriate measures to ensure full application of all the 
provisions of this Directive” and to “determine the penalties to be applied for 
infringement of the measures adopted pursuant to this Directive”.  
 
The EU has maintained this position in subsequent Directives. Article 1(2) of the Fourth 
Directive on Money Laundering agreed in 2015 simply provides that “Member States 
shall ensure that money laundering and terrorist financing are prohibited”.45 There is no 
provision for criminalising a failure to report suspected money laundering in the Sixth 
Directive on Money Laundering,46 which is the most recent Directive. Instead, as Article 
1 makes clear, the Directive establishes minimum rules for defining criminal offences and 
identifying predicate offences for money laundering which will be uniform across 
member States. 
 
Several EU member States have established an administrative and not a criminal sanction 
where a person fails to report a suspicion of money laundering to the enforcement 
authorities. In Belgium, criminal offences are triggered only where a person commits a 
substantive money laundering offence which involves the handling of the proceeds of 
crime. Where a person fails to report a suspicion of money laundering but does not 
commit a substantive money laundering offence, the enforcement authorities may impose 
an administrative fine of anywhere between Euro 250 and Euro 1,250,000.47 A similar 
position pertains in Italy, where a failure to notify a suspicious transaction to the 
competent authority is punishable by an administrative fine ranging between 1% and 40% 
of the value of the relevant transaction.48 In France, whereas substantive money 
laundering offences have been inserted into the Criminal Code, the reporting of 
suspicious transactions is required pursuant to the Monetary and Financial Code, which 
is an administrative code.49 In Germany also, the substantive money laundering offences 
 
45 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing 
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 
2006/70/EC [2015] OJ L141/73. 
46 Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on 
combating money laundering by criminal law [2018] OJ L285/22.  
47 Berger & Anckaert, ‘Belgium’ in Srivistava, Simpson & Moffatt (eds), International Guide to Money Laundering 
Law and Practice (4th edn, Bloomsbury 2013) 468. 
48 Fornari & Borsani, ‘Italy’ in Srivistava, Simpson & Moffatt (eds), International Guide to Money Laundering 
Law and Practice (4th edn, Bloomsbury 2013) 922. 
49 Freedman, ‘France’ in Srivistava, Simpson & Moffatt (eds), International Guide to Money Laundering Law and 
Practice (4th edn, Bloomsbury 2013) 613, 618, 628–29. 
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are found in the Criminal Code. The reporting obligation is found in the Anti-Money 
Laundering Act, in respect of which violation constitutes a regulatory offence punishable 
by an administrative fine of up to Euro 100,000.50 In Spain, the substantive money 
laundering offences are included in the Criminal Code as a form of receiving stolen goods, 
contrasting with a breach of the reporting requirement which is classified as a very serious 
regulatory infringement punishable by a fine of between Euro 150,000 and a maximum 
fine of 5% of an entity’s equity, or double the amount of the transaction, or Euro 1.5 
million, whichever is the greatest.51 
 
Compared with these European jurisdictions, a sentence of imprisonment for a maximum 
period of five years for committing the “failure to report” offence in section 330(1) of 
POCA 2002 is a disproportionate legislative response.  
 




The current UK law on money laundering offences is to be found in Part 7 of POCA 
2002. The new legislation was foreshadowed in a Cabinet Office report which 
recommended the alignment of drugs and non-drugs money laundering offences.52 The 
Cabinet Office also recommended that the use of disclosures needed to be improved, 
noting that at the time of its report there was no requirement to make an “all crime” 
disclosure.53 The Government endorsed the Cabinet Office’s approach and decided to 
introduce an “all crime” mandatory reporting requirement applying to all persons working 
in the financial, or more accurately, the regulated, sector.54 Also, the obligation would be 
triggered not only where a person subjectively knows or suspects money laundering, but 
where, objectively, there are reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting that another 
person is engaged in money laundering.55 These significant changes were introduced in 
 
50 Lorenz, ‘Germany’ in Srivistava, Simpson & Moffatt (eds), International Guide to Money Laundering Law and 
Practice (4th edn, Bloomsbury 2013) 663, 669. 
51 Rubio & Olivares, ‘Spain’ in Srivistava, Simpson & Moffatt (eds), International Guide to Money Laundering 
Law and Practice (4th edn, Bloomsbury 2013) 1202, 1212–13. 
52 Cabinet Office, ‘Performance and Innovation Unit Report: Recovering the Proceeds of Crime’ (June 
2000) para 9.62. 
53 ibid para 9.12. 
54 Home Office, Proceeds of Crime Bill, Publication of Draft Clauses (CM 5066, 2001) para 8.5. 
55 ibid para 8.6. 
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Part 7 of POCA 2002, and the new legislation was implemented on 24 February 2003 
pursuant to article 3 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Commencement No.4, 
Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2003.56 
 
With reference to the issue of reporting a money laundering suspicion, there are two 
reporting avenues set out in Part 7 of POCA 2002. The first avenue involves the making 
of an “authorised disclosure”. Although the failure to make an authorised disclosure may 
render a person liable for the commission of a money laundering offence, the making of 
an authorised disclosure is not mandatory. The legislation nudges a person into making a 
disclosure to the State authorities of the suspected handling of criminal property, but the 
disclosure is not compelled. This contrasts with the second reporting avenue, where a 
failure to make a SAR constitutes the commission of a criminal offence, irrespective of 
whether an act of money laundering is taking place. The obligation to make a SAR is 
mandatory, and subject to certain exemptions involving suspicious information covered 
by legal privilege and reasonable excuse, criminal liability ensues if the disclosure is not 
made. 
 
2.4.2 Voluntary reporting 
 
Referencing the provisions for voluntary disclosure in the AML regime, the starting point 
is the prohibitions set out in sections 327(1), 328(1) and 329(1) of POCA 2002 which 
specify the acts of money laundering that constitute criminal offences under the Act. The 
prohibited acts described in these sections are widely configured. They embrace 
laundering by a third party who was not involved in the commission of the predicate 
offence, as well as the “self-laundering” of criminal property where the laundering – i.e., 
the prohibited act – is performed by the same person who committed the predicate 
offence. The inclusion of self-laundering within the scope of money laundering offences 
accords with international standards. Paragraph 6 of the Interpretive Note to 
Recommendation 3 of the FATF Recommendations contemplates that the definition of 
money laundering offences may be sufficiently broad to encompass self-laundering of 
criminal property, whilst recognising that “some countries may provide that the offence 
of money laundering does not apply to persons who committed the predicate offence, 
 




where this is required by fundamental principles of their domestic law”.57 This is not the 
position in the UK where it is well established that in appropriate cases a person may be 
prosecuted for the commission of the predicate offence as well as laundering the proceeds 
of the offence which he has committed.58 
 
Section 327(1) prohibits a person from concealing, disguising, converting, or transferring 
criminal property, or removing criminal property from the jurisdiction. An act of 
conversion is construed broadly and connotes dealing with property, such as paying 
money, or withdrawing money from, a bank account.59 Section 328(1) is a broader 
prohibition and captures the entering into or becoming concerned in an arrangement 
which facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of another person’s criminal 
property. “An arrangement” embraces some form of specific conduct which assists a 
third party in his efforts to launder money.60 The third offence in section 329(1) is wider 
still in its application. It prohibits a person from acquiring, using, or possessing criminal 
property. As a self-launderer, a thief obtains an interest in property he stole since, at the 
time of stealing the property, he claims a possessory interest in it.61 If any of the money 
laundering offences are committed, a person is subject to a maximum sentence of 
fourteen years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine.62 Money laundering is defined in 
section 340(11) of POCA 2002 to mean an act which constitutes a criminal offence under 
sections 327, 328, or 329, as well as any act which constitutes an attempt, conspiracy or 
incitement to commit one of these offences, or the aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring the commission of such an offence. 
 
The common thread running through the money laundering offences is the notion of 
criminal property which is defined as property that “(a) constitutes a person’s benefit 
from criminal conduct or … represents such a benefit (in whole or part and whether 
directly or indirectly), and (b) the alleged offender knows or suspects that it constitutes 
or represents such a benefit”.63 “Criminal conduct” is conduct “which (a) constitutes an 
offence in any part of the United Kingdom, or (b) would constitute an offence in any part 
 
57 FATF (n 41). 
58 CPS, ‘Legal Guidance, Money Laundering Offences’ (updated 1 March 2018) <www.cps.gov.uk/legal-
guidance/proceeds-crime-act-2002-part-7-money-laundering-offences> accessed 20 July 2020. 
59 R v Fazal [2009] EWCA Crim 1697. 
60 CPS v Dare [2012] EWHC 2074 (Admin). 
61 R v Rose; R v Whitwam [2008] 1 WLR 2113. 
62 POCA 2002, s 334(1)(b). 
63 ibid s 340(3). 
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of the United Kingdom if it occurred there”.64 This latter provision expands the reach of 
the money laundering offences to include property which derives from conduct 
committed lawfully abroad, but where the conduct if transposed to the UK, would be 
unlawful. An obvious example is the case of a company which receives sales from a 
contract obtained through payment of a bribe made in a country where private sector 
bribery is not illegal. However, the conduct would be captured by the extra-territorial 
reach of sections 1 and 12 of the Bribery Act 2010.  
 
Where an offence of money laundering is alleged, in addition to proving performance of 
the prohibited act, a prosecutor must establish two elements. First, a prosecutor must 
show that the property involved in the prohibited act represented the benefit from 
criminal conduct.65 Secondly, a prosecutor must establish that the defendant knew or 
suspected this was the case.66 The type of criminal offence which constituted the predicate 
offence and gave rise to the existence of criminal property does not need to be shown. It 
is sufficient for a prosecutor to show that criminal property was derived from conduct of 
a specific kind, or circumstantially there is an irresistible inference that the property must 
have been derived from criminal activity.67 There is further guidance for a prosecutor in 
section 340(4) of POCA 2002. This provides that for the purpose of committing the 
money laundering offences, “[I]t is immaterial (a) who carried out the conduct; (b) who 
benefitted from it; (c) whether the conduct occurred before or after the passing of this 
Act”. Finally, in noting the expansive application of the money laundering offences, the 
threshold test for the formation of suspicion or reasonable grounds for suspicion is the 
recognition of a possibility which is more than fanciful that the property consists in whole 
or in part of a person’s benefit from criminal conduct.68 This is a low threshold in terms 
of the mental state which must be established.  
  
In respect of each offence, a person is exempted from criminal liability where he makes 
an “authorised disclosure” externally to the State authorities or internally within his 
organisation to a nominated officer, and the State authorities or internal nominated 
officer grant “appropriate consent” to the commission of the prohibited act in question.69 
 
64 ibid s 340(2). 
65 R v Montila [2004] UKHL 50; R v GH [2015] UKSC 24. 
66 R v Saik [2006] UKHL 18. 
67 R v Anwoir [2008] EWCA Crim 1354. 
68 R v Da Silva [2007] 1 WLR 303. 
69 POCA 2002, ss 327(2)(a), 328(2)(a), 329(2)(a). 
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The meaning of an “authorised disclosure” is given in section 338. To constitute an 
“authorised disclosure”, it is sufficient for a person to disclose that the property involved 
in the prohibited act is criminal property.70 By section 338(5), a disclosure to a nominated 
officer is a disclosure to a person nominated by the discloser’s employer to receive 
authorised disclosures made during the discloser’s employment. 
 
There is no statutory requirement to reveal the basis on which knowledge or suspicion 
has been formed, although in reality this is unavoidable since it is difficult to see how the 
State authorities can decide whether to give “appropriate consent” to the commission of 
a prohibited act without knowing the basis on which knowledge or suspicion that the 
property was criminal property was formed. “Appropriate consent” is defined in section 
335(1) to mean consent given externally by the State authorities, or internally by a 
nominated officer, to do a prohibited act. Although the nominated officer is authorised 
to give consent for a prohibited act to take place, where an authorised disclosure is made 
internally to the nominated officer, section 336(1) provides that a nominated officer must 
not give appropriate consent unless he had made his own prior disclosure to the State 
authorities, and the latter have given the nominated officer consent to proceed. Whether 
an employee discloses externally to the State authorities or internally to his nominated 
officer, the decision whether to give appropriate consent rests, unsurprisingly, with the 
State authorities. 
 
Whilst the legislation distinguishes sharply between voluntary reporting and mandatory 
reporting, it fails to acknowledge any difference in reporting obligation between the 
position of a third party who handles suspected criminal property and the position of a 
predicate criminal who has committed the underlying criminal offence which gives rise 
to the existence of the property. Both the third party and the predicate criminal are treated 
alike in terms of the reporting obligations. This is true in the case of a company as well 
as an individual. The exposure to criminal liability for the commission of a predicate 
offence and a money laundering offence in the case of a company which has received 
payments pursuant to a contract obtained by a bribe is no different from that of a thief 
who steals money from a bank with a sack of cash marked “swag” swung over his 
 
70 ibid s 338(1(a). 
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shoulder. In both instances, if criminal liability for the commission of a money laundering 
offence is to be avoided, an authorised disclosure will need to be made.  
 
Realistically, as already noted, it is a company rather than the predicate criminal which 
will be contemplating the making of a voluntary self-report to the State authorities, 
directly to the SFO and/or by making an authorised disclosure to the NCA. However, 
whilst a company incriminates itself in this situation, the privilege against self-
incrimination will not be engaged. The company is not obliged to incriminate itself 
pursuant to the authorised disclosure model. Circumstances may dictate the advantages 
for a company in making a self-report, but a self-incriminating disclosure remains a 
voluntary act. The State authorities may offer indirect advantages to a company for 
making a self-incriminating disclosure, but there is no element of compulsion. 
Accordingly, this thesis does not advance an argument that the privilege against self-
incrimination should be engaged in a case involving voluntary reporting. Unlike the 
position for a person or company operating in the regulated sector, in the case of the 
making of an authorised disclosure, patently the company has a choice. 
 
2.4.3 Mandatory reporting 
 
The mandatory reporting offences applying to those working in the regulated sector are 
set out in sections 330 to 332 of POCA 2002 and are designated as “failure to disclose” 
criminal offences punishable by a maximum term of five years imprisonment and/or 
unlimited fine when convicted on indictment.71  
 
Pursuant to section 330(1) of POCA 2002, a person commits a criminal offence if, when 
working in the course of a business in the regulated sector, he fails to make a SAR when 
he knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that another 
person is engaged in money laundering.72 The offence is committed where a person fails 
to disclose reasonable grounds that another person is engaged in money laundering, even 
though no money laundering is taking place. It is the reasonable grounds for suspecting 
money laundering rather than the fact of money laundering which must be reported.73 
 
71 ibid s 334(2). 
72 ibid s 330(1) and (2). 




The information on which knowledge or suspicion is based must have come to the person 
during his business in the regulated sector.74 In addition, under section 330(3A), the 
obligation to make a report arises where a person can identify the other person suspected 
to be engaged in money laundering or locate the whereabouts of any of the laundered 
property. The reporting obligation also arises where a person believes, or it is reasonable 
to expect him to believe, that the information giving rise to the knowledge or suspicion 
will or may assist in identifying that other person or the whereabouts of laundered 
property. By section 340(4), the SAR must be made to the discloser’s internal nominated 
officer, or externally to the State authorities. Section 330(5) stipulates that the mandatory 
report must disclose “(a) the identity of the other person who is suspected to be engaged 
in money laundering, (b) the whereabouts of the laundered property, so far as he knows 
it, and (c) the information or other matter [on which knowledge or suspicion has been 
based].” Section 330(5A) clarifies that the laundered property refers to property forming 
the subject-matter of the money laundering that a person knows or suspects, or has 
reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, another person to be engaged in. Again, 
the SAR is made externally to the State authorities or internally, to a nominated officer.75 
There is no statutory prohibition against the appointment of a company as a nominated 
officer. However, guidance issued by HMRC suggests that the role should not be 
performed by an external party. The guidance adds that the nominated officer should be 
a senior person in the organisation who can act independently when determining when a 
SAR should be made.76   
 
Regulated sector business is defined to include almost all commercial activity in the 
financial sector. More specifically, the regulated sector embraces business undertaken by 
credit institutions, financial institutions, auditors, insolvency practitioners, external 
accountants and tax advisers, solicitors and barristers when participating in financial or 
real property transactions, trust or company service providers, estate agents, letting 
agents, high value dealers who accept cash payments of Euro 10,000 or more, art market 
participants and casinos.77 
 
74 POCA 2002, s 330(3). 
75 ibid ss 330(4), 330(9). 
76 HMRC, ‘Guidance on Money Laundering Regulations’ (26 June 2017) <www.gov.uk/guidance/money-
laundering-regulations-nominated-officers-and-employee-training> accessed 21 July 2020.  
77 POCA 2002 sch 9, and The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Business in the Regulated Sector and 




Section 330 provides for four exemptions from criminal liability under the mandatory 
reporting requirement. First, under section 330(6)(a) there is no obligation to report 
where a person has a reasonable excuse for not making the report. Secondly, where 
information has come to a legal adviser or other relevant professional adviser in legally 
privileged circumstances, there is no obligation for the information to be reported 
pursuant sections 330(6)(b), 330(7B), 330(10) and 330(11). Thirdly, a person is exempt 
from liability under sections 330(6)(c) and 330(7) where he does not know or suspect that 
another person is engaged in money laundering, and he has not been provided with 
professional training by his employer. Fourthly, pursuant to section 330(7A), a person 
does not commit a criminal offence where he fails to make a mandatory report if he 
knows, or believes on reasonable grounds, that the money laundering is occurring in a 
particular country or territory outside the UK, and the money laundering is not unlawful 
under the criminal law applying in that country or territory. Also, the activity must not 
fall within a narrow category of offences specified by the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department. 
 
There is no statutory provision in the “failure to disclose” offence which references the 
privilege against self-incrimination or limits the use of a SAR or any information derived 
from a SAR in any criminal or administrative proceedings which may subsequently be 
brought against the maker of the SAR and/or or any persons, individual or corporate, 
identified in the SAR. Section 339ZI of POCA 2002, introduced by section 12 of the 
Criminal Finances Act 2017, provides that any statement made in response to a further 
information order may not be used in evidence against the information provider in 
criminal proceedings against him. This provision concerns the response to a further 
information order made by a Magistrates’ Court on the application of the State authorities 
where access to specific information not included in a SAR is sought. It would be 
incoherent if the evidential use of further information were restricted in circumstances 




are referenced in The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019, SI 
2019/1511, reg 15. 
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There are two further mandatory reporting obligations contained in Part 7 of POCA 2002 
which have been enacted to cover the situation where either a voluntary disclosure or a 
mandatory disclosure has been made internally to a nominated officer. In both instances, 
depending on the facts of the case, a mandatory obligation to make a SAR may be 
triggered. The legislative objective is to place a mandatory reporting obligation on a 
person operating in a commercial organisation (both inside and outside the regulated 
sector) who has responsibility for ensuring the organisation’s compliance with the making 
of external disclosures to the State authorities. The internal nominated officer becomes a 
conduit under the legislation for the transmission of suspicious information which he has 
received internally to the State authorities. 
 
The first additional mandatory reporting obligation is found in section 331(1) of POCA 
2002 and applies to a nominated officer who has received a disclosure from an employee 
acting pursuant to the mandatory disclosure obligation in section 330(1). If the nominated 
officer knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that 
another person is engaged in money laundering, the nominated officer must submit a 
SAR to the State authorities.78 The mandatory disclosure obligation filed under this 
section applies only where a nominated officer is working in the regulated sector. The 
second additional mandatory obligation in section 332(1) applies to other internal 
nominated officers where they are operating outside of the regulated sector. Again, if the 
nominated officer knows or suspects that another person is engaged in money laundering, 
a mandatory disclosure to the State authorities must be made.79   
 
The difference between the two provisions in sections 331 and 332 is both subtle and 
significant. Consistent with the test for making a disclosure under section 330 where the 
discloser is working in the regulated sector, the threshold in section 331 for forming 
suspicion is an objective standard. The position is different where a nominated officer is 
required to make a disclosure under section 332. Here, the threshold test is subjective, so 
that it aligns with the circumstances where an authorised disclosure is made under 
sections 327(2)(a), 328(2)(a) and 329(2)(a). This, it will be remembered, is a voluntary 
disclosure which triggers an exemption from liability for the commission of a money 
laundering offence where the mental ingredient is entirely subjective. Although at first 
 
78 POCA 2002, s 331(4). 
79 ibid s 332(4). 
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blush the provisions in sections 331 and 332 of POCA 2002 appear unbalanced, in fact 
they accurately reflect the dichotomy between the subjective and objective thresholds for 
voluntary reporting80 and mandatory reporting81 which have been written into Part 7 of 
the Act.  
 
2.4.4 A company’s obligation to report 
 
The mandatory reporting obligation in section 330(1) applies to a company as well as an 
individual. The legislation does not make any distinction between reporting money 
laundering suspicions by individuals and reporting suspicious by a corporate entity. 
Throughout Part 7 of POCA 2002, the obligation to act is placed on “a person” who is 
defined in Schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act 1978 to include “a body of persons 
corporate or unincorporated”. It follows that both natural persons and companies are 
equally affected by the voluntary and mandatory reporting provisions set out in Part 7 of 
the Act. A company officer’s or senior employee’s knowledge or suspicion of money 
laundering, or failure to recognise reasonable grounds for suspecting money laundering, 
binds a company where the officer or senior employee can be said to constitute the 
company’s directing mind for this purpose.82 The application of the mandatory reporting 
obligation to a company is consistent with Interpretive Note 3 (7 d & e) of the FATF 
Recommendations. This states that criminal and administrative liability and sanctions 
should apply to legal persons, without prejudice to the criminal liability of natural 
persons.83  
 
As an instructive example of the imposition of corporate criminal liability for failing to 
make a mandatory disclosure, the High Court in New Zealand recorded a conviction 
against a company for failing to report suspicious transactions under section 92 of the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counterfeiting Financing of Terrorism Act 2009. The 
company operated a money remittance and currency exchange business. There were 311 
suspicious transactions in question, to the value of around NZ$53 million, equivalent to 
around £27.5 million.84 As well as imposing significant fines on the director and 
 
80 ibid ss 327(2)(a), 328(2(a), 329(2(a), 332. 
81 ibid ss 330, 331. 
82 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL). 
83 FATF (n 41). 
84 Calculated at an exchange rate of 0.52 NZ$ to the UK pound. 
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underlying client’s agent, the Court fined the company NZ$2.55 million (equivalent to 
around £1.3 million). The Judge rejected an argument that fines on the director and 
company would be duplicative since the legislation contemplated separate penalties for 
individuals and companies. The company was convicted as a principal offender, and the 
director and client’s agent were secondary parties to the offending. 
 
If the company had made a mandatory disclosure in accordance with its statutory 
obligation, the company would have incriminated itself, its director and the client’s agent, 
in relation to the commission of criminal offences involving the handling of multiple 
suspicious transactions. The sensitivity of the matter was rendered more acute by the fact 
that the client’s agent was the director’s mother. Notwithstanding, in the absence of any 
consideration of the privilege against self-incrimination, by requiring a mandatory 
disclosure to the State authorities the law expected the company to incriminate itself, its 
director and the  director’s mother, jointly and severally, in relation to the commission of 
these serious criminal offences.85 It follows that, pursuant to the mandatory disclosure 
obligation, the scope for a company making a mandatory disclosure which contains self-
incriminating information is significant, and it is not necessarily limited to a breach of 
money laundering regulations.  
 
2.4.5 Self-incrimination and the reporting obligation in section 330 
 
In the case of an individual, a question arises as to whether the mandatory disclosure 
requirement captures a failure to report where the person obliged to make a SAR is the 
same person as the person engaged in money laundering. In its plain meaning, where 
section 330(2) uses the pronoun “he” to designate the person obliged to make a report in 
order to avoid committing an offence of failure to disclose, this person is clearly 
distinguishable from “another person” engaged in money laundering. There are two 
persons contemplated in section 330(2), not one. On this analysis, if an obligated 
individual is the sole criminal participant engaged in money laundering, no issue of self-
incrimination arises since the mandatory obligation to make a disclosure is not triggered. 
Here, there is no “other” person in respect of whom the report could be made.  
 
 
85 R v Jiaxin Finance Limited [2020] NZHC 366. 
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In practice, often more than one person is involved in criminal offending. If a person 
working in the regulated sector handles proceeds of criminal conduct along with another 
person, the requirement to make a mandatory disclosure is engaged. There are two people 
involved in this scenario – the obliged individual, and another person with whom he has 
acted – and both are engaged in money laundering. When a person working in the 
regulated sector articulates the money laundering narrative, there will be cases where, 
inevitably, he incriminates himself. This is exactly what would have happened in R v Jiaxin 
Finance Limited 86 if a mandatory disclosure had been made by the director of the company 
in his personal capacity as a person working in the regulated sector. The narrative would 
have recorded an acceptance that he had caused his company to conduct a series of 
suspicious transactions without conducting adequate customer due diligence and making 
a SAR, to the prejudice of his own, as well as his mother’s and the company’s, interests. 
 
The scope for the reporter’s potential criminal liability as a secondary participant is wide 
and includes responsibility for encouraging or assisting criminal activity contrary to 
sections 44 to 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Whilst the imposition of secondary 
liability requires proof of an intention to encourage or assist, the evidential burden is not 
difficult to discharge. As the Court of Appeal in England and Wales has made clear, 
knowledge of a company’s offence, plus an ability to control the company’s actions 
together with a decision not to exercise such control, may constitute an aiding and 
abetting of the company’s offence.87 Therefore, to return to R v Jiaxin Finance Limited,88 if 
the director was aware of the suspicious nature of the transactions, he would have 
intended to encourage or assist the company in executing the transactions, without 
undertaking sufficient customer due diligence and making a mandatory disclosure of 
suspected money laundering to the State authorities. The legislator may not have intended 
to establish a mandatory reporting regime which compelled a company to self-incriminate 
and incriminate others, but on a plain reading of the statutory text, this is the outcome 
which follows.  
 
Thus, in a case involving the mandatory self-reporting of criminal conduct by a company, 
there are three candidates for incrimination. First, there is the company, as the principal 
 
86 ibid. 
87 R v J F Alford Transport Ltd [1997] 2 Cr App R 326. 
88 Jiaxin (n 85). 
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offender with responsibility for handling criminal property, and/or committing the 
underlying predicate offence. Secondly, there are the company’s officers and employees 
whose actions fix the company with criminal liability and who are exposed as encouraging 
or assisting the company’s actions. Thirdly, there may be associated individuals whose 
involvement in the predicate offending is revealed in the narrative of the company’s self-
report. 
 
The width of the corporate self-reporting obligation in cases of serious financial crime is 
demonstrated by positing an unexceptional hypothetical case of a board of directors of a 
financial institution such as a bank discovering that one of its senior employees acting in 
collusion with a director has been engaged in criminal conduct involving making false 
representations to the financial markets in an effort to increase corporate profits and, in 
turn, dishonestly inflate their personal annual bonuses. The bank knows or suspects, or 
has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that other persons – its senior 
employee and director – are engaged in money laundering. The information has come to 
the attention of the bank’s audit committee, and subsequently its board of directors, 
during the bank’s business in the regulated sector. As well as identifying the relevant 
employee and director, the bank has a shrewd idea of the whereabouts of the laundered 
property, which in the case of dishonestly making false representations to the financial 
markets in an effort to increase corporate profits and personal annual bonuses, is retained 
in the bank’s own bank account. In these circumstances, because the bank is operating in 
the regulated sector, there is a mandatory reporting obligation resting on the bank to self-
report the criminal conduct of its director and senior employee, both of whom are 
sufficiently senior to have embroiled the bank itself in the commission of a serious 
criminal offence for corporate as well as personal gain. A similar situation arose in the 
case involving Standard Bank and allegations of bribery committed by a subsidiary 
company in Tanzania. The case proceeded as a self-report to the SFO and a DPA was 
made. However, the matter first came to light when Standard Bank made a SAR five days 
before it decided to approach the SFO.89 
 
To further illustrate how a corporate obligation to self-report can arise, other examples 
of companies operating in the regulated sector and required to make a mandatory self-
 
89 ibid; Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank plc, Case No U20150854 (Southwark Crown Court, 30 November 
2015) [16] (Sir Brian Levenson P). 
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report can be posited. Criminality around a breach of economic sanctions provides an 
instructive example. Suppose an associate in a bank receives a secret payment from a 
customer for providing him with banking services in breach of an economic sanction 
issued by HM Treasury. The secret commission constitutes criminal property in the hands 
of the associate, and when the associate’s conduct comes to the attention of the bank, 
there are reasonable grounds for the bank to know or suspect that the associate is a person 
who is engaged in money laundering. If a mandatory report is made pursuant to section 
330(1), in addition to providing incriminating information against the associate, the bank 
would be providing self-incriminating information which acknowledged that it had 
provided financial services in breach of an economic sanction. Also, in so far as the bank 
obtained any financial benefit from the arrangement made by the associate with the 
sanctioned person, the bank would have acquired possession of criminal property. In the 
absence of making a voluntary disclosure, the bank would commit a continuing money 
laundering offence contrary to section 329(1) of POCA. 
 
Another illustration of mandatory corporate self-reporting may involve a company 
operating a company within the regulated sector such as an estate agency business. If a 
sales agent employed by the company receives a bonus payment as part of his salary which 
is calculated by reference to the number of properties the agent has sold, and in one or 
more instances the sales agent has dishonestly made misrepresentations to purchasers 
during a course of dealing with them, the need to make a corporate self-report arises. Like 
the banker, the sales agent receives a benefit from criminal conduct, and leaving aside the 
question of whether the company is liable in criminal law for the dishonest 
representations which the sales agent has made, potentially the company has an exposure 
to the commission of a money laundering offence from the time when it knows or 
suspects that the sales agent has acted dishonestly. This is because monies received from 
dishonestly obtained sales would represent the benefit from criminal conduct at the time 
when they are paid to the company. In this situation, the question of the company’s 
liability for money laundering depends on whether the company knew or suspected that 
the monies had been dishonestly obtained.  
 
This scenario can be replayed with any company operating in the regulated sector, such 
as an art gallery where a sales agent sells a painting by dishonestly misrepresenting its 
provenance. Or where a firm of solicitors discovers that a solicitor has deliberately mis-
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recorded time and inflated an invoice which has been paid by a client. When discovered, 
the firm knows that it has come into possession of criminal property. The same 
considerations in the application of the mandatory reporting requirement under section 
330(1) will arise. In these examples, unless relieved by the exercise of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, a company is compelled to provide self-incriminating information as 
a hidden consequence of the mandatory reporting requirement set out in section 330(1) 
of POCA. In the company’s possession, the information is private and highly sensitive. 
The company must determine how it responds to the conduct of its miscreant employee 
as well as resolve matters with the company’s customer, in the best interests of the 
company. Making a confidential settlement with the customer, and taking disciplinary 
action against the employees, are options the company may wish to consider, without 
involving the State authorities if the privilege against self-incrimination can be engaged. 
 
Pursuant to section 330(3), the mandatory reporting obligation is triggered where the 
information giving rise to knowledge or suspicion that another person is engaged in 
money laundering comes to the company in the course of its business. Internally, the 
information may come to the company as a result of confidential internal processes which 
have identified suspected wrongdoing, triggering an investigation. Information received 
from a whistle-blower falls into this category. Alternatively, information could come to 
the company’s attention from an external source. For example, the company’s 
professional advisers such company’s accountants may share information with the 
company which gives rise to reasonable grounds for suspecting that another person is 
engaged in money laundering, Whilst the requirement is clear in section 330(3) that the 
information must come to the company “in the course of a business in the regulated 
sector”, information communicated from reports in the media or resources available on 
the internet may prompt enquires which give rise to knowledge or suspicion that another 
person is engaged in money laundering. Information triggering an enquiry may also be 
passed to a company by one of its stakeholders, or a counterparty in a transaction. 
 
The prospect of corporate self-incrimination in response to the reporting requirement in 
section 330(1) is recognised beyond peradventure and, absent any right to assert the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the prospect of a company divulging self-
incriminating information by reference to the acts or omissions of its officers and 
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employees, as well as incriminating the same officers and employees simultaneously, 
remains extant.  
 
2.4.6 Self-incrimination under the reporting obligations in sections 331 and 332 
 
The same issue does not arise under the mandatory reporting obligations set out in 
sections 331(1) and 332(1) of POCA 2002 since in both cases the reporting obligation 
fixes on “a person nominated to receive disclosures”, in contrast to the reporting 
obligation in section 330(1) which applies to all persons working in the regulated sector, 
individual and corporate, who come into possession of information about suspected 
money laundering. Whether the nominated officer is individual or corporate,90 when the 
nominated officer makes the SAR, no issue of self-reporting arises. This is because the 
persons making the suspicious activity report under sections 330(1) on the one hand, and 
sections 331(1) and 332(1) on the other, will be different. Under section 330(1), the 
person operating in the regulated sector, in this instance a company, is required to report 
the suspicious acts of its officers and employees, which may establish the company’s 
criminal culpability in the process, whereas under sections 331(1) and 332(1), where a 
nominated officer makes a SAR in identical terms, no criminal exposure for the 
nominated officer arises. The outcome in this scenario is unhappy because the nominated 
officer would be reporting incriminating information about the company as his employer 
and his co-workers, but the key point, for the purpose of this analysis, is that unless the 
nominated officer is himself criminally implicated as a participant in the wrongdoing,91 





The review of the AML regime which has been undertaken in this foundational chapter 
establishes the differences between the two avenues for reporting money laundering 
 
90 It is not clear whether a company may be appointed as a nominated officer. Guidance issued by the NCA 
contemplates that a company may make a suspicious activity report on behalf of another company within 
the group. NCA, ‘SAR Online User Guidance’ (v 4.1, February 2021) 
<www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/498-sar-online-user-guidance-february-
2021/file> accessed 3 March 2021, para 2.6. Whether an independent company may be appointed by a 
person working in the regulated sector to act as its nominated officer is moot. 
91 In this event, if the mandatory reporting obligation engages the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
nominated officer could assert the privilege in his own right, as an individual.  
60 
 
suspicions. The key difference is that voluntary reporting is consensual, whereas 
mandatory reporting is not. The legal provisions governing voluntary reporting and 
mandatory reporting are complex, and the legislative framework established in Part 7 of 
POCA 2002 presents several challenges which need to be addressed. Criminal law is the 
instrument chosen by the legislature to enforce compliance with the mandatory reporting 
requirement, by the introduction of three “failure to report” offences in sections 330(1), 
331(1) and 332(1) of POCA 2002.  
 
Detailed consideration of the provisions in Part 7 of POCA 2002 has exposed other 
matters, as it is clear that the mandatory reporting requirement in section 330(1) is 
sufficiently wide to compel a company to report information which is self-incriminating, 
and which may incriminate its officers and employees. In the case of an individual, the 
mandatory reporting requirement can present awkward moments where there is a 
relationship between the reporter and the other person who is suspected of involvement 
in money laundering. Unlike the position with a company, no issue of self-incrimination 
arises since the incriminating information relates to another reporter and not himself. In 
the case of a company, the position is different. By making a mandatory disclosure, a 
company self-incriminates by disclosing the wrongful conduct of its officers and 
employees, and the individual culpability of the company’s officers and employees is 
simultaneously exposed. 
 
This gives rise to several questions which are considered in due course. Is this a situation 
in which the privilege against self-incrimination might apply? In what circumstances may 
a company assert a right to protect its interests, and does the privilege against self-
incrimination constitute such a right? The absence of any reference in the legislation to 
the privilege against self-incrimination or the evidential or investigative use to which 
information contained in a SAR can be put presents fertile ground for discussion as to 
whether the law should recognise a corporate claim to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination as an authentic response to resist the mandatory reporting requirement. 
The breakdown of mandatory reports submitted by individuals and companies is not 
known. Similarly, there is no information publicly available recording whether mandatory 
reports submitted by companies disclose information which self-incriminates the 
reporting company or its officers and employees. The number might be small, but this is 
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none to the point. The mandatory reporting obligation lays down a gauntlet to the 









This chapter addresses whether a mandatory self-reporting requirement to report 
suspicious money laundering conduct can be assimilated within the norms of omission 
liability in criminal law. This is the first sub-question to be considered in the thesis.  In one 
sense, the answer to this question does not have any impact on the resolution of the 
research question, since the engagement of the privilege against self-incrimination with 
mandatory self-reporting supported by penal sanction is not dependent on its coherence 
with theoretical norms of criminal law. In another sense, though, the answer does have 
resonance. A sound jurisprudential foundation for the mandatory reporting requirement 
assists the theoretician in gaining an understanding of the criminal peril against which the 
privilege against self-incrimination operates to protect. There is an attractive symmetry 
where the imposition of a mandatory reporting requirement and the engagement of the 
privilege against self-incrimination can be coherently justified with reference to their 
distinct conceptual narratives. 
 
The chapter begins with a short account of the traditional approach towards the 
recognition of criminal liability for conduct by omission. The notion of duty is central to 
a consideration of when the law requires a person to act, and the identification of a duty 
to act draws heavily on the concept of social responsibility in the case of an individual 
and a company alike. This is followed by an extensive critique of the academic literature 
which addresses the theoretical conceptualisation of the mandatory reporting 
requirement in section 330(1) of POCA 2002.  
 
To this point, the chapter proceeds on the assumption that a breach of the duty to report 
suspected money laundering constitutes a public wrong which is punishable by criminal 
sanction. Although the chapter addresses as part of the narrative the factors which are 
presented as sufficient justification for invoking the criminal law, decidedly the legislature 
has opted for coercive enforcement of an obligation to disclose suspicious information 
which may be self-incriminating on occasions. The legislative power of the State is 
harnessed to compel a company to confess its wrongdoing, and that of its officers and 
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employees. The criminal law is the favoured enforcement tool, and a company is forced 
to choose between admission of criminal wrongdoing or non-disclosure and the 
commission of a further criminal offence. Theorisation of the mandatory reporting 
requirement in terms of duty exposes the full extent of the criminal jeopardy for a 
company, its officers, and employees. Applying Hohfeldian analysis, the chapter explains 
how this corporate peril could be mitigated if the law recognised the ability of a company 
to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, in the protection of its interests and those 
of its stakeholders. A potential conflict between corporate self-reporting and a company’s 
ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination is resolvable when viewed through 
the prism of duties and correlative rights. 
 
The final section of the chapter evaluates corporate reporting through the perspective of 
an economic approach to the theory of crime.  Economic theory illuminates the multiple 
benefits which flow from the encouragement of corporate reporting where a company 
and the State authorities are spared the ordeal of lengthy engagement with the legal 
process.  This rationale underpins both voluntary and compulsory models of corporate 
self-reporting. Economic benefits in terms of reduced public expenditure and lower 
corporate defence costs form part of this dynamic, as a company is encouraged by the 
State to act in a manner which remediates its criminal wrongdoing at comparatively little 
cost to the public purse. In this way, the economic costs associated with corporate 
wrongdoing are shifted from the State to the corporate sector. 
 
3.2 OMISSIONS LIABILITY 
 
Criminal liability is imposed on a company when it conducts business in the regulated 
sector and fails to report suspected money laundering in contravention of section 330(1) 
of POCA 2002. In this way, the law imposes criminal liability not for an act of commission 
but rather for conduct by omission. The effect of the legislation is to place a duty on a 
person, individual or corporate, to disclose self-incriminating information, or 
incriminating information relating to a third party, to the State authorities. The extent of 




Although the theoretical foundation for criminal liability by omission has generated much 
discussion over the centuries,92 the idea that there are occasions when the common law 
should punish a person for omitting to do something is uncontroversial. Whilst Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen described crimes by omission as exceptional,93 Sir William Blackstone 
had been content to define a crime or misdemeanour as “an act committed, or omitted, 
in violation of a public law, either forbidding or commanding it”.94 In his seminal work, 
Glanville Williams noted that in occasional instances an omission could trigger criminal 
responsibility without any positive act, citing a passage from Thomas Babington 
Macaulay’s writings to explain the underlying philosophy that there are circumstances 
sufficiently distinguishable from the vast majority of omissions “which marks them as 
peculiarly fit objects of penal legislation”.95 The challenge, as with Blackstone’s reference 
to the violation of a public law, is definitional. What public laws, and what character of 
omission, should be punished by the criminal law? This difficult task is compounded by 
an equivocality which hovers over whether there is any moral distinction which falls to 
be drawn between an act of commission and conduct by omission.  
 
3.2.1 Conventional view 
 
Historically, the common law reflected a conventional understanding that there was a 
qualitative moral difference between an act of commission and conduct by omission.  In 
Williams’ view, since active wrongdoing is more commonly associated with causing 
physical damage to a person or property than conduct by omission, the latter is necessarily 
less threatening. Accordingly, it is said that greater moral culpability attaches to an act of 
commission than conduct by omission.96 For Williams, there is a clear moral distinction 
to be drawn “between (for example) killing a person and failing to save his life (the former 
being the worse; and similarly between other acts and corresponding omissions”.97 This 
line of thought reflects the judicial approach taken by the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
 
92 See George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little Brown and Company 1978) ch 8, discussing the 
theory of direct and derivative liability for omissions. 
93 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, vol II (1883) ch 28, 97. In the year 
before publication, Hawkins J had remarked in R v Coney [1882] 8 QB 557 ‘It is no criminal offence to stand 
by, a mere passive spectator of a crime, even of a murder’. 
94 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, vol IV, Of Public Wrongs (1769) chs 1, 5. 
95 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (Stevens & Sons 1953) ss 2, 3–4. 
96 Glanville Williams, ‘Criminal Omissions – The Conventional View’ [1991] 107 LQR 86, 87. 
97 ibid 88. 
65 
 
Division) in R v Lowe98 where Phillimore LJ explained that “there is a clear distinction 
between an act of omission and an act of commission likely to cause harm. Whatever may 
be the position [concerning the imposition of criminal liability] regarding the latter, it does 
not follow that the same is true of the former”.99 Williams explained that there are 
differences in the psychological approach towards an act of commission and conduct by 
omission, with much greater condemnation of an action which inflicts damage than 
passive conduct which merely permits damage to occur. At a basic level, Williams 
observed that “it is in every way easier not to do something (personal needs apart) than 
to do it”.100 As a result, Williams believed that criminal liability for conduct by omission 
should be exceptional and established by statute only where the legislative intent is clear.101  
 
Andrew Ashworth’s contribution to the academic discourse surrounding criminal liability 
for an omission has been immense, in terms of the general part of criminal law as well as 
more specifically, his work on the new breed of “failure to disclose” offences which 
includes the mandatory reporting of suspected money laundering. Ashworth’s conception 
of criminal liability for conduct by omission is different from the conventional view 
espoused by Williams. Ashworth rejects the sharpness of a moral distinction between 
active and passive conduct and sees no impediment to the principle of criminal liability 
in common law where a duty to act can be established:102  
 
The general principle in criminal law should be that omissions liability should be 
possible if a duty is established, because in those circumstances there is no 
fundamental moral distinction between failing to perform an act with foreseen 
bad consequences and performing the act with identical foreseen bad 
consequences.103  
 
Ashworth points out that the moral culpability of criminal acts of commission vary in 
their seriousness, and there is no reason to suppose that conduct by omission is less 
suitable for criminal prosecution than acts of commission.104  
 
98 R v Lowe [1973] QB 702. 
99 ibid 709. 
100 Williams (n 96) 88. 
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Ultimately, the division between the view taken by Williams, which is known as “the 
conventional view”, and the approach articulated by Ashworth, which he terms “the 
social responsibility view”, focuses on their differing conceptions of duty and when a 
breach of duty should be recognised as deserving of condemnation as a public wrong. 
Williams recognises a category of duty triggering criminal liability for an omission to act 
which is narrow and confined to “particular classes of persons” who have accepted a 
responsibility to act, “sometimes only for the protection of particular classes”.105 In 
contrast, Ashworth  sees the notion of duty through a much wider lens, and in terms of 
social responsibility which “draws attention to the co-operative elements in social life”.106  
Ashworth explains that “[T]he social responsibility view of omissions grows out of a 
communitarian social philosophy which stresses the necessary relationship between 
individual behaviour and collective goods”.107 The difference in approach between 
Williams and Ashworth is rudimentary. Williams’ limited conception of criminal liability 
for conduct by omission maximises the room for private independence, whereas 
Ashworth’s conception expands the boundaries to embrace changing social perceptions, 
with reduced space for autonomy in consequence. 
 
3.2.2 Social responsibility view 
 
Ashworth’s language of social responsibility posits the recognition of wider societal duties 
which include the imposition of criminal liability on a person who has omitted to assist 
in law enforcement and the wider interests of the community have been damaged. 
Ashworth identifies this obligation as part of a duty of citizenship which focuses primarily 
on a duty to assist other members of a community in distress.108 The argument is: 
 
… not founded on a simple benefit/burden calculation, that whoever takes the 
benefits of living in a certain society must in fairness expect to have to submit to 
its burdens … The reasoning is rather that the imposition of certain minimal 
 
105 Williams (n 96) 88. 
106 Ashworth (n 102) 425. 
107 ibid 431. 
108 ibid 447. For a broader on civic duties and the criminal law, see Andrew Ashworth, ‘Public Duties and 
Criminal Omissions: Some Unresolved Questions’ [2011] Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law 1; 
Anthony Duff, ‘Legal Reasoning, Good Citizens, and the Criminal Law’ [2018] 9(1) Jurisprudence 120. See 
also Gerard Bradley, ‘Plea Bargaining and the Criminal Defendant’s Obligation to Plead Guilty’ [1999] 
Scholarly Works, Paper 272 (Notre Dame Law School) for a focused consideration of circumstances in 
which a defendant has a duty to plead guilty. 
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duties shows a concern for the rights of other members of the community and 
therefore for the community itself, and so tends to promote the maximisation of 
liberty.109  
 
Ashworth acknowledges that identifying the nature and scope of citizenship duties is a 
challenging task, and he asks whether the narrative of social responsibility includes a 
general duty to take action to prevent crime, or to notify the police about the commission 
of crime:110  
 
It is not difficult to construct prima facie arguments for imposing duties to assist. 
Whether the criminal law should yield to those arguments then depends on such 
factors as the significance of the interests which would be upheld by such a duty 
(i.e. the argument is stronger where a citizen’s life is at stake than where property 
of small value is concerned), the actual impact of such duties on the liberty of 
citizens (how much sacrifice and how often would the obligations demand?), and 
consequential effects on social life such as the possibility of turning citizens into 
busybodies, creating vigilantes and other possible changes.111  
 
Reflecting the deep division between Williams and Ashworth, Williams commented that 
Ashworth’s approach “looks like translating law into morals rather than morals into 
law”.112  
 
If Williams’ approach were to be adopted, the theorization of the mandatory reporting 
obligation in section 330(1) of POCA 2002 into the norms of criminal law will be difficult 
to accomplish since it would be reliant upon an argument that, by operating in the 
regulated sector, a person has accepted a voluntary responsibility to assist the State in the 
detection of suspected money laundering. Whether it is accurate to suggest that a person 
genuinely accepts a voluntary responsibility in these circumstances is considered later in 
the chapter. In any event, William’s position contrasts with Ashworth’s broader approach 
which can coherently theorize the mandatory reporting obligation if a societal duty to 
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There is historic precedent for recognising the existence of a duty to assist the State by 
reporting the commission of criminal conduct in the form of the offence of misprision 
at common law. The offence was classified as a high misdemeanour involving the 
concealment of a felony, and as Courtney Stanhope Kenny recorded,113 there was some 
authority to suggest the offence might have been committed where a felony was planned 
(as opposed to having been committed) and a person knowing of the design but not 
assenting to it refrained from disclosing it to a Justice of the Peace in order to prevent its 
commission.  
 
The jurisprudential foundation for the common law offence of misprision lay in 
considerations of public policy, with the recognition of a legal duty imposed on a citizen 
to assist in the detection and apprehension of fellow citizens who have committed serious 
criminal offences injurious to the public weal.114 In his work on misprision, 115 Peter 
Glazebrook pointed out that in medieval societies: 
 
… it is reasonably clear that the system was predominantly one of communal 
responsibility and communal liability, which relied very heavily on the numerous 
bodies of jurors under oath to tell of all they knew about administrative failings 
and revenue evasions, as well as ordinary crimes.116 
 
This societal analysis may have worked well six hundred years ago, but it bequeathed to 
the twentieth century a criminal offence of omission which was, in Williams’ words, 
“impossibly wide”. As Williams noted, “[r]ead literally, it would make it an offence for a 
mother to fail to inform the police that her eight year old son has taken a cake from the 
pantry, knowing that it is wrong to do so”.117 Prosecutorial restraint limited the number 
 
113 Courtney Stanhope Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (15th edn, Cambridge University Press 1936) 320–
21. See also Hawkins, Treatise on Pleas of the Crown, vol II (1716) ch 29 s 23. 
114 Joseph Chitty, Criminal Law, vol I (2nd edn, 1828) 2–3. See also R v Crimmins [1959] VR 270. 
115 Peter Glazebrook, ‘Misprision of Felony – Shadow or Phantom’ (1964) 8 AJLH 189, 283. 
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of cases brought before the courts for misprision118, and although the existence of the 
offence was confirmed by the House of Lords in Sykes v Director of Public Prosecutions,119 the 
offence was abolished by section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1967.120  
 
There is a further aspect which should be mentioned before leaving the offence of 
misprision. The example given by Williams is interesting not only for its focus on trivial 
offending, but also because it posits that the reporting requirement would not be relieved 
in a case where the subject of the disclosure was a close relative, and in this instance, 
consanguineous. In Sykes v Director of Public Prosecutions,121 Lord Denning cited a case from 
1315 in which it was held that it was the duty of a brother “to raise hue and cry” against 
his brother, and he was fined for failing to do so. There was also a case in 1938 – Mrs 
Casserley’s Case122 - where a mistress was convicted of misprision for concealing criminal 
conduct committed by her lover. Unfortunately, none of their Lordships reflected on the 
more difficult question of whether the common law offence required a person to self-
report criminal conduct. However, in argument Sir Jocelyn Simon QC, appearing for the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, explained that a person could be “a misprisor of one’s 
own offence”.123 For Sir Jocelyn, the common law offence of misprision established a 
duty to make a report which was, “ex hypothesi, … a public duty”.124  
 
Four years after Sykes v Director of Public Prosecutions was decided, it was judicially established 
that the common law offence of misprision could not be committed where the discloser 
would incriminate himself in the commission of a criminal offence by his disclosure. In 
R v King,125 the defendant had been charged with misprision after giving false information 
to the police during an interview under caution in order to conceal his involvement, and 
the involvement of his two accomplices, in a robbery. Following his conviction, the 
defendant argued that the offence of misprision would not be committed where 
disclosure of the commission of criminal conduct, in this case a robbery, would have been 
self-incriminating. In developing the argument, the defendant relied on “the cardinal 
 
118 Kenny (n 6) 321; Williams (n 96) 236. 
119 Sykes v Director of Public Prosecutions [1962] AC 528. 
120 Abolition of the offence was recommended by the Criminal Law Revision Committee, Seventh Report on 
Felonies and Misdemeanours (Cmnd. 2659, May 1965) paras 37–43. 
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principle of English law that a man is not bound to incriminate himself”.126 The Court of 
Criminal Appeal confirmed the existence of this limitation and quashed the conviction.127 
In the view of the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Parker, “there clearly is such a limitation on 
the duty to disclose”.128 
 
There are two points which emerge from a consideration of the offence of misprision 
before its abolition. First, the common law has not shied away from imposing criminal 
liability for omitting to report the existence of a serious criminal offence. On the contrary, 
the offence of misprision was consistent with the notion that a citizen had a moral as well 
as a legal duty to assist the police to discover and apprehend offenders. The history of 
misprision at common law supports the argument advanced by Ashworth that an attribute 
of citizenship incorporates an obligation to notify the State authorities of another person’s 
commission of serious criminal conduct. This sits unhappily with the conception of the 
conventional view of omissions liability which Williams has espoused. Secondly, the 
tension between the application of the offence and the privilege against self-incrimination 
was an acknowledged issue which has the potential to be problematic where disclosure 
of self-incriminating information is concerned.  
 
In addition to the protection afforded by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Sykes 
v Director of Public Prosecutions, the Judges’ Rules,129 which set out in 1964 the principles to 
be followed by the police when interviewing suspects, made clear that there were other 
limits which remained extant. This was confirmed by the High Court in the seminal case 
of Rice v Connolly130 when Lord Parker CJ said that it was: 
 
… quite clear that though every citizen has a moral duty or, if you like, a social 
duty to assist the police, there is no legal duty to that effect, and indeed the whole 
basis of the common law is the right of the individual to refuse to answer 
questions put to him by persons in authority, and to refuse to accompany those 
in authority to any particular place; short, of course, of arrest.131  
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1984. 
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The rationale supporting the common law offence of misprision and Lord Parker’s 
reasoning in Rice v Connolly are reconcilable. It is one thing for a person to withhold 
information incriminating a third party where the information already exists and relates 
to serious criminality which has been committed. It is another thing to require a person 
to answer a question asked by a person in authority which may be speculative and where 
criminal activity may not have taken place.  
 
In recommending the abolition of misprision, the Criminal Law Revision Committee 
expressed its concern over the application of the common law offence to the reporting 
of minor offences, as well as offences committed by near relatives.132 However, the 
mandatory reporting requirement in section 330(1) of POCA 2002 has mimicked the 
extensive reach of the old common law offence. The duty to report under section 330(1) 
includes reporting the handling of criminal property derived from the commission of low-
level offences and regulatory breaches,133 as well as reports on suspected money 
laundering committed by third parties including relatives and friends. Williams would 
have deprecated this legislative development. In a passage which reiterates the extent of 
his disagreement with a social responsibility approach to omissions liability in criminal 
law, Williams accused Ashworth of presenting an analysis which would revive the offence 
of misprision in an expanded form: 
 
This would be an appalling way of extending the circle of criminality beyond the 
immediate doers and omitters and their accomplices. It is inconceivable that a 
proposal to revise misprision in some modernised form, and to turn us all by 
force of law into subsidiary policemen and tell-tales, would have any chance of 
legislative acceptance.134 
 
Far from being inconceivable, this is precisely what Parliament accomplished when 




132 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Seventh Report, Felonies and Misdemeanours (Cmnd 2659, 1965) para 39. 
133 For examples, see Law Commission, Anti-Money Laundering: the SARS Regime (Law Com No 384, 2019) 
para 4.10. 
134 Williams (n 96) 90. 
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3.3 STATUTORY DUTY TO REPORT 
 
It is against this background that academic writers have sought to locate the theoretical 
foundation for the mandatory reporting requirement imposed by the AML regime. Here, 
the focus of consideration shifts from a generic consideration of how omissions liability 
can be conceptualised in terms of duty to the more specific task of locating a theoretical 
foundation for a corporate duty to report, and self-report, suspected money laundering 
established in section 330 of POCA 2002.  
 
The issue was first addressed in the United States when Matthew Hall noted that, 
notwithstanding the general position in American law that there is no duty to report 
criminal activity, there was “an emerging acceptance of legally-mandated reporting in 
specific instances despite the prevailing reluctance to recognise a broader duty”.135 Hall 
recognised the competing interests between public interest in reducing financial crime 
and the importance of financial privacy, but he did not offer any formative analysis as to 
how this clash could be resolved in terms of conventional omissions liability in criminal 
law.136 Hall identified a potential dichotomy between companies and individuals, noting 
that “[T]he world of business associations has its own set of specific, and growing, duties 
and incentives to report criminal conduct … [which] …. differ dramatically from those 
imposed on the citizenry as individuals”.137 Hall acknowledged that these reporting 
obligations often require a company to inform upon itself.  
 
Hall’s recognition of the emergence of an acceptance of legally mandated reporting was 
supported six years later when Sandra Thompson suggested that “reporting requirements 
[were] quietly and incrementally reshaping American criminal law traditions”.138 
Thompson sought to explore how mandatory reporting requirements could sit happily 
with the absence of a “Good Samaritan” law which would punish an individual for failing 
to rescue a person in need of immediate assistance. Thompson’s point was that 
mandatory reporting is a variant of Good Samaritan laws in the sense that it required 
disclosure of possible harm or injury to the State authorities so that they could intervene 
 
135 Matthew Hall, ‘An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: Banks, Money Laundering, and the 
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and rescue the victims. Thompson concluded that mandatory reporting could be 
theoretically conceptualised as resting somewhere between the rationale which underlay 
Good Samaritan laws and public welfare criminal offences.139  
 
Academic scholars in the UK have tackled the intellectual challenge presented by 
mandatory reporting by asking more questions about the nature of citizenship in modern 
society. Shlomit Wallerstein has asked “[W]hat information can the State legitimately 
require from persons who have knowledge concerning the involvement of others in 
criminal activity?”140 Wallerstein divides disclosure obligations into two forms. A direct 
obligation imposes a positive duty on a citizen to disclose information concerning another 
person’s participation in criminal activity, whereas an indirect obligation places a negative 
restriction on a citizen not to obstruct the police in the execution of their duty. Plainly, 
mandatory reporting under the AML legislation falls into the former category.  Echoing 
Sandra Thompson’s work, Wallerstein appreciates that the arguments against mandatory 
reporting are associated with concerns about the introduction of a general duty to rescue 
and the enactment of a “bad Samaritan law” which would significantly undermine 
individual freedom by the State dictating to a citizen how he must behave.141 
Notwithstanding, Wallerstein posits circumstances in which the imposition of a duty to 
disclose can be justified.  
 
With reference to mandatory reporting in money laundering cases, Wallerstein identifies 
two bases of justification, and both are associated with personal choice. First, Wallerstein 
articulates a distinction between the imposition of a direct duty to disclose which applies 
to all citizens and the imposition of a duty on persons who choose to enter a relationship 
or position. Wallerstein’s point is that it is less problematic to recognise a direct obligation 
to disclose where a person has chosen to accept the obligation when entering the 
relationship or position. The second basis is broader and posits that if a person suspects 
that a particular activity may contravene the criminal law, where the person declines to 
disclose his suspicion, he should be regarded as responsible for the subsequent harm 
which results. The justification for this responsibility rests in the person’s failure to inquire 
into his suspicion and accords with the criminal law doctrine of “Nelsonian blindness” 
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or closing an eye to the obvious.142 However, as Wallerstein recognises, any attempt to 
ground a theory of mandatory reporting in notions of personal choice is not all-embracing 
since apart from anything else it does not provide an answer to issues concerning the 
justification for mandatory reporting where the reporter is engaged in the underlying 
criminal activity. This situation, as Wasserstein acknowledges, raises different issues, and 
requires further consideration.143  
 
3.3.1 Identifying duties 
 
Building on his earlier consideration of omissions liability in criminal law, Ashworth has 
developed his analysis of the theoretical foundation for mandatory reporting under the 
AML legislation in the discourse around civic obligation.144 In his recent work, Ashworth 
divides duties into four identifiable groups. First, there are family obligations such as the 
duty of parents to provide for the needs of their children and household members to 
protect vulnerable adults in the house from serious harm. Secondly, there are voluntarily 
incurred obligations such as the duty of persons in possession of hazardous materials 
such as explosives to protect people from danger and the duty of a person who 
contractually agrees to undertake care for another person. Thirdly, there are obligations 
arising from personal responsibility where, for example, there is a duty owed by a property 
owner to use his influence to prevent criminal activity taking place on his property. 
Fourthly, there are civic obligations. Ashworth identifies four offences, these being a 
broad duty to assist in law enforcement, a duty to notify the police about suspected 
terrorist offences, a duty to notify suspected child abuse, and a duty to make reasonable 
efforts to ascertain the criminal law.145 Ashworth locates the duty of mandatory reporting 
under section 330(1) of POCA 2002 in the second group, whilst the duty to mandatorily 
report terrorist activity is placed in the fourth group.146 The rationale for the distinction 
rests in the fact that section 330 of POCA 2002 applies only to persons working in the 
financial sector, and therefore in this sense these people can be said to have accepted a 
voluntarily incurred obligation, whereas the duty to inform the authorities about 
suspected terrorist activity applies to every person in the UK.  
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It is clear that Ashworth is not entirely comfortable with his classification of the 
mandatory reporting of suspected money laundering offences as falling within his second 
group of voluntarily incurred obligations since he acknowledges that “the force of this 
cannot derive simply from the argument that if one voluntarily takes on a position one 
must accept all the duties that go with it”.147 If a person’s business falls within the 
regulated sector, there is no choice about whether the reporting obligation should be 
accepted. Indeed, there are many individuals and companies operating in the regulated 
sector whose businesses pre-date their inclusion in the regulated sector. A raft of 
professional service providers such as solicitor and accountants were included in the 
regulated sector on 24 February 2003,148 and most recently, since 10 January 2020, art 
market participants have been included in the regulated sector.149 If these individuals and 
companies declined to accept the mandatory reporting obligation which the legislature 
has imposed, they could not conduct any future business. 
 
Moreover, employees in the regulated sector have differing degrees of responsibility. The 
benefit enjoyed by a lowly paid employee in the regulated sector may be no greater than 
the benefit which would be enjoyed by the employee undertaking the same work outside 
the regulated sector. So, if there are sound policy arguments for applying the mandatory 
reporting obligation to a lowly paid employee in the regulated sector, the question arises 
as to whether this burden should apply to all citizens. Also, the mandatory reporting 
obligation prioritises money laundering which is odd since, as Ashworth points out, even 
where it is associated with organised crime and gang culture, “[money laundering] is a 
crime which should not be ranked as high as significant physical or sexual abuse”.150 This 
leads Ashworth to ask whether there should be a general duty on citizens to report serious 
criminal offences or perhaps a special duty to report abuse of the vulnerable.151 Ashworth 
concludes that there are strong arguments in favour of an offence of failure to report 
offences against the person, since the law should be concerned to impose a duty which 
promotes the better protection of victims.152 
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3.3.2 Reflections  
 
Ashworth offers a rationally defensible account of how the mandatory reporting 
requirement in section 330(1) of POCA 2002 can be coherently theorised within the 
norms of criminal law. However, there remain some important outstanding issues which 
need to be addressed.  
 
First, Ashworth does not tackle the issue which arises in the regulated sector where a 
company is legally obliged to self-report criminal conduct, or the wrongdoing of one of 
its officers or employees. It is true that the company is participating in regulated sector 
activity, and in so doing it has notionally agreed to abide by additional obligations which 
are not placed on other companies operating outside the regulated sector. This approach 
provides a jurisprudential foundation for the application of the mandatory reporting 
obligation where a company is compelled to report suspected money laundering 
committed by a third party, but whether it extends to embrace the making of a corporate 
self-report of criminal conduct is not discussed. Whilst the company’s officers may have 
steered the company into the regulated sector, a company employee will not have 
voluntarily accepted an enhanced level of personal responsibility to make a mandatory 
report simply by virtue of the fact that they have secured employment with a company 
which is operating in the regulated sector. To share in Ashworth’s jurisprudential 
foundation of “voluntary acceptance” for mandatory reporting, a company employee will 
need to be subsumed into the company’s persona for this purpose. Again, there is 
considerable artificiality regarding an understanding of this sort. 
  
Secondly, Ashworth considers section 330 of POCA 2002 in isolation, without discussing 
its relationship with the money laundering offences contained in sections 327 to 329 of 
POCA 2002. There are many occasions when the mandatory reporting obligation in 
section 330 is co-extensive with the need to make an authorised disclosure under sections 
327 to 329. As explained in chapter 2, this arises where a company operating in the 
regulated sector comes into possession of criminal property which derives from criminal 
conduct committed by its director or senior employee, a principal money laundering 
offence will be committed unless an authorised disclosure is made. Strictly speaking, as 
previously noted, the authorised disclosure is voluntary since the company has the option 
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of not reporting and committing the criminal offence. But, in reality, the disclosure is 
precipitated by force of circumstance because if corporate criminal liability for a money 
laundering offence is to be avoided a voluntary disclosure which recites the underlying 
predicate criminal offending will need to be made.  
 
Whilst technically speaking an authorised disclosure remains a voluntary act, whereas a 
report under section 330 is compelled, the decision to make an authorised disclosure is 
far from voluntary. The decision-maker’s course of action is driven by the mandatory 
disclosure obligation in section 330(1) which applies to the company, as well its 
professional advisers such as its solicitor and accountant. Even if the company is not 
conducting business in the regulated sector, the company’s professional advisers 
(solicitors, accountants etc) will be bound to make a mandatory disclosure in relation to 
suspected money laundering. To be consistent with his analysis, presumably Ashworth 
would list this form of “voluntary” disclosure as falling within the second category of 
duties to report which he identifies. 
 
Thirdly, although Ashworth acknowledges the significance of mandatory reporting as a 
response to the limitations of conventional policing and perceives this factor may form 
“part of the reasoning for co-opting the regulated sector into law enforcement”,153 the 
point is undeveloped. There is considerable force in the point, and, as with the previous 
two points, it would militate in favour of shifting mandatory reporting of suspected 
money laundering from Ashworth’s second group of voluntarily incurred obligations into 
the fourth group of identifiable civic obligations. Whilst a company elects to undertake 
business on terms laid down by government, obligations such as mandatory reporting of 
suspected money laundering are imposed and not the subject of negotiation. This reality 
weakens Ashworth’s classification since it is artificial to categorise the corporate 
obligations as voluntarily incurred in circumstances where it is the State which determines 
the content and degree of risk which is inherent in the terms of business which it has laid 
down. This contrasts sharply with an arrangement by private treaty where a company 
knows the nature and extent of its obligations which have been the subject of prior 
negotiation between the parties. By moving both mandatory reporting and voluntary 
reporting into Ashworth’s fourth category, a single narrative could be articulated. A 
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combined narrative for corporate reporting founded upon the notion of civic 
responsibility would be achieved, although it would still leave the tension with the 
privilege against self-incrimination unaddressed in cases where corporate self-reporting 
of criminal conduct is concerned.  
 
Fourthly, Ashworth’s conceptualisation of mandatory reporting under the AML 
legislation begs a wider question about the place of causation in the continuing 
development of omissions liability in criminal law. Traditionally, the duty to act has been 
recognised where the omission is causally connected with harmful behaviour for which 
the duty-bearer has accepted personal responsibility.154 In effect, the criminal 
responsibility of a person who fails to act is equated with the criminality of a person who 
perpetrates the offending act. The common thread between acts of commission and acts 
of omission is causation of harm, rather than identification of different forms of harm. 
As Gideon Yaffe explains: 
 
[T]he difference between omission cases and positive act cases is not a difference 
in what is done; both omitters and actors commit the crime. The difference is in 
how they commit the crime. It’s a difference in means. A person can commit 
murder by omission, or by action; but either way he commits murder.155  
 
With the devaluation of the distinction between criminal liability for acts and omissions 
which Ashworth has promoted, Yaffe regards the continuing recognition of the “duty 
requirement” as a critical limitation on the expansion of liability in criminal law for 
omissions conduct. Almost thirty years earlier, Arthur Leavens had downgraded the 
distinction between acts and omissions for the purposes of determining criminal 
liability.156 For Leavens, the concept of legal duty was “no more than an imperfect proxy 
for the law’s requirement that there be an appropriate causal relationship between an 
actor’s conduct and the prohibited harm”.157  
 
 
154 See, for example, R v Gibbins and Proctor [1918] 13 Cr App R 134 where a defendant was convicted of 
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Applying considerations of causal connection to the mandatory reporting of suspected 
money laundering, the legal duty to report established in section 330(1) of POCA 2002 
does not fit into this theoretical mould. In many cases, the maker of a mandatory report 
has no connection or association with the third parties who are involved in suspected 
money laundering, and a failure to make a report will not have caused the offending 
conduct to have taken place. Ashworth leaves open whether there is a need for a causal 
connection or association to be established between the actor’s failure to report and the 
predicate offending. Presumably, the answer is “no” since as Ashworth recognises, it is 
sufficient for the jurisprudential foundation to support a duty to assist the State in the 
detection of crime to rest solely on the notion of civil responsibility. Paradoxically, in the 
case of corporate mandatory reporting, the reporting obligation fits more snugly into this 
traditional construct, especially where a corporate self-report is made, and the company 
has been involved in the underlying criminality which forms the substance of the report.  
 
3.3.3 Corporate responsibility 
 
Ashworth’s construction of omissions liability around a civic duty of social responsibility 
is supported by Jeremy Horder’s work in this area. Horder does not use the language of 
social responsibility, but he does recognise legislative developments which look towards 
an enhanced level of civic commitment by cajoling the citizenry into acting in the wider 
public interest. For Horder, criminalising a failure to disclose a money laundering 
suspicion is a paradigm example of a wider development in English criminal law which 
has established a polity termed as the “bureaucratic-participatory state”.158 “In the 
bureaucratic-participatory state, the relevant measurement of participation, as a means to 
an end, is the extent to which citizens can be persuaded or coerced into contributing to 
better bureaucratic decision-making in the public interest”.159  
 
The State’s interest in receiving disclosures is “diachronic”, as “businesses handling 
money” are coerced into “not [missing] an opportunity to “blow the whistle” on possible 
money launderers”.160 The “good citizen of the bureaucratic-participatory state is the co-
operative, honest, and truthful citizen” who assists “officials whose task it is to secure 
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regulatory goals”.161 Corporate entities are part of the landscape in the “bureaucratic-
participatory state”, and the notion that the legislature has been “persuaded or coerced 
into contributing to better bureaucratic decision-making in the public interest” applies 
equally to a company as it does to an individual. The “bureaucratic-participatory state” 
no longer permits a company to define its duties exclusively by reference to the 
maximisation of profit for its shareholders.  
 
In recent years, the legislature has recognised an increasing range of corporate 
responsibilities and issues concerning social responsibility which are the subject of 
burgeoning academic literature and extensive discourse in the commercial world.162 The 
obligations are framed as civil law obligations and are not directly freighted with criminal 
liability, although consequential criminal liability hovers in the background as an 
enforcement tool. The enactment of section 172(1)(d) of the Companies Act 2006 is an 
oft-quoted instance, where the legislature requires a company director to act in a way 
which is most likely to promote the company’s success, having regard to several factors 
including “the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment”. In a further development, large companies must include in their “non-
financial information statement” a description of how the directors have had regard to 
the duty in section 172,163  as well as other communitarian considerations such as social 
matters, respect for human rights, and anti-corruption and anti-bribery matters.164 A 
criminal offence is committed by every company officer if a section 172 statement is not 
uploaded onto the company’s website and is punishable summarily buy a maximum fine 
of £1,000.165 
 
3.4 A PUBLIC WRONG 
 
So far, the discussion has proceeded on the assumption that a breach of civic duty by 
failing to report suspected money laundering constitutes a justifiable public wrong which 
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is supported by criminal sanction. In this section, this assumption is subjected to scrutiny. 
Nearly thirty years after the publication of his article outlining the difference between the 
conventional view and the social responsibility view of liability for omissions in criminal 
law, Ashworth returned to the topic and asked hard questions about the justification of 
deploying the criminal law as a mechanism for enforcing an expanding number of positive 
duties which include duties to report such as the mandatory reporting obligation in 
section 330(1) of POCA 2002.166 The issue is not whether the legislature is able to impose 
criminal liability for an omission, but rather, whether it is a proportionate and appropriate 
response for a criminal sanction to be invoked. 
 
Ashworth begins by noting that the determination whether to invoke the criminal law for 
a breach of a civic duty is “a threshold decision”:167  
 
Where the moral wrong is serious (in terms of the direct harm to victims), there 
is a strong case for criminalisation in order publicly to mark and condemn the 
wrong. Both elements have considerable indeterminacy. Thus, the seriousness of 
the moral wrong may be assessed by reviewing the harmfulness of the act or 
omission and the culpability involved. In determining the harmfulness of an 
omission, the interests at stake must be identified (e.g., the right to life, physical 
integrity), and the arguments for placing the duty on the individual must be clear 
and strong. The second element, whether the wrong “properly concerns the 
public” such that only the State should punish it, is manifestly opaque since it is 
difficult to be sure when the State has (or has not) the standing to prosecute for 
a particular type of violation in order to lead to conviction and punishment.168  
 
3.4.1 Failure to report suspected money laundering 
 
In the case of a failure to report suspected money laundering, the State’s entitlement to 
prosecute the failure, as well as those responsible for the predicate offending, is not in 
doubt, and therefore, the second element is easily satisfied. Satisfying the first element is 
more challenging. The interests at stake are readily identifiable as the discovery, 
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investigation, and prosecution of those involved in the commission or serious criminal 
activity and the laundering of its illicit proceeds. There are also strong arguments in favour 
of requiring an individual or corporate person to disclose this information to the State 
authorities since, by virtue of their confidential work in the regulated sector, they are 
uniquely placed to know or suspect the handling of criminally obtained funds.  
 
Ultimately, as Ashworth recognises, whether a failure to report suspected money 
laundering should be criminalised “depends on the view [which is taken] about the 
seriousness of money laundering”,169 and one should add, the underlying predicate 
offence which is likely to be revealed in the narrative of the disclosure report, or during 
the course of an investigation. Ashworth expresses reservations about the criminalisation 
of a failure to report suspected money laundering, although he does not articulate a 
concluded view. Ashworth’s main concerns focus on the maximum penalty of five years 
for an offence of negligence which “appears disproportionately high”,170 and the 
illogicality of a criminal offence of failing to report suspected money laundering in 
circumstances where there is no equivalent criminal offence for failing to report homicide 
or rape.171 In addition, Ashworth draws attention to the lack of causal connection or 
association, since “the harm factor is at one remove, as it were, and the culpability 
(knowingly or dishonestly) must be assessed in relation to that (discounted) harm”.172 
 
Where there is a strong case for criminalising an omission, Ashworth notes that there are 
many countervailing factors against criminalisation which must also be considered. One 
of these factors is whether the criminalised conduct will interfere with fundamental rights 
such as freedom of expression or the right to privacy.173 In terms of fundamental rights, 
the engagement of the privilege against self-incrimination is presently unrecognised, but 
as Ashworth commented in connection with the offence of misprision, “[i]f the privilege 
against self-incrimination and right to silence are to mean anything, they ought to stand 
in the way of such an offence”.174  
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As Ashworth acknowledges, the decision whether to criminalise conduct by omission is 
a question of judgment and priority: 
 
In the final analysis, the fairness of imposing the various duties on individuals or 
on commercial organisations depends on contest political conceptions of whether 
crime prevention in these spheres is an ‘inherently government function’ and to 
what extent it is acceptable to expect individuals or companies to take a hand in 
the suppression of crime.175 
 
Suffice it to note that in the case of criminalising individuals and companies working in 
the regulated sector for failure to report, and self-report, suspected money laundering, the 
UK Government is able to present a strong case. Between April 2019 and March 2020, 
the NCA received 573,085 disclosures of suspected money laundering.176 Following 
investigation, proceeds of criminal activity totalling £172 million was restrained or 
forfeited,177 and in three cases the UK was able to restrain criminal assets on behalf of a 
foreign jurisdiction. As reported by NCA previously, “[t]his demonstrates the unique 
value of the SARs regime – in that SARs submitted are directly leading to new law 
enforcement investigation.”178 Information from AML disclosures triggered multiple 
investigations into tax avoidance and tax evasion, leading to the recovery by HMRC of 
over £40 million in public revenue.179 The NCA stores disclosures on its computer data 
base for six years,180 which means that somewhere between 1.5 million and 2 million 
disclosures are held at any one time. This is a significant “common pool resource” 
available to the State in the fight against serious and organised crime.  
 
Whether the societal benefits to the State authorities are sufficiently significant to justify 
criminalising an individual or corporate failure to report, especially when the costs of 
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compliance by those working in the regulated sector are considered,181 is a matter which 
has been much discussed. The UK Government’s response to criticisms of the AML 
reporting requirement has been expressed on many occasions.182  
 
In several instances, the legislature’s judgment in the enactment of the mandatory 
reporting offence has been judicially supported as a proportionate response to the 
challenges inherent in the detection, investigation and prosecution of money laundering 
the proceeds of serious and organised crime. In Ahmad v HM Advocate, 183 when upholding 
a conviction for failing to report suspected money laundering contrary section 330(1) of 
POCA 2002, the High Court of Justiciary noted that “the apparent purpose of the section 
is to prevent money laundering and in particular to provide assistance to the investigatory 
authorities, so that they may investigate [money laundering]”.184 The Court added that the 
reporting obligation is “entirely consistent with the [European] Directives which the 
legislation was designed to implement”.185  
 
In R v Duff,186 the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) highlighted the importance of 
imposing a custodial sentence on a solicitor for failure to report suspected money 
laundering. The Court remarked that the omission was “a very serious matter and 
breaches of the legislation by professional people cannot be overlooked”.187 Likewise, in 
R v McCartan,188 a solicitor had been convicted of a failing to report offence. Citing with 
approval the decision in R v Duff, Lord Kerr explained that the Court “needs to take a 
firm line where a breach of this important species of legislation by a professional person 
has occurred. A custodial sentence will almost invariably be required to make clear the 
importance of scrupulous adherence to the requirements of the legislation”.189 To the 
same effect in R v Griffiths,190 which again involved a solicitor convicted of an offence of 
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failing to report suspected money laundering, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
reduced a sentence of fifteen months to six months imprisonment. The Court added that 
it did not leave the case “without underlining to all professional people involved in the 
handling of money and with an involvement in financial transactions the absolute 
obligation to observe scrupulously the terms of this legislation and the inevitable penalty 
that will follow failure so to do”.191  
 
The AML reporting requirement has also successfully withstood scrutiny in the ECtHR 
and the ECJ. In Michaud v France192 an argument that the mandatory reporting provision 
is incompatible with rights to privacy and due process guaranteed by the ECHR failed. 
Here, the failure to report suspected money laundering triggered an administrative and 
not a criminal sanction, but nonetheless the attack on the reporting requirement failed in 
the light of the ‘legitimate aim pursued’ by the reporting requirement and “the particular 
importance of that aim in a democratic society”.193 The legitimacy of the AML regime has 
also been upheld by the ECJ in the face of similar attack.194 
 
Looking beyond the parameters of the AML regime, the legislative imposition of a duty 
to report information relating to the commission of serious crime has been judicially 
upheld in Ireland. In Sweeney v Ireland, 195, the Irish Supreme Court held that a requirement 
to disclose information to the State authorities contained in section 9(1)(b) of the 
Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998 was compatible with the provisions 
of the Irish Constitution. Section 9(1)(b) criminalises a person’s failure to disclose 
information which he knows, or suspects, will materially assist in securing the 
apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of another person in the commission of a 
serious offence, or in preventing the commission of such an offence. In reaching its 
decision, the Court was heavily influenced by the fact that the reporting requirement 
applied only to a serious criminal offence committed by another, thereby implicitly 
preserving the ability of a person to assert the privilege against self-incriminating 
information in appropriate circumstances. The Court rejected a construction of the 
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reporting requirement in section 9(1)(b) which would have obligated a person involved 
in a crime to confess their participation.196  
 
3.5 HOHFELDIAN ANALYSIS 
 
Having located the foundation for criminalising a failure to report suspected money 
laundering in the twin notions of civil duty and social responsibility, Hohfeldian analysis 
provides a useful tool through which the nature of the duties and responsibilities may be 
illuminated.  Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s analysis of legal conceptions promotes the 
notion that all legal relations may be adequately described  in terms of “rights” and 
“duties”.197 However, Hohfeld criticised reliance on these twin concepts as reflecting a 
“paucity and confusion” regarding actual legal conceptions and suggested the term 
“rights” tended to be used indiscriminately to refer to a privilege, power or immunity 
rather than a right in the strictest sense which is most frequently applied to an interest 
[sic, a right] in property.198 The solution, Hohfeld believed, was to limit the broad and 
indiscriminate use of the term “right” to “a definite and appropriate meaning” by aligning 
it with the concept of “duty” as its invariable correlative.199 “In other words”, Hohfeld 
explained, “if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, the correlative 
(and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place …. The privilege 
of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off”.200  
 
One of the difficulties with this analysis is the problem of defining all legal relationships 
within a matrix which recognises legal duties and correlative rights to the exclusion of 
other concepts. Hohfeld cited by way of example the difficulty experienced by an 
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academic writer in conceptualising the duty placed upon an innkeeper who exercises a 
public calling to serve every person who is a member of the public. The writer observed 
that “[i]t is somewhat difficult to place this exceptional duty in our legal system. The truth 
of the matter is that the obligation resting upon one who has undertaken the performance 
of public duty is sui generis”.201 Hohfeld explained that the writer experienced this difficulty 
because he failed to appreciate that the innkeeper was “holding out” under a personal 
liability rather than a personal duty.202 In this instance, the innkeeper takes upon himself 
an altruistic responsibility, in respect of which there is no correlative right. 
 
Applied to the AML regime, in so far as mandatory reporting under section 330 is 
concerned, considerations of sui generis do not arise. Persons working in the regulated 
sector obtain their special status by virtue of their occupation which carries with it a 
personal duty to report suspected money laundering when required to do so. In 
Hohfeldian terms, by virtue of the mandatory reporting requirement, the State has a right 
to receive from an individual or company a report of suspected money laundering, and 
there is a correlative duty on the part of an individual or company to report suspected 
money laundering in accordance with the statutory requirements. The State has a right to 
expect that this duty to be met.  
 
The relationship between mandatory reporting and the engagement of the privilege 
against self-incrimination can also be analysed in Hohfeldian terms, although in order to 
achieve a coherent outcome the circumstances in which the privilege can be asserted must 
be widened beyond Hohfeld’s perception. Hohfeld viewed the privilege narrowly, as 
reflecting no more than the negation of a duty to give evidence as a witness in court 
proceedings. To quote from Hohfeld, “in the law of evidence the privilege against self-
incrimination signifies the mere negation of a duty to testify, a duty which rests upon a 
witness in relation to all ordinary matters; and quite obviously such privilege arises, if at 
all, only by virtue of general laws”.203 Hohfeld describes the privilege as the negation of a 
duty, but more accurately, the privilege is a right which belongs to a witness who is at risk 
of giving self-incriminating evidence.  Where there is an obligation on a person to testify 
in Court, there is a correlative right to require that the witness answers questions which 
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he is asked. But where the answers may be self-incriminating, the witness has the right to 
assert the privilege, and the State has a duty to protect this right and ensure that self-
incriminating questions are not answered.  
 
In his reference to the privilege, Hohfeld was intent on demonstrating the nature of the 
correlative relationship between right and duty. Hohfeld was not seeking to delineate the 
boundaries of the privilege or the rationale which sustains it. Suffice it to note that when 
it is appreciated the privilege has a wider application beyond the situation where a witness 
is testifying in court, an analysis of the mandatory reporting obligation and the privilege 
in Hohfeldian terms becomes possible.  
 
Therefore, with reference to corporate self-reporting, there are multiple rights and 
correlative duties. Hohfeldian reasoning posits that if the State has a right to demand a 
corporate self-report of criminal conduct, this right is reflected in a correlative duty on 
the part of the company to make the self-report. Then, with regard to the privilege against 
self-incrimination, if a company has a right to assert the privilege, this right correlates 
with a duty on the part of the State not to require a company to disclose information 
which is self-incriminating.   Hohfeldian discourse illustrates the existence of rights and 
correlative duties which operate in parallel with each other.  
 
3.6 ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIME 
 
Economic analysis provides an interesting perspective when seeking to understand 
developments in criminal law, and corporate reporting of criminal conduct is a perfect 
topic for consideration. As a legislative regime directed at the detection of money 
laundering and serious criminal activity, it would be surprising if economic considerations 
had not influenced the architecture of the AML regime. The economic advantages 
flowing from corporate self-reporting, whether voluntary or compulsory in nature, serve 
the interests of the State, and to a lesser extent, the interests of a company which has self-
reported. The exposition of a duty-based model of corporate self-reporting is fortified by 
an analysis which visibility through the lens of economic theory can offer.    
 
In his Treatise on Crimes and Punishments published in 1764, Cesare Beccaria perceived 
that the relationship between crime and punishment was proportionate, in the sense that 
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if an arithmetical calculation could be applied, there would be sale of punishment which 
“descend[ed] from the greatest to the least” depending upon the severity of criminal 
conduct in question.204 The idea of applying an arithmetical calculation to crime and 
punishment was novel, and sixteen years later, Jeremy Bentham developed this idea as 
part of his utilitarian theory which held that the general object shared by all laws, including 
criminal law, was the total happiness of the community.205 More particularly, Bentham 
explained that “the value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is 
sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence”,206 and that “the greater the 
mischief of the offence, the greater is the expense which it may be worthwhile to be at, 
in the way of punishment”.207  
 
The contemporary approach, as exemplified by Gary Becker, is to view economic theory 
as a tool for analysing choices made by the legislator and the criminal alike.208 It is the role 
of the legislator to minimize the costs to society of the crime which the criminal commits, 
together with the costs to society associated with the prevention, detection, and 
enforcement of the crime. Meanwhile, the criminal makes a calculation of a different sort. 
The criminal calculates the utility in terms of his gain from the criminal conduct, 
comparing the costs likely to be incurred by him as a result of committing the criminal 
conduct, and then reaching a rational determination as to whether or not to commit the 
criminal conduct in question. It is the aggregate effect of each decision made cumulatively 
by the totality of criminals to commit crime which becomes impactful. Whilst not all 
criminals act rationally, for instance in crimes of violence involving loss of self-control, it 
is economic crime which poses the greatest threat to the economy.  In 2019, economic 
crime was estimated to cost £37 billion in the UK.209 
 
The next step in the emergence of a modern perspective on economic theory was taken 
by Richard Posner when he analysed the substantive doctrines and concepts of criminal 
law which had not been previously addressed.210 Posner derived the basic criminal 
prohibitions from the concept of efficiency and contended that judges and legislators 
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often reasoned implicitly in economic terms. Neal Katyal provided a paradigm example 
of this approach with the offence of conspiracy, arguing that co-conspirators have 
significant economic value to a prosecuting authority since they are valuable sources of 
information and many prosecutions would not be possible without them.211 Katyal cited 
a study in 1998 which found that conspirators implicating their co-conspirators “helped 
the government obtain guilty pleas of co-defendants, additional convictions and arrests, 
prosecution of new defendants, recovery of assets, cooperation of known and new co-
defendants, and deportations”.212 
 
In the area of corporate criminal liability, economic analysis of enforcement models in 
the United States has been associated with a discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the imposition of strict vicarious liability which renders a company 
criminally liable for the actions of its employees, however senior or junior they may be. 
Conventional understanding suggests that the imposition of vicarious liability operates to 
reduce corporate crime, since the wider exposure to financial sanction is said to deter the 
future commission of criminal activity. Hence, criminal conduct is deterred efficiently. 
Jennifer Arlen challenges this view on the ground that it ignores the corporate 
enforcement expenditure which needs to be considered.213 In fact, Arlen believes that the 
policy of increased corporate vicarious liability may even lead to an increase in criminal 
activity rather than a decrease.214 The burden of Arlen’s argument is that the imposition 
of vicarious liability presents companies with conflicting incentives. Increased 
enforcement expenditure ought to reduce the number of employees who commit criminal 
acts by increasing the probability of detection, but as a result of detecting these criminal 
acts and self-reporting them to the enforcement authorities the company increases its 
exposure to large criminal fines.215 In addition, rather than lead to a greater level of 
transparency in relation to corporate wrongdoing, the imposition of vicarious liability 
would create an incentive for a company to cover up rather than disclose wrongdoing 
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3.6.1 Self-reporting: an economic solution 
 
The solution, according to Arlen and Reinier Kraakman, lies in the utility of the voluntary 
self-reporting model.  Corporate policy should incentivise companies by exempting them 
from criminal penalties where they have self-reported criminal activities committed by 
their employees and co-operated with the prosecution authorities to convict the 
individual employees who are involved.216 The effect of this solution would be to place a 
duty on a company to undertake extensive monitoring, corporate self-reporting and 
police co-operation, and in consideration the company would escape criminal sanction.217 
This would not remove company policing from the criminal law arena since if a company 
failed to self-report its employee’s wrongdoing or declined to co-operate with the 
prosecution authorities, the company would commit a criminal offence and incur a 
substantial financial penalty. Alan Mitchell Polinksy and Steven Shavell follow Arlen and 
Kraakman’s approach in a review of the theory of the public enforcement of law, asking 
whether sanctions should be reduced in cases where a company self-reports before an 
enforcement authority discovers the wrongdoing for itself.218 Polinsky and Shavell 
conclude that it is “generally socially desirable for the structure of enforcement … to 
encourage self-reporting”.219 There are three reasons. First, self-reporting reduces 
enforcement costs because the enforcement authority is not required to identify the 
violator. Secondly, self-reporting reduces risk because potential violators know their 
wrongdoing will be reported to the enforcement authorities. If no self-report is made, 
there is considerable risk as to whether the wrongdoing will be discovered or not. Thirdly, 
self-reporting allows harm to be mitigated and facilitates its containment and rectification.  
 
It is not difficult to see how mandatory corporate self-reporting under the AML 
legislation can also be viewed in this manner, as an economically efficient way of policing 
corporate misconduct applying a duty-based approach supported by criminal sanction 
where necessary. In the case of voluntary self-reporting, the State “nudges” a company 
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into making a self-report,220 whereas in the case of a mandatory self-report, a company is 
compelled. Either way, a company makes a self-report, and the same economic analysis 
applies. The three factors identified by Polinsky and Shavell which promote voluntary 
self-reporting apply with equal force to the economic forces which support the 
compulsory model.  
 
The impact of corporate self-reporting shifts the costs of detection from the State onto 
companies operating in the private sector. Pejoratively, the State has recruited the 
company to act as an unpaid, involuntary (and sometimes deeply resentful) informant, to 
assist in the detection of suspected money laundering and the underlying predicate crimes. 
The cost shifting arrangement requires a company to make this contribution in the 
broader interests of the community. Putting in place corporate procedures to reduce 
exposure to economic crime is also part of the remediation process associated with the 
corporate self-reporting.221 Costly compliance processes require individuals and 
companies to identify a customer and any individual or company beneficially associated 
with a customer. A company is also required to obtain information on the source of a 
customer’s monies.222  
 
Ronald Coase would have regarded these corporate contributions as a “social cost”.223 
Coase draws on cases involving the tort of nuisance to establish his point that there is 
always a “transaction cost” to be paid. A claimant may complain about noisy machinery 
emanating from a nearby factory, but in determining whether to grant an injunction for 
nuisance, the law will require him to accept some degree of discomfort for the general 
good.224 This is the “social cost” which is required to paid. Here too, in the context of 
corporate reporting of suspected money laundering, a company is required to accept some 
degree of discomfort as the costs of detecting money laundering and the underlying 
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predicate crimes shift from the public to the private sector. The burden of Coase’s 
argument is that it is inefficient to impose the cost of detecting money laundering on the 
State, because the detection can be achieved at lower cost, and probably at a higher rate, 
by companies. The “social cost” of engaging in commercial financial activity rests in the 
acceptance of the reporting duty. The choice rests with a company, either to withhold 
information and commit a criminal offence or accept the need to self-report and suffer 




The discussion in this chapter regarding a theoretical home for mandatory reporting has 
borne out the sharp distinction between a corporate model of self-reporting which is 
voluntary and consensual, and a coercive model which compels corporate self-reporting 
by threat of criminal prosecution. Whilst there are commonalities shared by the two 
models which an economic approach illuminates, mandatory self-reporting is 
characterised by the imposition of a legal duty, whereas in the case of voluntary self-
reporting, if there is any duty, it is no more than a duty to act morally by confessing to 
the corporate criminality which has been committed. The moral element is clouded by 
the hope or expectation of reward, in the form of leniency, and in reality, voluntary self-
reporting constitutes no more than a bargain struck between a company and the State in 
which both sides perceive themselves to be winners. In contrast, there is no deal to be 
struck in the case of mandatory self-reporting. It is the brute force of the law, or as Robert 
Cover would have said, the violence of the law,225 which compels corporate self-reporting 
of criminal conduct, subject to any relief which may be asserted in the form of the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
In so far as corporate reporting of third-party criminality and corporate self-reporting are 
concerned, the critique in this chapter has demonstrated that they are mitochondrially 
two branches of the same tree. The mandatory reporting requirement in section 330 of 
POCA 2002 is adequately theorised as a criminal offence of omission supported by 
notions of civic duty and social responsibility which individuals and companies are 
required to discharge. The theoretical foundation for the use of coerciion is soundly 
 
225 Robert Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ [1985–86] 95 Yale LJ 1601. 
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established in terms of corporate third-party reporting and equally, in the absence of any 
acknowledgment of the privilege against self-incrimination, the compulsory making by a 









The second research question explores whether the mandatory obligation to self-report 
engages the spirit, if not the letter, of one of the most important liberties at common law, 
namely, the privilege against self-incrimination. In 2007, the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR described the Latin maxim “nemo tenetur seipsum accusare” (“no man is bound to 
accuse himself”) as a principle which “goes back to the very origins of Western legal 
tradition”.226  
 
In addressing the second research question, this chapter researches the rationales which 
support the privilege, before developing an argument in chapter 8 that the mandatory 
requirement to self-report criminal conduct engages, or ought to engage, the privilege 
against self-incrimination. An assessment of the risk to the report maker of criminal 
prosecution is fact specific. In a case where the State authorities have no prior knowledge 
of the criminality, they may initiate a criminal investigation following receipt of a 
mandatory self-report. In due course, the report maker may, or may not, be prosecuted 
for the commission of criminal conduct identified in the report. The key point is that 
once a self-report is made, the maker loses control of his information and exposes himself 
to a risk of criminal prosecution which, prior to the filing of the self-report, was not there. 
In cases where the State authorities have some prior knowledge of the criminality, the 
filing of the self-report could increase the risks of prosecution where the narrative of the 
self-report is incriminating and indicates new avenues for the gathering of evidence which 
could be presented against him. 
 
The continuing place of the privilege against self-incrimination in English law has been 
the subject of much judicial and academic discussion.227 On several occasions, the judges 
have sought to limit the application of the privilege,228 and there are multiple instances of 
 
226 Jalloh v Germany App no 54810/00 (ECtHR, 11 July 2006) per Judge Zupančič at page 39 of the judgment. 
227 For a comprehensive review, see Andrew Choo, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Criminal Justice 
(Hart Publishing 2013). See also, Hannah Quirk, The Rise and Fall of the Right to Silence (Routledge 2017). 
228 See, for example, Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola v Lundqvist [1991] 2 QB 310 (the privilege 
cannot be claimed by a company for the protection of its office holders); R v Hertfordshire CC, ex p Green 
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the legislature disapplying the ability to assert the privilege or restricting its application.229 
The courts have upheld these provisions at the highest level as proportionate restrictions 
on the privilege’s application,230 and in applying a legislative provision which abrogates 
the privilege the courts will not lean against the abrogation if this would frustrate the 
legislative purpose such as reducing the risk of injustice to victims of crime.231 This is part 
of a wider trend which has witnessed the erosion of the right to silence at trial,232 and the 
increasing tendency of the legislature to require defendants to accept criminal 
responsibility or prove their defence.233 The application of the privilege is threatened in a 
criminal justice system which demands a person’s co-operation in the detection of crime 
which they have allegedly committed. The stakes are high, when the legislature imposes 
a mandatory self-reporting requirement based, at least in part, on a supposition that a 
person – individual or corporate – is expected to divulge self-incriminating information. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is not to critique these developments or weigh the respective 
arguments which militate for and against the contemporary application of the privilege. 
The public interest consideration which supports the abolitionist, or at least restrictive, 
approach is acknowledged, but it is not the subject of consideration. Rather, this chapter 
is devoted to the discovery of theoretical justifications which have underpinned the law’s 
recognition of the privilege from the time of its origin. The boundaries of the privilege 
should be set by the perils which it has sought to protect against, and their identification 
influenced by the purposes which the privilege has been developed to serve.  
 
The development of multiple rationales has been evolutionary, from the time of the 
privilege’s origin until the present day. Historically, the rationale underlying the 
recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination rested on the concern that 
information obtained as a result of physical threat would not be regarded as reliable. 
Today, as the use of physical threat has become an anathema and prohibited by Article 3 
of the ECHR, the element of coercion is more commonly reflected in other forms of 
pressure which are brought to bear on an individual to elicit self-incriminating 
 
Environmental Industries [2002] 2 AC 412 (the privilege does not apply to the compulsory provision of 
information in extra-judicial inquiries).  
229 See, for example, Theft Act 1968, s 31(1) (questions regarding recovery of stolen property); Road Traffic 
Act 1988, s 7 (breath, blood, or urine sample on a drink-driving charge). 
230 See, for example, Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681. 
231 Phillips v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 28 [14] 
232 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 34. 
233 Bribery Act 2002, s 7(2); Criminal Finances Act 2017, ss 45(2), 46(3). 
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information. These forms of pressure undermine the dignity of an individual and his right 
to privacy, and whilst physical pressure may not be exerted, the element of coercion is 
extant. The common denominator between the use of physical pressure and other forms 
of pressure is an attack on an individual’s freedom to make an unforced determination as 
to whether or not he should disclose self-incriminating information. In both instances, 
an individual’s freedom to choose is lost and the individual’s right to make an 
autonomous decision is overborne. The purpose of the disclosure is none to the point.  
The underlying rationale supporting the privilege is not affected by the nature of 
proceedings in which the information is sought, and the reach of the privilege is not 
limited to situations where incriminating information is sought during the course of 
criminal investigation or civil proceedings. 
 
4.2 A PRIVILEGE, OR A RIGHT 
 
Before exploring the origin of the privilege against self-incrimination and the light which 
history can shed on the rationales supporting the privilege, a moment of linguistic 
reflection is helpful. There are occasions where a study of terminology used to express a 
legal concept can assist in revealing the depth of its meaning and the nature of its 
application. 
 
The legal protection against self-incrimination is most frequently expressed as a privilege, 
although sometimes it is referenced as a right. In this instance, there is no significance in 
the articulation of the protection as a privilege and not a right, even though the two 
concepts are different in meaning and effect. The ability of an accused person to remain 
silent in the face of an accusation is almost always expressed as a right, and as becomes 
apparent from a study of its historical origin, the privilege against self-incrimination and 
the right to silence have a common origin. This suggests that, unusually, the variation in 
terminology is a distinction without a difference and where the privilege against self-
incrimination is described, it is the right of silence which is being referenced. And vice 
versa. 
 
This approach is consistent with the understanding of a privilege in common parlance. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a privilege as “a right, advantage, or immunity 
granted to or enjoyed by an individual, corporation of individual which is beyond the 
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usual rights or advantages of others”.234 Therefore, in its literal meaning the privilege 
against self-incrimination operates to exempt a person by reason of a right or advantage 
from answering questions or producing information or documents, which would 
incriminate himself. To reflexively self-incriminate is to accuse oneself; it is “the action 
of making oneself appear guilty of a crime or misdemeanour”.235   
 
Arthur Corbin’s seminal analysis of legal terminology and the philosophical dichotomy 
notes that the difference between a privilege and a right is not always as pronounced as 
the language would suggest.236 Certainly, in ordinary parlance, a privilege connotates an 
advantage granted by a person in authority which is concessionary in nature. In this way, 
the notion of a privilege contrasts sharply with the notion of a right, which connotes a 
moral or legal entitlement. As Corbin explains in a passage which establishes the 
dichotomy: 
 
If A invades B’s house, we are able to predict that the police will eject A, that a 
court will give judgment for damages, and that the sheriff will levy execution. We 
say that B had a right that A should not intrude, and that A had a duty to stay out. 
But if B had invited A to enter, we know that those results would not occur. In 
such case we say that B had no right that A should stay out and that A had the 
privilege of entering.237 
 
However, in a later passage Corbin develops the understanding that there are instances 
where a privilege sits alongside a right and transforms into one. Corbin makes the point 
that although a privilege does not itself include conferral of a right to non-interference 
from another person, a privilege and a right are very commonly found together.238 Corbin 
gives as an example the case of self-defence to an assault in criminal law: “A assaults B. 




234 <www.oed.com/> accessed 13 April 2021. 
235 ibid. 
236 Arthur Corbin, ‘Legal Analysis and Terminology’ [1919] 29(2) Yale Law Journal 163. 
237 ibid 164–65. 
238 ibid 167. 
239 ibid 168. 
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Whether the right to self-defence is conceptualised as a right or a privilege, the outcome 
is the same. Either way, the law permits B to strike back, and provided he uses no more 
than reasonable force, the law exempts B from criminal responsibility by reason of his 
conduct.  
 
Self-defence arises where a defendant has committed a criminal offence but seeks 
exemption from criminal responsibility on the ground that his action was justified.  In 
this instance, the common law has long recognised that force used in defence of a private 
interest such as personal safety, or to reference the language of human rights, individual 
autonomy, is permitted where the force was reasonable. Although the ability to self-
defend is described loosely as a right or entitlement, Corbin’s conceptualisation of self-
defence as a legal privilege is noted.240 
 
Thus, the law arrives at the same place whether protection from self-incrimination is 
conceptualised as a privilege or a right. The emerging question is not the significance of 
any distinction between an understanding of a privilege in contrast to a right, but rather, 
why the law should regard it as appropriate to permit an exemption from a legal 
requirement to answer questions or initiate a disclosure of information, where the content 
of the answer or disclosure is self-incriminating. 
 
4.3 ORIGIN OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
 
As a first staging post on the journey to understand the nature of the privilege against 
self-incrimination and the rationales which underpin it, it is helpful to trace the origins of 
the privilege. If the foundation stone of the privilege can be identified, a review may shed 
light on the discussion about the potential engagement between the privilege and the 
 
240 In Social Philosophy (Foundations of Philosophy) (Prentice-Hall Inc 1973), 56–58, Joel Feinberg discusses the 
notion of privilege, in the context of duties and rights. Whether Feinberg would afford equivalence to the 
ability to self-defend and the privilege against self-incrimination is uncertain. Feinberg recognises that self-
defence affords an individual liberty to strike back and override a duty of forbearance, in contrast to another 
type of privilege which is no more than a benefit, and which is not necessarily justified. An example is the 
rule in some US jurisdictions that physicians are not required to appear in court if they are a defendant in 
a negligence claim. Whilst the philosophical analysis is impeccable, Feinberg’s application is questionable. 
It is by no means clear that the law imposes a duty of forbearance on an individual when his interests are 
threatened. In contemporary academic literature, privilege has assumed a broader connotation, forming the 
substratum of discussion about social injustice. The discussion frames privilege as a vehicle for maintaining 
established systems of racist, gender and classist narrative domination. See Alison Bailey, ‘Privilege: 
Expanding on Marilyn Frye’s “Oppression”’ [1998] 29(3) Journal of Social Philosophy 104. 
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mandatory self-reporting obligation, and in due course the ability of a corporate entity to 
assert the privilege.  
 
4.3.1 Biblical origins 
 
The first recognisable mention of the Latin maxim “nemo tenetur accusare seipsum” in the 
Western legal tradition can be traced to the writings of Saint John Chrysostom who was 
Archbishop of Constantinople at the start of the fifth century. Regarded as an important 
Early Church Father who fought against abuse of power by authority, in his work Epistle 
to the Hebrews Saint John Chrysostom instructed his followers that they should remain 
silent in the face of public accusation: “I do not tell you to display your sin before the 
public like a decoration, nor to accuse yourself in front of others”. [Non tibi dico ut ea 
tamquam pompam in publicim proferas, neque ut apud alios te accuses]”.241 
 
Although the context of St Chrysostom’s exhortation is obscure, the spirit of the 
instruction took root in canonical law. By the 12th century the jurist known as Gratian, 
writing in his Decretum (a restatement of early canon law) was able to declare that 
Christians should not self-incriminate themselves. “I do not tell you to incriminate 
yourself publicly or to accuse yourself before others” [Non tibi dico, ut te prodas in publicum, 
neque apud alios accuses].242 
 
These two closely associated formulations gave way to the shorter maxims, “nemo tenetur 
prodere seipsum” and “nemo teneur accusare seipsum”, with which the common law is familiar 
today.  
 
The rule against self-incrimination in canon law, encapsulated in these Latin maxims, 
appears to have been drawn from a principle in Biblical law which focused on the lack of 
evidential weight which could be placed on a statement made by a person who had been 
accused of committing serious wrongdoing.243 Different scenarios may be posited. An 
 
241 John Chrysostom, ‘Homiliae in Epistuluam ad Hebraeos’ in JP Migne (ed), Patrologiae Graeca, vol 63, 186, 
213, 216 
242 Gratian, Decretum Gratiani, 2nd Part, Causa 33, Qu (de poenitentia) c.87, 1 in Aemilius Friedberg (ed), 
Corpus Juris Canonici (1879–81) 1184. 
243 Richard Helmholz, ‘Origins of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European IUS 
Commune’ (1990) 65 NYUL Rev 962; Jonathan Fisher, ‘Self-incrimination at Common Law – Its Origin 
in Jewish Law’ in Nahum Rakover (ed), Jerusalem City of Law and Justice (The Library of Jewish Law 1998) 
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individual may be pressurised into making a false confession, or he may seek to acquit 
himself by casting wrongful aspersion on others. Either way, an individual subject to 
accusation is cast as a potentially unreliable witness. In the Old Testament there is an 
injunction which instructs a court of law “not to accept a false report or extend your hand 
with the wicked to be a corrupt witness”.244  
 
The principle is summarised in the Talmud245 in a shorter formulation that a person who 
has committed wrongdoing is not permitted to act as a witness in his defence.246 The 
Talmud explains that a person cannot be convicted of a criminal offence by his own 
testimony, since his statements cannot be treated as credible. An individual stands in the 
same place as a relative to the accused, whose statements would also be rejected for the 
same reason.247 A respected religious commentator in the thirteenth century summarised 
the position regarding the evidential incompetence of an accused person as follows:  “The 
root reason for this injunction is obvious: Any person who has no concern for himself 
and will not care about his evil deeds, will have no care or concern for others. Therefore, 
it is not proper to believe him about anything”.248 
 
The parallelism between testimony given by an accused person and evidence tendered by 
a relative presented as a guardrail against unreliable testimony, which may or may not be 
self-incriminating. Indeed, a suspected person and a relative may wish to give evidence in 
their favour which is not self-incriminating. But in both cases the suspected person and 
relative are treated as incompetent witnesses because of the risk that their evidence is 
unreliable. In the case of a person suspecting of committing culpable activity, the Biblical 
concern is not that an accused person may be compelled by threat or violence to make 
an admission against his interest, but rather that he may choose to do so, by virtue of his 
unbalanced state of mind249 or a preconceived motivation to mislead. As Norman Lamm 
 
461–74; Samuel Levine, ‘An Introduction to Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law, with Application to the 
American Legal System’ (2006) Loy LA Int'l & Comp L Rev 28, 2, 257.   
244 Exodus 23:1. 
245 The Talmud is the central text of Rabbinic Judaism and the primary source of Jewish religious law and 
Jewish theology. 
246 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 9b. 
247 ibid. 
248 Sefer Ha-Hinnukh, Exodus (Shemot) 23:1. Sefer Ha-Hinnukh is a Jewish rabbinic text which 
systematically discusses the commandments of the Torah. It was published anonymously in 13th-century 
Spain. 
249 Psychological study has revealed that false confessions may be made voluntarily for several different 
reasons. Irrationally, a suspect may have a ‘morbid desire for notoriety’, feelings of guilt about perceived 
criminal conduct, or an inability ‘to distinguish fact from fantasy’. More rationally, a suspect may have 
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explained: “[Biblical law] … is obviously concerned with protecting the confessant from 
his own aberrations which manifest themselves, either as completely fabricated 
confessions, or as exaggerations of the real facts”.250 
 
In due course, the invocation of the privilege in the courts came to be associated with the 
need to protect suspected persons against making unreliable admissions in the face of 
coercive practices, but in its earliest conception the Biblical root of the privilege was more 
concerned with the unreliability of a self-incriminating statement than the use of 
compulsion to obtain it. 
 
4.3.2 Self-incrimination in Tudor and Stuart England 
 
During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the privilege against self-
incrimination became recognised as a vitally important shield against oppression. Queen 
Elizabeth I restored Protestantism following the reign of her Catholic half-sister Mary 
Tudor, and Archbishop Whitgift prosecuted many members of clergy suspected of not 
conforming to the Protestant faith. Under Elizabethan law, an individual could be 
compelled to testify as to his innocence by answering a series of interrogatories on oath. 
The judges expressed concern about the legality and operation of the oath, known as the 
ex officio oath,251 and the matter became the subject of public controversy.  
 
Sir Edward Coke successfully argued in Cullier v Cullier252 that the oath could not be 
administered in an ecclesiastic prosecution before a secular court. The law report discloses 
Coke’s citation of the maxim “nemo tenetur prodere seipsum” in support of his argument. A 
few years later, when sitting as a Judge on an application for a writ of habeas corpus to the 
High Commission Court in Burrowes v The High Commission,253 the maxim having been cited 
many times in argument and judgment, Coke (by now, Chief Justice) said that the 
 
decided to protect himself or a third party from admitting some other fact such as more serious criminal 
wrongdoing or some other embarrassing conduct. In short, he may have decided that the benefits of a false 
confession outweigh the costs. See Memon, Vrij and Bull, Psychology and Law: Truthfulness, Accuracy and 
Credibility (Wiley 2003) 78.                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
250 Norman Lamm, ‘The 5th Amendment and Its Equivalent in Jewish Law’ 17 Decalogue Jour 1 (January 
to February 1967) 10, 12. 
251 The ex officio oath was a religious oath made by an accused before questioning by Star Chamber to answer 
all questions truthfully. 
252 Cullier v Cullier (1589) Croke, Elizabeth 201, 78 ER 457 
253 Burrowes v The High Commission (1615) 3 Bulstrode 48, 81 ER 42 
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Elizabethan statute was a penal law, “and so they are not to examine one upon oath upon 
this law; thereby to make him to accuse himself”.254  
 
Charles Firth treated the circumstances in R v John Lilburn (1639) as a pivotal event in the 
recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination, calling into question the usual 
procedure in Star Chamber which led to the abolition of the oath in due course.255  
Lilburn, an anti-royalist leveller, refused to take the oath and was tortured until he obeyed.  
Subsequently, in May 1641, the House of Commons resolved that Star Chamber had 
behaved in a manner which was “illegal, and against the liberty of the subject: and also 
bloody, cruel, barbarous, and tyrannical”.256 Writing in the mid-seventeenth century, the 
English jurist John Selden summarised the position as follows: “By an old law, moreover, 
it becomes established that no person should be delivered up to be executed … or for 
punishment by lashes by his own confession, but by the testimony of others …”.257 
 
In the reign of James II (1633–1701) the privilege was firmly established as applying 
generally in connection with an accused’s inability to give self-serving testimony. In 1680, 
it was noted in Emlyn’s Edition of Hale’s Pleas of the Crown that “a man concerned in 
point of interest is not a lawful accuser or witness in many cases”.258 For Sir Matthew 
Hale, the fact that an individual is parti prix is stated as the reason for the privilege and 
harks back to the rule’s Biblical origins. 
 
4.3.3 Self-incrimination in the United States 
 
In the United States, the privilege against self-incrimination was incorporated into the 
Constitution as a fundamental right under the “due process” provision. The Fifth 
Amendment, ratified on 15 December 1791, provides that “no person shall … be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law”, and as the United States 
Supreme Court has made clear, “due process of law” embraces the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to silence. At the beginning of his judgment in Miranda v 
 
254 ibid. 
255 Charles Harding Firth, ‘Lilburne, John’ in Leslie Stephen (ed), Dictionary of National Biography, 1885–1900, 
vol 33, 243–44.  
256 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, vol I (1883), 345. See generally 343–
45. 
257 John Selden, De Synhedriis Veterum Ebraecorum, (1653), 2:545. 
258 Emlyn’s Edition of Hale’s The History of Pleas of the Crown, (1736), I-302. 
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Arizona,259 which concerned the interrogation of an accused while in police custody, Chief 
Justice Warren cited at length from the 1896 judgement of the Supreme Court in Brown v 
Walker.260 The citation, from Mr Justice Brown’s judgment, is worthy of attention because 
it demonstrates the Supreme Court’s understanding of the historical origin of the privilege 
against self-incrimination and its underlying rationale:  
 
The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the 
inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, 
which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of 
the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688 and the erection of additional barriers 
for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] not 
uncommon even in England. While the admissions or confessions of the 
prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale 
of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent 
connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions 
put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the 
witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a 
corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident 
in many of the earlier State trials … made the system so odious as to give rise to 
a demand for its total abolition.261 
 
Echoing the Tudor and Stuart development of the privilege, it is the potential unreliability 
of self-incriminating statements which underpins the privilege where coercive measures 
have been applied. Pressure exerted by representatives of State authorities when 
questioning an individual about the alleged commission of criminal behaviour can 
produce inconsistent or contradictory answers, causing the reliability of the answers to be 
heavily compromised.  
 
In one sense, this contrasts with the Biblical formulation where, as noted, the concern 
about the unreliability of self-incriminating statements is promoted not by the application 
of physical threats but by the mental state or purpose of the individual. The former is an 
 
259 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966] 
260 Brown v Walker, 161 US 591 [1896] 
261 Miranda, 442–43. 
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external catalysing force, whereas the latter is inherently internal. In another sense, 
though, there is a unifying thread which connects the common law and Biblical 
approaches. The common denominator is concern about the potential unreliability of 
self-incriminating statements. The touchstone is the need for reliability, with both 
approaches operating to safeguard the dignity of the individual as well as the efficacy and 
integrity of the trial process.  
 
4.3.4 A wider application of the privilege 
 
To this point, the application of the privilege has been discussed in the context of its role 
in Court proceedings. However, as the application of the privilege developed, broader 
considerations about the fairness of due process came into sharper focus, especially where 
physical threats or coercive measures were brought to bear on an accused person during 
an investigation by the State authorities. The ability to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination was no longer confined to relieve an accused person from incriminating 
himself when giving evidence during legal proceedings. In time, the treatment of suspects 
during a criminal investigation became equally important. This expansion in the 
application of the privilege is reflected in the theoretical justifications for the existence of 
the privilege which have been articulated in the post-Second World War era.  
 
With legal protections against the use of oppressive practices in securing confessions 
increasing, the concern here transcended the reliability of the evidence and began to focus 
on the nature of the relationship between the individual and the State, and whether it was 
acceptable in terms of fairness and justice for State authorities to require a person to make 
self-incriminating statements during an investigation into their suspected wrongdoing. 
Considerations relating to the respect for a person’s dignity, their personal autonomy and 
their entitlement to privacy came into play. Edwin Driver notes in his comment on the 
seminal decision of the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v Arizona,262 “[t]he Court 
… evidenced a shift in concern from fear of the untrustworthiness of coerced confessions 
to protection of the individual”.263  
 
 
262 Miranda (n 259). 




As Justice Goldberg explained in Murphy v Waterfront Commission two years earlier:  
 
[The privilege against self-incrimination] reflects many of our fundamental values 
and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime 
to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for 
an accusatorial, rather than an inquisitorial, system of criminal justice; our fear 
that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and 
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by 
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown 
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the 
individual to shoulder the entire load; our respect for the inviolability of the 
human personality and of the right of each individual to a private enclave where 
he may lead a private life; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our 
realization that the privilege, while is sometimes a shelter to the guilty is often a 
protection to the innocent.264  
 
These sentiments were echoed by Mr Justice Murphy in the High Court of Australia in 
the following terms:  
 
The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is part of the common law of 
human rights. It is based on the desire to protect personal freedom and human 
dignity. These social values justify the impediment the privilege presents to 
judicial or other investigation. It protects the innocent as well as the guilty from 
the indignity and invasion which occurs in compulsory self-incrimination; it is 
society’s acceptance of the inviolability of human personality. 265   
 
Referencing an association between the privilege against self-incrimination and concerns 
for human dignity, these citations articulate a value which penetrates the root of the 
human condition. As Sir Geoffrey Gilbert explained in the early part of the 19th Century 
in his Law of Evidence, the privilege against self-incrimination was associated with “the 
natural duty of self-preservation”, since the “Law of Nature … commands every Man to 
 
264 Murphy v Waterfront Commission [1964] 378 US 52, 55. 
265 Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission [1983] 152 CLR 328. 
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endeavour his own Preservation …”.266 For Gilbert in England, and others such as Justice 
Goldberg in the United States and Mr Justice Murphy in Australia, the association 
between a wide application of the privilege and the law’s respect for individual dignity, 
personal autonomy, and enjoyment of privacy was clearly established.  
 
This association is visible in the approach of the ECtHR to the topic. In recent times, the 
breadth of the privilege’s application was articulated by the ECtHR in Murray v United 
Kingdom,267 with the Court declaring that “… there can be no doubt that the right to remain 
silent under police questioning and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally 
recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair 
procedure”.268 
 
The broadest exposition of the privilege against self-incrimination is to be found in the 
judgment of the ECtHR in Heaney and McGuiness v Ireland 269 where legislation compelling 
a citizen to give a full account of his movements and actions during a specified period 
was held to be incompatible with the privilege against self-incrimination if the citizen’s 
answers might have tended to incriminate him. The Court: 
 
recalled its established case-law to the effect that, although not specifically 
mentioned in Article 6 of the [European] Convention [on Human Rights], … the 
right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself, are generally recognised 
international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure 
under Article 6. Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of the accused 
against improper compulsion by the authorities, thereby contributing to the 
avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 
6.270   
 
Stressing that the privilege “must be interpreted in such a way as to guarantee rights which 
are practical and effective as opposed to theoretical and illusory”,271 the Court re-iterated 
 
266 Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence (1805), cited by Mike MacNair, ‘The Early Development of the 
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267 Murray v United Kingdom [1996] 22 EHRR 29. 
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that a mandatory requirement to provide information would not be allowed to 
“destroy[ed] the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination”.272   
 
This reasoning accorded with the ECtHR’s previous decision in Funke v France273  and 
clearly established that in so far as an international human rights court was concerned the 
privilege against self-incrimination can be engaged in cases involving the compelled 
disclosure of information more generally and is not confined to potentially incriminating 
answers given by a witness during the course of legal proceedings.  Certainly, the 
theoretical justification for a wider application of the privilege is strong when viewed 
through the prism of fundamental rights and human dignity.  
 
4.4 SELF-INCRIMINATION IN THE ENGLISH COURTS 
 
Recognition of a wider role for the privilege intertwined with considerations of human 
dignity, personal autonomy, and privacy entitlements, can sometimes lead to a different 
outcome to that which would have been reached if a more traditional understanding of 
the rationale underlying the privilege had been applied. The difference can have important 
practical consequences, and, in respect of one aspect of criminal investigatory powers 
English law remains in a state of confusion as a result of appellate judges expressing 
different views about their understanding of the scope of the privilege. 
 
In two recently decided cases, judges expressed divergent opinions on whether the 
privilege can protect an individual from a requirement to produce pre-existing documents 
which were created independently of the investigation. A narrow conception sees the 
privilege as a protection against the production of evidence in the face of threat and 
coercion, whereas a wider conception recognises the value of the privilege more 
extensively, as part and parcel of respect for individual dignity, personal autonomy, and 
enjoyment of privacy. In the narrower conception, the privilege does not operate to 
protect the production of pre-existing documents which are self-incriminating, since they 
were not created as a result of threat or coercion. In the wider conception, the privilege 
does attach to these documents, since the compelled production of self-incriminating 
documents whenever created is an affront to individual dignity, personal autonomy, and 
 
272 ibid 54. 
273 Funke v France [1993] 16 EHRR 297; see also Murray v United Kingdom [1996] 22 EHRR 29. 
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enjoyment of privacy. The point is important in the context of the making of a mandatory 
self-report of criminal conduct in accordance with section 330(1) of POCA 2002. In the 
case of a mandatory self-report where is no criminal investigation afoot, the self-
incriminating information will necessarily be pre-existing. 
 
4.4.1 River East Supplies 
 
The first of the two cases is R (River East Supplies Ltd) v Crown Court at Nottingham,274 a 
decision of the High Court in 2017. In this case, an order was sought against a company 
to produce documents for the purposes of a criminal investigation into the company’s 
alleged involvement in counterfeit activity. The company was awaiting trial in the Crown 
Court and unsuccessfully resisted the making of an order on the ground that the privilege 
against self-incrimination may be violated.  
 
Following a line of earlier cases decided in the English courts and several key cases 
decided in the ECtHR, the High Court held that the application of the privilege against 
self-incrimination did not extend to the production of documents whose creation pre-
existed the commencement of the criminal investigation. In the Court’s view, there is a 
clear distinction to be drawn between pre-existing documents, and documents – or other 
material - created only by virtue of criminal or regulatory investigation or proceeding. The 
former category of documents falls to be regarded as made independently of the will of 
the person seeking to assert the privilege, and therefore one to which the privilege does 
not apply, whereas the latter category may have been produced by compulsion. 
Production of documents or other materials falling into the latter category engages the 
privilege where there is risk that the documents or material may be adduced by a 
prosecutor as evidence to incriminate the suspect.  
 
The position is complicated by the fact that the limitation on the application of the 
privilege to pre-existing incriminating documents is a comparatively recent innovation in 
English law emerging from the decision in the ECtHR in Saunders v United Kingdom.275 In 
this case, the Court ruled that answers given by a defendant in a compulsory interview 
held during the investigation of his case should not have been used as evidence against 
 
274 R (River East Supplies Ltd) v Crown Court at Nottingham [2017] EWHC 1942 (Admin). 
275 Saunders v United Kingdom [1993] 23 EHRR 313 
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him. However, in reaching this conclusion, the Court made clear that the application of 
the privilege was limited, and the admission of documents or material independent of the 
will of the suspect would not be precluded: 
 
68.  The Court recalls that … the right to silence and the right not to incriminate 
oneself are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of 
the notion of a fair procedure ... Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection 
of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities thereby 
contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice … The right not to 
incriminate oneself … presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek 
to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained 
through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused.  
In this sense the right is closely linked to the presumption of innocence …  
 
69.  The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned, however, with 
respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent.  As commonly 
understood…, it does not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material 
which may be obtained from the accused through the use of compulsory powers 
but which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect such as, inter 
alia, documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine samples 
and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA testing.276  
 
Prior to the decision of the ECtHR in Saunders v United Kingdom, there had been a trilogy 
of cases decided in England at the highest level in which the limitation was not 
acknowledged. In Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contract Litigation277, the 
House of Lords declined to quash a production order in civil litigation relating to the 
production of pre-existing incriminating documents not because they were pre-existing, 
but because their production would not increase the risk of penal proceedings. As Simon 
LJ noted in R (River East Supplies Ltd),278 the argument proceeded on the assumption that 
the privilege could apply to pre-existing documents. The same assumption was made by 
the House of Lords in Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre279 where the 
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privilege was raised in answer to an order for search and seizing of documents made in 
civil proceedings.280 Similarly, in AT & T Istel Ltd v Tully281 the House of Lords upheld 
the application of the privilege in answer to an order against a defendant to disclose 
incriminating pre-existing documents in civil litigation.  
 
Disregarding the House of Lords cases and treating them as overtaken by subsequent 
decisions, the High Court in R (River East Supplies Ltd) drew on the reasoning in Saunders 
v UK in support of its conclusion that the privilege against self-incrimination was not 
engaged by the production of pre-existing incriminating documents. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court reviewed an extensive literature of domestic282 and ECtHR283 
judgments which populate this disputed area of law. The High Court was fortified in its 
decision by some of the judicial comments made in AT & Istel Ltd where the House of 
Lords considered itself conscripted into deciding the case in the way in which it did. Lord 
Templeman thought the application of the privilege was very limited since its purpose 
was to ensure only voluntary confessions would be adduced into evidence.284 Lord 
Templeman added that the application of this reasoning was non-sensical where a court 
has directed the production of documents or imposed a requirement on a defendant to 
specify his dealings with another’s property.285 Earlier in his judgment, Lord Templeman 
described the privilege as representing no more than “an archaic and unjustifiable survival 
from the past”.286 For Lord Griffiths, his Lordship considered that pre-existing 
incriminating documents spoke for themselves and there was no risk of a false confession 
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4.4.2 Volaw Trust 
 
The second case to address the same point is Volaw Trust and Corporate Services v HM 
Attorney General for Jersey,288 a decision of the Board of Privy Council in 2019. In Volaw 
Trust, the Privy Council was more nuanced about the ability of a person under criminal 
investigation to assert the privilege in response to a notice requiring the compulsory 
production of pre-existing incriminating documents. The judgment left open the 
possibility that the privilege could apply to pre-existing incriminating documents in a 
situation where legislation had established a regime for compelled production. In this 
case, Jersey’s Comptroller of Taxes had been required by the Norwegian tax authorities 
to serve a compulsory production notice on the first appellant, a trust company 
incorporated in Jersey, and seven further appellants who were associated entities and 
effectively the trust company’s clients. The notice required production of information for 
multiple purposes, one of which involved the investigation or prosecution of criminal tax 
matters relating to an individual and his associated companies (i.e., the seven further 
appellants) to whom Volaw Trust had provided trust services. One of the issues raised 
was whether the trust and the associated companies could assert the privilege against self-
incrimination under Jersey customary law which follows English common law.  
 
In denying the appellants the ability to assert the privilege, the Privy Council sought to 
achieve a synthesis between the divergent positions articulated in the House of Lords 
trilogy of cases and R (River East Supplies Ltd). On the one hand, the Privy Council was 
concerned to recognise the potential engagement of the privilege narrowly. On the facts 
of Volaw Trust, the Privy Council held that the coercive nature of the notices was relatively 
benign. Failure to produce documents in response to the notice was punishable by a fine 
and not loss of liberty; there was no physical or psychological pressure to respond to the 
notices; if the potentially incriminating materials was sought to be adduced in criminal 
proceedings in Norway, as an ECHR signatory country Article 6 due process protections 
would fall to be honoured; and in any event the notices did not call for any admission of 
liability but rather the production of documents containing objective factual information 
about the taxpayer’s affairs.  
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In a tilt towards the notion of qualified due process protections, the Privy Council noted 
there was a strong public interest in the investigation and prosecution of tax crimes, and 
it was not unreasonable to expect co-operation from financial service providers in this 
regard. On the other hand, the Privy Council declined to reject the appellants’ assertions 
that, at least in principle, the privilege could apply in common law to pre-existing 
incriminating documents.289 Although the point was acknowledged and left open, the 
Board’s judgment, delivered by Lord Reed, was significant, in so far as it addressed the 
rationales which underlay the application of the privilege. The rationale of the right lay, 
according to Lord Reed, “in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion 
by the authorities, thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice …”.290  
 
Lord Reed noted that production of information under compulsion renders evidence 
potentially unreliable only where the compulsion is “improper” and proceeded to ask 
what renders compulsion “improper” for this purpose. Drawing on the ECtHR judgment 
in Ibrahim v United Kingdom,291 Lord Reed indicated that in determining the propriety or 
otherwise of compulsion, four factors needed to be considered:  
 
… the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the documents in 
question, the weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of 
the offences at issue, the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure, 
and the use to which any material so obtained may be put.292 
 
It is a pity that Lord Reed did not consider the different rationales which underlie the 
privilege against self-incrimination, and how their application might produce different 
outcomes where the production during a criminal investigation of self-incriminating pre-
existing documents is involved. The judicial reasoning is weak; furthermore, there was no 
consideration in Lord Reed’s judgment of the High Court decision in R (River East Supplies 
Ltd). This was unquestionably unhelpful, on any view. 
 
In the first section of this chapter, the effort to discern the underlying rationales has 
focussed on a critique of the origin of the privilege and a snapshot of judicial decisions in 
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criminal and civil cases. In the next section, the thoughts of three leading academic writers 
are discussed. 
 




In a comprehensive paper published in 1986,293 David Dolinko subjected the theoretical 
foundation of the privilege against self-incrimination to robust analysis. Dolinko’s thesis 
is that justification for the privilege can be anthologized in two different ways. The first 
way identifies principles perceived to be critical for the proper administration of the 
criminal justice system and articulates the justification for the privilege through this prism. 
Dolinko categorises these arguments as “systemic rationales” since their essence 
“encourages third-party witnesses to appear and testify by removing the fear that they 
might be compelled to incriminate themselves” and “removes the temptation to employ 
short cuts to conviction that demean  official integrity”.294 In other words, the application 
of the privilege against self-incrimination is deemed to be necessary in order to maintain 
a fair system of criminal justice predicated on an accusatorial approach.295 
 
The second way identifies principles perceived to be essential for the maintenance of 
human dignity and the recognition of personal human rights. Dolinko classifies this 
approach as “individual rationales” since they bring together “the arguments that 
compelled self-incrimination works an unacceptable cruelty or invasion of privacy, as well 
as the notion of respect for the inviolability of the human personality, and the belief that 
punishing an individual for silence or perjury when he has been placed … in a position 
in which his natural instincts and personal interests dictate that he should lie … is an 
intolerable invasion of his personal dignity”.296 In addition to the perceived cruelty 
associated with compelling a person to confess his wrongdoing, coercive self-
incrimination presents a person with an extremely difficult choice.  
 
293 David Dolinko, ‘Is there a rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination?’ [1985–86] 33 UCLA L 
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As Dolinko explains: 
 
A person who has in fact broken the law must decide to produce the evidence of 
that violation (and subject himself to criminal penalties), or to lie (and subject 
himself to punishment for perjury), or to remain silent (and incur liability for 
contempt). The notion that it is cruel to subject someone to this “trilemma” has 
influenced the Supreme Court [in the United States] as well as some scholars.297 
 
Dolinko concludes that “neither of these justificatory strategies succeeds” and that “the 
role of the privilege … can be explained by specific historical developments but cannot 
be justified functionally or conceptually”.298  In so far as “systemic rationales” are 
concerned, Dolinko contends that none of the three goals of a criminal justice system are 
advanced by the privilege against self-incrimination. These goals are identified as the 
accurate determination of guilt, minimizing the chances of convicting the innocent and 
ensuring that State officials are not tempted to abuse their power. In point of fact, the 
privilege obstructs these goals by preventing the State from obtaining evidence which 
would convict the guilty.299 The concern about convicting the guilty also appears to 
underlie Dolinko’s objection to the principal arguments in the alternative “individual 
rationales” wrapper. Whilst it may be cruel to compel self-incrimination and contrary to 
basic human instinct, the fact remains that a person “certainly has the capacity to tell the 
truth – he just does not want to, because he believes it will greatly increase the likelihood 
that he will be found guilty”.300 
 
At first blush, it is difficult to undermine the logic of Dolinko’s objections to “systemic 
rationales” arguments. It is self-evident that a witness might prefer not to answer 
questions when he has something to hide, and although the information may not 
necessarily relate to the commission of a criminal offence, common sense suggests this is 
often the case. Moreover, Dolinko is not alone in his conclusion that the privilege against 
self-incrimination defies rational justification. As Judge Henry Friendly reminded his 
audience in a lecture over fifty years ago,301 the learned writer John Wigmore was less than 
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enthusiastic about any extension to the application of the privilege beyond the walls of a 
court, urging that the privilege should be “kept within limits the strictest possible”.302 
Friendly proceeded to record that in 1934 Dean Roscoe Pound criticised the privilege “as 
a device which serves not the innocent, but rather the evil purposes of criminals and 
malefactors who are well advised.303 In similar vein, three years later Mr Justice Cardozo 
commented in Palko v Connecticut304 that “justice would not perish if the accused were 
subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry”.305 Certainly, the interests of justice are 
served where an accused person voluntarily confesses to the commission of his crime. It 
is trite to observe that a voluntary confession is recognised as a significant mitigating 
factor to be considered when a criminal court passes sentence on an accused. 
 
However, there are difficulties with Dolinko’s analysis.  
 
First, it assumes the abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination will always 
promote the accurate determination of guilt. This would be true if self-incriminating 
statements could be treated as reliable, but as already noted, this is not always the case. 
The same flaw undermines the proposition advanced by Alan Dershowitz that there are 
circumstances where the obtaining of a coerced statement may be lawfully approved. 
Dershowitz posits the obtaining of advance judicial approval for the use of non-lethal 
torture in a hypothetical ticking bomb case where a captured terrorist refuses to divulge 
self-incriminating information about the planning of an imminent attack. In this type of 
case, Dershowitz maintains that the aim of a judicial torture warrant is “to reduce the use 
of torture to the smallest amount and degree possible, while creating public accountability 
for its rare use”.306 But again, the accuracy of answers given under torture cannot always 
be guaranteed. History is replete with occasions where an accused wrongly confessed 
under torture. As John Langbein noted, “the agony of torture created an incentive to 
speak, but not necessarily to speak the truth”.307  
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Secondly, Dolinko’s arguments are detached from the reality of the circumstances which 
pertain when an interview takes place during the course of a criminal investigation. An 
interview, whether under caution or not, presents considerable potential for unfairness. 
Typically, the interview takes place in a specially designed interview room in a police 
station, with minimal furniture and facilities. The interviewers sit directly opposite the 
interviewee, in close proximity. The interviewers set the agenda and lead the questioning, 
with an objective of obtaining a confession from the interviewee. The expectation in an 
interview is that an interviewee will answer questions, and silence in response to a 
question pre-supposes the expectation that an interviewee will speak. The interviewers 
can present the interviewee with evidence against him, in the form of a narrative account 
or a witness statement.  
 
Where the interviewer develops a prima facie case on reasonable grounds which points at 
the interviewee’s culpability, whilst there is no legal requirement on the interviewee to 
respond, arguably there is a moral expectation that the allegations will be answered. Very 
often interviewers are highly experienced, whereas the interviewee is not. The interviewee 
will have legal representation, but he is denied access to his family and friends. Although 
an interview must be conducted strictly in accordance with a statutorily approved Code 
of Practice,308 an interview is a hostile and intimidating experience. The operation of the 
privilege against self-incrimination partially redresses the imbalance between the force of 
the State authorities and offers the suspect under interview some element of protection 
against this unfairness. As Chief Justice Warren commented in Miranda v Arizona, 
“incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, while 
not physical intimidation, is equally destructive of human dignity”.309 
 
When key protections are diluted, whether in the shape of the absolute prohibition against 
the use of torture enshrined in Article 3 of the ECHR,310 or the qualified right against 
self-incrimination as recognised in Article 6 of the Convention, criminal justice is the 
inevitable casualty.311  
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4.5.2 Gerstein  
 
Robert Gerstein takes an entirely different approach to locating the rationale justifying 
the privilege against self-incrimination, viewing the justification not through 
considerations of relieving a person from cruel dilemmas but instead the protection of a 
person’s right to privacy and his ownership of the incriminating information.312  
 
Gerstein’s starting point is Charles Fried’s work on the subject of personal privacy, in 
which Fried points out that “privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in 
the minds of others; rather, it is the control we have over information about ourselves”.313 
It follows that when compulsory investigation powers are exercised, in many instances 
the process will involve an involuntary disclosure of private information which the 
discloser might not have wished to disclose. Whilst the right to privacy is not an absolute 
right and historically the State has sought disclosure of certain types of information from 
its citizens, the compulsory divulgence of self-incriminating information raises sharper 
concerns. It is one thing for the State to require a citizen to disclose his income for tax 
purposes; it is quite another for the State to require a citizen to disclose that he has lied 
about his income and dishonestly evaded payment of tax, thereby guaranteeing himself a 
criminal conviction and a period of imprisonment. This is because, as Gerstein explains, 
self-incriminating information falls into a special category of information which it is 
acutely important for a citizen to control: 
 
I am thinking about what is likely to be involved in a confession beyond the bare 
recital of facts about the crime: the admission of wrongdoing, the revelation of 
remorse. I would argue that a man ought to have absolute control over the making 
of such revelations as these. They have generally been regarded as a matter 
between a man and his conscience or his God, very much as have been religious 
opinions. This, it seems to me, is a very important part of what lies behind the 
privilege against self-incrimination … It is not the disclosure of the facts of the 
crime, but the mea culpa, the public admission of the private judgment of self-
condemnation, that seems to be of real concern.314 
 
312 Robert Gerstein, ‘Privacy and Self-Incrimination’ [1970] 80 Ethics 87. 
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Gerstein acknowledges the distinction to be drawn between the situation where an 
individual’s confession is adduced in evidence against him and the position where a 
confession provides clues which lead an enforcement authority to establish his guilt. 
Noting that on occasions the line between the two situations can be a fine one, Gerstein 
continues by positing the situation where the State requires a citizen to submit records 
and reports in circumstances where the provision of information will be self-
incriminating. Here, Gerstein questions the extent to which the right to privacy is 
infringed: 
 
If … the information is of a sort which would normally be kept private and 
revealed only in the context of a confidential relationship, if the individual is being 
required, for example, to keep a private diary and reveal it to the government so 
that it can be examined for expressions of self-incrimination, then the privacy 
interest is very strong.315 
 
Although the production of self-incriminating information through the exercise of 
compulsory powers does not expose the reporter to immediate risk of prosecution, a 
serious breach in the reporter’s right of privacy and ability to retain control of 
incriminating information remains extant. As Gerstein points out, “the absence of this 
danger [of criminal prosecution] would have no effect whatever on the relevance of the 
privacy argument”.316 
 
Gerstein’s recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination through the prism of 
privacy is important because it sustains a wide application of the privilege. Any operative 
constraint needs to be justified in terms of proportionality, acknowledging as Gerstein 
does, that the right of privacy is not an absolute right and on occasions it will be qualified 
by a broader public interest in the State’s ability to obtain information from its citizens in 
circumstances where public interest considerations trump the rights of an individual.  
Typical examples arise in the context of public safety where there has been an accident at 
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work, or a road traffic accident and the police wish to identify the driver of the offending 
motor vehicle. 
 
Brown v Stott317 is the seminal decision in English law, where the Privy Council held that 
answers obtained pursuant to powers of compulsory questioning under section 172 of 
the Road Traffic Act 1988 overrode the privilege against self-incrimination. In contrast 
to the position where a notice for compulsory interrogation is served on a suspect under 
section 2(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987, section 172 provided for the putting of a 
single question and not prolonged questioning. As Lord Bingham pointed out, “[t]he 
answer cannot of itself incriminate the suspect, since it is not without more an offence to 
drive a car”.318 Nonetheless, the making of an admission in response to the exercise of 
compulsory interrogation powers is necessarily an invasion of privacy. A suspect may 
welcome the opportunity to make a confession of his criminal activity, and to this extent, 
his privacy has not been invaded. But notwithstanding, the admission will still have been 
made within a coercive framework.  
 
Gerstein’s approach has special resonance in the context of the AML reporting regime 
where an obligation to make a mandatory self-report of criminal conduct is concerned. 
In a situation where a suspect is interrogated under compulsory interview powers during 
a criminal investigation, the State authorities are already aware, or at least partially aware, 
of a certain amount of incriminating information. In this situation, if there is an 
appreciable risk of criminal prosecution after the investigation has concluded, the 
privilege against self-incrimination is engaged and operates to prevent the State authorities 
from adducing in evidence at trial any self-incriminating answers which the suspect has 
given. However, in the case of the mandatory reporting obligation under the anti-money 
laundering regime, the position is different. It is true that in this situation the State 
authorities have not designated a person to be a suspect and in this sense, there is no 
existential threat against him. But that said, where a person (whether individual or 
corporate) is mandated to make a self-report, he is required to proactively take the 
initiative by informing the State authorities of information about his own criminality, of 
which the State has no prior knowledge. There is a risk that ultimately the State authorities 
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may initiate a criminal prosecution against the person making a self-report, but there is 
no such risk at the time when the self-report is made. So here, applying rationales 
underpinning the privilege which pivot around the importance of evidential reliability, the 
privilege would not apply.  
 
In these circumstances, Gerstein’s approach of conceptualising the rationale for the 
privilege against self-incrimination through the prism of privacy rights is apposite. If an 
individual is required to respond to questions based upon facts already known by the 
State authorities, the infringement of privacy rights will be significant. But the impact of 
the infringement is much larger in the case of a person who is mandated to disclose self-
incriminating information where the State has no prior knowledge of the conduct in 
question, and a person’s loss of control over his private information will be greater.  
 
With reference to an invasion of privacy rights, it is one thing to require a person to act 
responsively in the face of an accusation; it is quite another to mandate a person to initiate 
a disclosure of his incriminating conduct in circumstances where the State authorities 
have shown no prior interest. Alongside an invasion of privacy, a person’s individual 
dignity and personal autonomy is also undermined. A requirement, supported by a threat 
of penal sanction positively to disclose information in the public interest represents a 
significant infringement of a person’s freedom to make important decisions about the 
way in which he chooses to live his life, whether the decision is made for good or ill. This 
is especially so in circumstances where the person is not under investigation and the State 





Abenaa Owusu-Bempah offers another perspective on the role played by the privilege 
against self-incrimination in a criminal justice system.319 Viewing the privilege positively, 
Owusu-Bempah suggests the privilege reflects an integral element of the compact made 
between the State and its citizens which acknowledges that a person should not be 
required to provide the State with self-incriminating information. As a constraint 
 
319 Abenaa Owusu-Bempah, Defendant Participation in the Criminal Process (Routledge 2017). 
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operating in a legal system which seeks to achieve a fair and efficient outcome in criminal 
cases, the privilege contributes to the legitimisation of the legal process.320  
 
Instead of conceptualising the criminal trial process as the mechanism by which individual 
and corporate persons are required to accept responsibility for their actions, Owusu-
Bempah reverses the perception by conceiving of a criminal trial as a process in which 
the State is “[called] to account for the accusations which it has brought against the 
individual, before that individual can be subjected to official condemnation or 
punishment.”321 It is the State which accounts to the person accused of committing a 
crime, and not the other way around. As part of this accountability, the State affords a 
person with an opportunity to be informed of the evidence against him.  
 
Owusu-Bempah takes an absolutist approach and makes clear that a defendant’s role in 
this demonstration of State accountability is entirely passive: “The defendant should be 
under no requirement to actively participate by answering questions or providing 
information during the pre-trial and trial stages, not least because to do so may assist the 
State in accounting for its accusations”.322  
 
This approach, adds Owusu-Bempah, is not undermined by the tendering of a pleas of 
guilty. This signifies no more than that a person has made a free and informed decision 
to admit his guilt and forfeited his right to require the State to prove the case against 
him.323 
 
In a powerful passage which resonates with a contemporary consideration of the value of 
the privilege against self-incrimination in a criminal justice system, Owusu-Bempah 
explained: 
 
The theory, and its absolutist approach, is grounded in political liberal theory and 
in the values of dignity, autonomy and freedom. The importance of these values, 
in relation to the contemporary liberal State, can be traced back to the emphasis 
placed on individualism during the age of enlightenment, and to social contract 
 
320 ibid 101, 102. 
321 ibid 9. 
322 ibid 9. 
323 ibid 9, fn 30. 
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theory. The meaning of dignity is often context specific, but at its core is a 
requirement that the intrinsic worth of every human being be recognised and 
respected. As part of our intrinsic worth, we have the authority to demand respect 
for our autonomy. To be treated with dignity this includes being treated as an 
autonomous individual; and able to make choices for oneself.324 
 
As Owusu-Bempah points out, this approach to the justification of the privilege affords 
it a wide application, protecting an individual against a requirement to provide self-
incriminating information and its subsequent use in a criminal trial.325  
 
Although Owusu-Bempah doubts whether the privilege should be abrogated on grounds 
of public interest, she accepts that limited exceptions may be justified where a person 
undertakes a regulated activity, and it would be impossible to prosecute a criminal offence 
without the defendant’s co-operation. Owusu-Bempah presents as an example the 
requirement in section 172(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, 326 the terms of which have 
already been noted.327 The mandatory reporting requirement in section 330(1) of POCA 
2002 would not fall within Owusu-Bempah’s classification of limited exceptions since the 
position there is strikingly different. Although a person, individual or corporate, operates 
in the regulated sector and undertakes regulated activity, when the State authorities 
become aware of criminal activity which would otherwise form the substance of a self-
incriminating suspicious activity report, the need for self-incriminating information is not 
present in order to prosecute those persons responsible for the commission of the 
criminal activity in question. There are many different ways in which the State authorities 
may become aware of the existence of the criminal activity without the submission of a 
mandatory self-report. Unlike the position in section 330(1) of POCA 2002, the 
requirement in section 172(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to disclose self-incriminating 
information is made in circumstances where the State authorities will always know that 




324 ibid 9, 10. Owusu-Bempah references in her footnotes Christopher McCrudden’s article, ‘Human 
Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ [2008] 19 European Journal of International Law 655, 
659–60, 679. 
325 Owusu-Bempah (n 319) 101. 




4.6 PRIVACY, DIGNITY AND AUTONOMY  
 
The critique of academic and judicial thinking demonstrates a shift away from an 
approach which articulates a rationale for the privilege based exclusively on a concern to 
ensure evidential reliability in circumstances where admissions against interest have been 
obtained under compulsion. Alongside this rationale, a second approach has emerged 
which favours the location of the rationale for the privilege in the coercive undermining 
of an individual’s rights to privacy, dignity, and autonomy. This dynamic is unsurprising 
in circumstances where, in societies governed by the rule of law, the use of physical threats 
to produce self-incriminating statements has markedly reduced, along with concerns 
about the unreliability of statements produced in this way. Today, the element of 
compulsion most frequently lies in the coercive mechanics of a legal framework which 
requires the production of incriminating information during the course of an investigation 
or legal proceedings where issues of criminal wrongdoing are involved.  
 
Viewing the underlying rationale of the privilege through prisms of privacy, dignity, and 
autonomy, has consequences. Instead of a model supporting the privilege which focuses 
on the pragmatic consideration of ensuring the reliability of evidence, a model founded 
on notions of privacy, dignity and autonomy has a strong moral dimension. If an 
individual has a moral right to enjoy his privacy, dignity and autonomy, and these rights 
are protected by the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, a denial of the 
ability to exercise the privilege infringes a person’s individual rights. Although connected 
by their intrinsic value to the person, the notions of dignity and autonomy are distinct. In 
the ordinary meaning of the words, dignity suggests a sense of worth, merit and esteem,328 
whereas autonomy is more closely associated with the ability of a person to make free 
choices and, in terms of Kantian philosophy, “the capacity of reason for moral self-
determination”.329 
 
Joseph Raz explains the nature of personal autonomy in the following terms: 
 
 
328 Oxford English Dictionary, <www.oed.com/view/Entry/52653?redirectedFrom=dignity#eid> 
accessed 12 April 2021. 
329 Oxford English Dictionary, <www.oed.com/view/Entry/13500?redirectedFrom=autonomy#e> 
accessed 12 April 2021. 
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The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should make 
their own lives. The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life. The 
ideal of personal autonomy is a vision of people controlling, to some degree, their 
own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives.330 
 
Autonomy is the key attribute of personhood, and by recognising a person’s right to assert 
the privilege against self-incrimination, the law is protecting the value of the person’s 
autonomy and personhood.331 
 
A narrative for recognising the rationale underlying the privilege against self-incrimination 
which focuses on concepts of privacy, dignity, and autonomy has broader implications 
for the application of privilege where concerns of evidential unreliability are not 
paramount. The mandatory self-reporting requirement pursuant to section 330(1) of 
POCA 2002 is a case in point. The coercive nature of the AML reporting regime is 
unlikely to cause a maker of a SAR to disclose self-incriminating statements in the text 
which are untrue or unreliable. But without question the coercive framework in which 
the SAR is required to be made has implications for the protection of the maker’s privacy, 
dignity, and autonomy. 
 
An approach to the privilege which does not regard unreliability as the exclusive hallmark 
validating for the inadmissibility of evidence is consistent with established principles at 
common law. Certainly, the truthfulness or otherwise of an admission is disregarded as 
irrelevant when a court considers whether a confession was made voluntarily and 
therefore admissible in evidence against the person who made it.332  
 
Confession evidence is commonplace in criminal trials, and in England and Wales it is 
enough to convict a defendant on his own admission without the need for corroborating 
evidence. Section 76(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE 1984”) 
provides that “a confession made by an accused person may be given in evidence against 
him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded 
 
330 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) 166. 
331 For further discussion of the relationship between personhood, dignity, and autonomy, see James 
Griffin, On Human Rights (OUP 2008) ch 8, 149–58, and Aharon Barak, Human Dignity, The Constitutional 
Value and the Constitutional Rights (CUP 2015) 124–29. 
332 The relevant statutory provision is to be found in s 76 of PACE 1984. 
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by the court in pursuance of this section”. A confession is afforded an inclusive definition 
in section 82(1) of PACE 1984 to include “any statement wholly or partly adverse to the 
person who made it, whether made to a person in authority or not and whether made in 
words or otherwise”. Where a defendant represents the content of a confession is likely 
to have been obtained involuntarily in consequence of anything said or done, section 
76(2) requires the prosecutor to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the confession had 
not been obtained in this way. 
 
This posits a scenario whereby, even if the content of a confession is reliable and truthful, 
the confession cannot be adduced into evidence unless the prosecution is able to establish 
that it was made voluntarily, in the absence of any threat made or inducement offered. 
As Lord Hailsham explained in Wong Kam-Ming v R,333 the common law recognised that 
admissions obtained by improper means should be excluded from evidence partly 
because of their potential unreliability “but also, and perhaps mainly, because in a civilised 
society it is vital that persons in custody or charged with offences should not be subjected 
to ill treatment or improper pressure in order to extract confessions”.334 Lord Hutton 
cited this passage with approval in R v Mushtaq,335 noting that in recent years, the courts 
had held that “in a civilised society a person should not be compelled to incriminate 
himself, and a person in custody should not be subjected by the police to ill-treatment or 
improper pressure”.336 The judicial references to the application of the privilege against 




It is clear from this critique that the development of underlying rationales in support of 
the privilege against self-incrimination has been evolutionary. At its Biblical origin, the 
concern of the courts to rely exclusively on independent evidence when making a fact-
finding determination was dominant, with the elimination of evidence adduced by a 
suspected person or a relative of one of the parties involved. Developed at common law 
in the furnace of Tudor and Stuart England, the rationale of the privilege shifted to a 
focus on the exclusion of self-incriminating evidence in criminal or civil proceedings 
 
333 Wong Kam-Ming v R [1980] AC 247. 
334 ibid 261. 
335 R v Mushtaq [2005] UKHK 25. 
336 ibid [7]. 
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where coercion or pressure had been brought to bear. In both instances, the need to 
ensure the reliability of evidence was the paramount concern. In more recent times, 
broader rationales for the privilege have been articulated, and these have been closely 
associated with considerations of human dignity, personal autonomy, and the entitlement 
to privacy. The privilege became enshrined as a constitutional right in the United States, 
and there is sound support for this view amongst leading judges, in the shape of Justice 
Goldberg in the United States and Mr Justice Murphy in Australia. Gerstein’s writings 
burnish this position with academic substance. Thus, multiple rationales have evolved to 
support the privilege against self-incrimination. Each rationale has, and retains, validity, 
and no single approach is mutually exclusive or wholly persuasive. Concerns to ensure 
evidential reliability in judicial determinations sit happily within a legal system which 
values the human dignity and a consensual balance between individuals and the interests 
of the State. As noted, when considering Gerstein’s contribution, there is a distinction to 
be drawn between the situation where a criminal investigation has been initiated, with due 
process rights already engaged, and a situation where the maker of a self-report may never 
become the subject of criminal investigation, let alone criminal prosecution. The other 
side of coin, of course, is that a person’s failure to self-report criminal conduct under 
section 330(1) of POCA 2002 constitutes a substantive criminal offence punishable by 
penal sanction, whereas compulsory interrogation powers are concerned with criminal 
process. 
 
To date, neither the legislature nor the judiciary have addressed the potential interaction 
between the privilege against self-incrimination and the mandatory reporting obligation 
set out in section 330(1) of POCA 2002.337 The key question which falls to be addressed 
is the extent to which the application of the privilege against self-incrimination operates 
to exempt a person from the obligation to self-report his criminal conduct pursuant to 
the otherwise mandatory reporting requirement. The nicety of the question is enlarged 
when the maker of the self-report is a corporate entity, where the narrative in a SAR 
incriminates both the company as reporter, and its officers and employees, since it is only 
through the deeds of its servants and agents that a company can act.   
 
337 The Supreme Court decision in Beghal v DPP [2016] UKSC 49 is the closest comparator. The case 
concerned sch 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, where Parliament had introduced a power which allowed police 
officers, immigration officers and customs officers to require an individual to answer questions for the 
purpose of determining whether a person was associated with terrorist activity. Failure to answer questions 
is punishable by penal sanction. There was neither a prior criminal investigation, nor an obligation on the 








In the last chapter, the thesis established that the reach of the privilege against self-
incrimination is potentially wide, embracing any situation where the law seeks to compel 
an individual or company to disclose information which prejudicially exposes the 
individual or company to the risk of criminal prosecution. In the case of a company, the 
position is complicated by a lack of academic (and judicial) clarity over the ability of a 
corporate entity to assert the privilege, in the same way as the privilege may be asserted 
by an individual. The question of corporate entitlement catalyses a broader discussion as 
to the basis on which the law recognises the ability of a company to assert any right or 
privilege, and whether the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination is 
distinguishable from a company’s ability to lay claim to more instantly recognisable rights 
such as the right to protect its property or good name. An individual’s right to claim the 
benefit of the privilege against self-incrimination predates the evolution of the modern 
corporate entity, and at first blush, with the development of the privilege at common law 
rooted in the concern of judges to provide protection for the individual against torture 
and other forms of oppressive behaviour, the justification for affording equivalence 
between an individual and a company is not obvious.  
 
The case for equivalence raises a wider issue since it exposes the juridical nature of the 
corporate entity to scrutiny. Does the law recognise that a company possesses rights 
which may be asserted against the State, and if so, on what basis? As Ernst Freund asked 
long ago: 
 
… if the corporation is a distinct person in law, of what nature is this person? Can 
we conceive of the holding of rights otherwise than as an attribute of physical 
personality? How is it possible, on any other basis, to deal with notions that are 
constantly applied to the holding of rights, and which explain their most 
important incidents: intention, notice, good and bad faith, responsibility?338   
 
338 Ernst Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations (University of West Virginia 1897) 7. 
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This is the third sub-question explored in this thesis. The chapter addresses the matter simply 
framed – Is a company entitled to assert a right, in the form of a legal claim on something 
or some other course of action, in the same way as an individual right?  
 
It is not possible to address the issue without excavating the attributes of the corporate 
form. There are some important questions which arise. Whilst an individual may 
contemplate their inner self, introspection is more challenging in the case of a company 
which lacks a natural origin and is constructively formed. The starting point for this 
enquiry is the exploration of a company as an entity which stands to be recognised as a 
legal person, and an evaluation of the incidents in terms of rights and responsibilities 
which characterise the nature of legal personhood. Is it possible to identify the incidents 
of corporate existence with rationally defensible criteria and conceptualise them within a 
traditional understanding of company law? The courts have consistently repeated that a 
company has an existence which is separate from its directors and shareholders, but what 
does this mean? There are two distinct but related questions here. The first involves the 
determination of legal personhood. Does legal theory accommodate the recognition of 
legal personhood in a corporate entity, and if so, on what basis is this recognition 
formulated? The second involves an examination of corporate personality. Does a 
corporate person have rights and responsibilities, and if so, on what basis are they 
grounded? Legal personhood is the consequence of incorporation, whilst legal personality 
reflects the nature of the corporate relationship.  
 
The burden of this chapter suggests that whilst traditional approaches to corporate 
personhood provide a sound structural footing to secure a theoretical framework for the 
creation and management of a company, they are inadequate to support a holistic 
approach to the recognition of corporate rights beyond those which flow from (a) the 
contractual ontology of the company’s existence, or (b) are integral to the company’s 
business, or (c) serve to protect individual interests which would otherwise be exposed if 
the corporate right was not acknowledged. 
 
The chapter begins with an exploration of the notion of legal personhood, and how 
corporate personhood has been recognised in three different models which have 
inhabited this space, known respectively as “contract theory”, “concession theory”, and 
“real entity theory”. The chapter reviews how civil and criminal cases in the courts have 
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contributed to an understanding of legal personhood and the assertion of company rights 
which the law has recognised. In many cases, recognition of corporate rights has been 
motivated by pragmatic considerations. Unlike the case of an individual, the fact of legal 
personhood alone has not provided a sufficient basis for the assertion of a corporate 
right, and the challenge for theoreticians of company law is to articulate a sound 
jurisprudential foundation for the recognition of corporate rights in these cases. The 
chapter proceeds to consider the development of a school of thought which seeks to 
determine the nature and extent of corporate personality by reference to the internal 
workings of a company’s social organisation. Although this approach emphasises the 
independent development of a company’s character, the chapter demonstrates that 
ultimately the organisational theory is unable to escape its dependency on the acts and 
omissions of individuals such as directors and senior employees who guide the company’s 
conduct.  
 
5.2 LEGAL PERSONHOOD  
 
The endeavour to uncover a foundation for the recognition of corporate rights begins 
with an examination of what is meant by the notion of legal personhood. This notion, to 
borrow language from Hans Kelsen339, is the grundnorm, or point of origin, of the corporate 
form. Definitionally, in the United States Restatement a “person” is expressed to mean 
“(a) an individual; (b) an organisation that has legal capacity to possess rights and secure 
obligations; (c) a government, political subdivision, or instrumentality or entity created by 
government; or (d) any other entity that has legal capacity to possess rights and incur 
obligations”.340 The definition is wide and embraces, potentially, non-human actors such 
as animals341 and robots,342 generating much discussion about the extent to which, in the 
case of robots,  moral personality accompanies legal personhood. 
 
339 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Knight (tr), 2nd edn, University of California Press 1967) (English 
translation). 
340 Restatement (Third) of Agency, 2006, Ch 1, para 1.04. 
341 See Raffael Fasel, ‘More Equal Than Others: Animals in the Age of the Human Rights Aristocracy’ 
(Doctoral Thesis) <www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/297914> accessed 30 December 2020; David 
Allen Green, ‘Should animals have legal personality?’ Financial Times, 26 October 2020, 
<www.ft.com/content/b6f0b022-2c70-42c3-b850-ab6b48841fcf> accessed 30 December 2020. 
342 See John Sullins, ‘When is a Robot a Moral Agent?’ [2006] 6 International Review of Information Ethics 
23; Amanda Sharkey, ‘Can robots be responsible moral agents? And why should we care?’ [2017] 29:3 
Connection Science, 210; Ian McEwan, Machines Like Me (Jonathan Cape London 2019) 303–04 (‘You 
weren’t simply smashing up your own toy, like a spoiled child. You didn’t just negate an important argument 
for the rule of law. You tried to destroy a life. He was sentient. He had a self. How it’s produced, wet 
neurons, microprocessors, DNA networks, it doesn’t matter’). 
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Viewed from the perspective of a company lawyer, the interest in this chapter is narrower. 
The question is whether a company is recognised as “a person” in English law. As noted 
in chapter 2, the formal answer is found in Schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act 1978 
which provides that “a ‘person’ includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate.” 
Although the definition makes clear that a company falls to be treated as “a person” in 
so far as the law is concerned, it is silent about the consequences which follow. It is one 
thing to confer legal status on a company by recognising the corporate construct as a legal 
person. It is another thing to articulate the consequences which flow from this 
designation. This precipitates a second question concerning the nature of legal 
personhood in law, and more particularly, whether these attributes afford a company 
equivalence with other persons, such as an individual?  
 
There is, however, extensive academic literature which seeks to theorize the concept of 
legal personhood and give it meaning. An exhaustive consideration of this literature falls 
outside the scope of this work, but a cursory understanding is helpful in forming an 
insight into the attributes of legal personhood and legal personality. Drawing on the 
weight of academic thought, Ngaire Naffine identifies three different approaches to the 
characterisation of legal personhood.343  
 
5.2.1 Endowed by law 
 
The first approach depicts personhood as a status endowed by law for the purposes of 
bearing rights and duties. As Frederick (Henry) Lawson explains: 
 
All that is necessary for the existence of the person is that the lawmaker … should 
decide to treat it as a subject of rights or other legal relations. Once this point has 
been reached, a vista of unrestricted liberty opens up before the jurist, 
unrestricted, that is, by the need to make a person resemble a man or collection 
of men.344  
 
 
343 Ngaire Naffine, ‘Who are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects’ [2003] MLR 
346, 349–50. 
344 Frederick (Henry) Lawson, ‘The Creative Use of Legal Concepts’ [1957] 32 New York University Law 
Review 907, 915. 
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This approach is legally formulaic.  In the case of a company, it means that if the lawmaker 
(the legislature or judiciary) decides to recognise a corporate entity as a subject of rights 
or other legal relations, the company is afforded the status of legal personhood. The fact 
that a company is the subject of rights and responsibilities is acknowledged, but in the 
absence of any moral or ethical input into the notion of corporate personhood, the legal 
theorist must search further afield to discover norms which identify and support the rights 
and responsibilities which are envisaged. 
 
5.2.2 Attribute of human condition 
 
The second approach views personhood as an innate attribute of the human condition. 
As Naffine explains, quoting the International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, 
“[p]eople everywhere acquire general legal personality at birth … [and] all laws establish 
the self-evident prerequisite that a child must come into the world alive in order to attain 
legal personality”.345  This line of thought underpins the first paragraph of the preamble 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which declares “recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family” as “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”346 Since human 
dignity is the kernel of this highly individualised notion of legal personhood, the corollary 
is that in hard cases the legal status of personhood will depend on medical assessment. 
Issues relating to the unborn child, or the patient whose heart continues to beat following 
brain death, present strong challenges to this second approach. On any view, the 
corporate entity cannot be theorised within this model of personhood since as a matter 




The third approach is anthropomorphic and perceives legal personhood as the 
embodiment of an individual. Naffine explains that in this conception a legal person is 
“quintessentially, an intelligent and responsible subject, that is a moral agent”.348  
 
345 Naffine (n 343) 357. 
346 Universal Declaration of Human Rights <www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/> 
accessed 10 January 2021. 
347 William Shakespeare, Macbeth (1623) Act IV, Scene 1 lines 81–83. 
348 Naffine (n 343) 350. 
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Although the anthropomorphic approach shares with the first approach the notion that 
personhood has a technical meaning in law, it recognises that not all human beings have 
sufficient mental or physical capacity to be regarded by the law as legally competent. 
Michael Moore expresses the idea in this way: “A person is a rational being, a being who 
acts for intelligible ends in light of rational beliefs”.349  Naffine notes that Moore “does 
not resile from the consequences of his own logic: those who are not yet sufficiently 
rational that they can reason about moral or legal norms and adjust their behaviour to 
them are simply not persons”.350  This is not so much to exclude a person from 
recognition of their personhood, but rather to deny that the same rights and duties 
conferred by personhood can always be exercised by individuals in equal measure. 
Referencing Hans Kelsen, Neil MacCormick notes that: 
 
… legal systems exclude some human beings from the category of persons or 
admit them only to reduced forms of it. To treat people as persons in law is as 
much conditional on legal provisions as it is to treat corporations (or whatever) 
as persons in law.351  
 
MacCormick explains that “the personality of human beings in law is neither less nor 
more ‘juristic’ than that of any other entity that the law recognizes”.352  The law of minors 
is a paradigm illustration of a reduced person in both criminal and civil law jurisdictions 
and demonstrates how the law determines the rights and duties of all persons, individual 
and corporate. 
 
Naffine points out that because the legal framework for the establishment of a company 
generates its own legal status, it would be wrong to dichotomise a company as an artificial 
person and a human being as a natural person.353  Naffine acknowledges that the 
conceptualisation of a company presents difficulty in the effort to achieve a neat 
categorisation. Noting the lack of clarity in the analysis of corporate personhood, Naffine 
quotes Nicola Lacey’s comment that “in both doctrinal scholarship and legal theory, the 
debate about the liability of corporations is marked by a sustained use of metaphors, 
 
349 Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry, Rethinking the Relationship (CUP 1984) 66. 
350 Naffine (n 343) 363. 
351 Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law (OUP 2007) 83. See Kelsen (n 339) 168–92. 
352 MacCormick (n 351) 83. 
353 Naffine (n 343) 352. 
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contrasts, images which depend upon analogies and disanalogies between ‘corporate’ and 
‘human’ persons”.354  
 
Lacey is surely correct, and in the traditional conception of corporate personhood there 
are moral constraints bearing down on an individual which would not apply in the case 
of a company.  That said, the imagery identified by Lacey does not detract from the 
elemental truth that whichever approach is followed, a company is properly 
conceptualised as a legal person which is afforded recognition in law. The nature of 
corporate personality which flows from the recognition of corporate personhood, is not 
so easily articulated. Sometimes the phrases “corporate personhood” and “corporate 
personality” are used interchangeably in academic and judicial literature. This is a mistake 
because they are subtly, but importantly, different. Corporate personhood is the status 
which the law affords to a non-human actor such as a company, whereas corporate 
personality references the attributes of the actor which flow from this status.  
 
5.3 COMPANY LAW THEORY 
 
Explaining the notion of corporate personhood, three models of corporate law theory 
have emerged in the last one hundred and fifty years. These models are known by their 
labels - “contract theory”, “concession theory”, and “real entity theory.” Each theory 
clothes the corporate entity with legal personhood, but with differences between them 
which impact on the nature of corporate personality to which each theory lays claim. 
Within each theory, a basis for supporting a claim to assert a corporate right may be 
recognised, but the foundation for support is not the same, and the nature of the 
corporate right is different.  
 
5.3.1 Contract theory 
 
As the establishment of a limited liability company for trading and investment purposes 
became more popular, the nature of the legal relationship established by a company was 
analysed in contractual terms. Section 16 of the Companies Act 1862 provided that a 
company’s Articles of Association “bind the company and the members thereof to the 
 
354 ibid 348. See Nicola Lacey, ‘Philosophical Foundations of the Common Law, Social not Metaphysical’ 
in Jeremy Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (OUP 2000). 
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same extent as if each member had subscribed his name and affixed his seal thereto”, and 
monies owed by a member to a company were deemed to be “a debt due from such a 
member” enforceable by the company in the courts. This provision was maintained in 
section 14 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908, and subsequently section 20 of 
the Companies Act 1948 and section 14 of the Companies Act 1985. Today, the relevant 
provision is to be found in section 33 of the Companies Act 2006. The statutory language 
has been modernised and records that “[T]he provisions of a company's constitution bind 
the company and its members to the same extent as if there were covenants on the part 
of the company and of each member to observe those provisions”. David Kershaw 
describes the arrangement as a constitutional contract which a company can enforce 
against its members, and vice versa.355 
 
This understanding of a corporate entity as a creature which owes its origin to a contract 
made between its founding members accords with a line of judicial authority in the United 
States. In Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward,356 where the Supreme Court was 
considering the constitutional validity of a provision which altered the company’s charter, 
Chief Justice Marshall explained that a corporation is conceived as a contractual 
arrangement between the founding members and the State. The company’s charter was: 
 
… a contract made on a valuable consideration. It is a contract for the security 
and disposition of property. It is a contract on the faith of which real and personal 
estate has been conveyed to the corporation. It is, then, a contract within the letter 
of the Constitution …357  
 
The contractual analysis is helpful to the extent that it focuses on the nature of the 
arrangements made between a company and its members, and vice versa, and it seeks to 
answer the antecedent question which dwells on the juristic nature of the corporate entity 
by reference to the charter which was agreed by the shareholders at the time of its 
creation. The contractual analysis recognises that company shareholders have made a 
contractual arrangement inter se to conceive a corporate entity. Further, the Supreme 
Court demonstrated a willingness to provide a mechanism for the enforcement of rights 
 
355 David Kershaw, Company Law in Context (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 87. 
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and responsibilities which arise pursuant to the contractual arrangement. The difficulty is 
that this approach necessarily delineates the limit of the analytical contribution which a 
contractual model of corporate theory can deliver.  
 
The contractual analysis is silent as to whether the company has any rights or 
responsibilities beyond the terms of its instrument of creation, or whether it has an 
identity which is independent of the contractual arrangement which had been made 
between the members. The contractual theory leaves at large the question of whether 
there are any corporate rights and responsibilities beyond those which flow from the 
contractual arrangements which have been made between the company’s members. If so, 
what are these rights and responsibilities, and how are they ascertained, and on what 
basis? A company’s ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination in the face of 
compelled testimony or investigation provides a paradigm example of a species of right 
which stands apart from the contractual analysis. 
 
5.3.2 Concession theory 
 
Moving away from contractual analysis, legal theoreticians have explored whether the 
corporate roots of legal personhood can be found in the legislative framework within 
which the establishment of a corporate entity is permitted. If operation of law confers 
legal personhood, it is axiomatic that a company achieves this status not through 
agreement between shareholders but rather when established in accordance with 
requirements set down by a legislative authority. Historically, a company, or corporation, 
was established ex nihilo by way of Royal Charter or Private Act of Parliament and its legal 
status as an entity would be exclusively dependent on its instrument of creation. 
Subsequently, Parliament introduced a mechanism for the incorporation of a company 
which was less individualised, and with the enactment of the Companies Act 1844 the 
notion of corporate birth by registration was established.  
 
As John Dewey explained, quoting from Freund: 
 
The somewhat vague theory of the later Middle Ages that communal organization 
not sanctioned by prescription or royal license was illegal was at least from the 
fifteenth century on supplemented by the technical doctrine, developed under 
137 
 
canonist influences, that there is no capacity to act as a body corporate without 
positive authorisation. To grant this authority has remained in England an 
attribute of the royal prerogative . . . It is hardly possible to overestimate the 
theory that corporate existence depends on positive sanction as a factor in public 
and legislative policy. It is natural that the charter or incorporation law should be 
made the vehicle of restraints or regulations which might not be readily imposed 
upon natural persons acting on their own initiative, and the course of legislative 
history bears this out.358 
 
As a formalistic approach to company law theory, it is unsurprising this analysis has 
attracted judicial support. In Salomon v Salomon,359 Lord Halsbury LC noted that, when 
dealing with the nature of a company, he was “simply here dealing with the provisions of 
the statute, and it seems to me to be essential to the artificial creation that the law should 
recognise only that artificial existence …”.360  
 
A concessionary analysis of legal personhood is not necessarily inconsistent with a 
contractual approach, and on occasion concessionary and contractual notions have been 
articulated in the same case. Chief Justice Marshall’s description in Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v Woodward of the company as an artificial construct established by agreement has 
already been noted in the context of the contractual approach. But in the sentences which 
follow, a more concessionary approach is espoused. Building on the contractual analysis, 
Chief Justice Marshall explained that: 
 
The objects for which a corporation is created are universally such as the 
government wishes to promote. They are deemed beneficial to the country; and 
this benefit constitutes the consideration, and, in most cases, the sole 
consideration of the grant.361 
 
This is the language of concession theory, and it does not exclude a contractual analysis 
of corporate personhood. Thus, it is wrong to see adherence to either contractual theory 
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or concession theory as a binary choice. Contract theory looks towards the role of private 
treaty in the establishment of a company, whereas concession theory defaults to an 
exercise of State power. In both instances, the dignification of corporate personhood is 
explained, and whereas contract theory is limiting in its recognition of rights and duties 
to those agreed by the parties, concessionary theory is equally limiting in its determination 
of rights and responsibilities to those conceded by the State. In concession theory, 
corporate rights and responsibilities are linked not to the nature of the contract made 
between the members and the company, but rather to the extent of the concession which 
the State has been willing to permit when establishing the legal framework within which 
a company is required to operate.  
 
5.3.3 Real entity theory 
 
“Real entity theory” provides an interesting alternative tool for analysing the root of 
corporate personhood, and unlike contractual theory and concession theory, real entity 
theory affords greater space for the recognition of corporate personality. In real entity 
theory, an association such as a company develops its own personality, separate to the 
identity of its individual members.  
 
At the beginning of the last century, Otto von Gierke made the point that recognition of 
a corporate entity as a “right-and-duty” bearing unit presumed the prior existence of 
properties on which a right-and-duty bearing unit is founded: “A universitas [or corporate 
body] … is a living organism and a real person, with body and members and a will of its 
own. Itself can will, itself can act … it is a group-person, and its will is a group-will”.362  
 
Citing this passage, Dewey interpreted Gierke as presupposing a corporate will in the 
existence of a legal person: “In short, some generic or philosophical concept of 
personality, that is, some concept expressing the intrinsic character of personality 
uberhaupt [in the first place] is implied”.363  
 
Whilst contractual and concession theory models provide frameworks for recognising 
corporate personhood as a bare legal construct without reference to the character of those 
 
362 Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (Maitland (tr), CUP 1902) xxvi. 
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who form them, real entity theory offers a different analysis. As a legal person, a company 
is acknowledged as having an existential presence, but with a will and personality of its 
own. It is not simply a fiction in the eyes of the law. In this sense, real entity theory 
presents a deeper analysis, by its acknowledgment that corporate existence is not limited 
to legal personhood.  
 
Harold Laski acknowledged the separate nature of corporate personality, arguing that 
“[j]ust as we have been compelled … to recognise that the corporation is distinct from 
its members, so, too, we have to recognise that its mind is distinct from their minds”.364 
Laski posited the situation where a company votes an annual pension to an employee. 
The gratitude expressed to the employee is the appreciation of the individual members 
conveyed as a unit, notwithstanding that one of the members may have voted against the 
pension award. It follows that the nature of corporate personality has consequences. If 
the company had acted differently by not conferring the pension, it would have suffered 
in circumstances when it is morally but not legally at fault: “Its men work for it with less 
zeal. It finds it difficult to retain their services. The quality of its production suffers. It 
loses ground and is outstripped in the industrial race”.365  
 
Although Laski was clear that the existence of corporate personality is something 
independent of the company members, in Laski’s example the nature of the corporate 
personality still remains reflective of the views of the individual members who voted in 
favour of the pension award. The company may be recognised as a real entity, but in this 
instance its personality reflects no more than a collective snapshot of views held by most 
of its members. Laski must have been aware of the point, for he was careful to write that 
the company’s personality was distinct from that of its members, rather than independent of 
them.  
 
More recently, developments in the notion of corporate purpose have militated in favour 
of an understanding of corporate personality which is independent from that of its 
members. Through the articulation of its shared purpose, a company gives expression to 
a group identity which stands apart from the individual personality of its members. To 
this end, corporate purpose is defined in a British Academy paper as “the expression of 
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the means by which a business can contribute solutions to societal and environmental 
problems”.366 The paper adds that corporate purpose should be formulated though a 
statement made by the company which identifies how it “assist[s] people, organisations, 
societies and nations to address the challenges they face, while at the same time helping 
companies to avoid or minimise the problems they might cause”.367 The hallmark of a 
well-run modern company is the recognition of its corporate purpose. As David Kershaw 
and Edmund Schuster explain:  
 
Purpose as a driver for corporate behaviour, and perhaps ideally as a catalyst for 
corporate success, has in recent years received growing attention in the business 
literature, and the ability to create ‘purposeful companies’ is increasingly seen as 
essential in a technology- and innovation-driven economy. 368 
 
The separation of corporate personality from the personality of its members is less clear 
when the question is asked whether it is possible for a company to experience emotions 
in the same way as an individual experiences a strong feeling deriving from the individual’s 
circumstances, mood, or relationships with other human beings. At first blush, it is 
strange to contemplate ascribing an emotional state such as love or hatred to the 
corporate form, but if it is correct that a company may have intentions and desires which 
are directed at the achievement of a corporate purpose, there is no reason in principle 
why the corporate personality cannot experience other mental states of awareness less 
commonly associated with the dispassion of a legal construct. It is against this background 
that Sylvia Rich asks whether a company can experience a level of fear which could 
support a claim of duress in appropriate circumstances.369 Rich answers the question in 
the affirmative, seeing no distinction to be drawn between other mental states such as 
knowledge and intention which a company is able to form.370  
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There is, however, subtlety in Rich’s argument which explicates her answer to this 
important question. Rich draws a distinction between intention and desire as “functional” 
emotional states which a company may experience, and emotions such as fear as 
“phenomenal emotional states” and dependent on the emotions of individuals: 
 
I am saying that corporations have emotional states but am being reductionist to 
the extent that I admit that the emotional state has its components in the 
emotions of individuals, and that these components are where the phenomenal 
experience of the emotion resides.371  
 
Here, Rich’s reductionism demonstrates the limitation of the real entity approach. Rich 
concludes: 
 
There is no contradiction between accepting that group entities are real, that they 
have an effect and a presence that is separate from that of their members, but also 
accepting that everything they think, feel, and do occurs through their individual 
members.372 
 
Moreover, it is not always possible for corporate personality to capture the free range 
which characterises the depth of individual personality. As George Deiser explains, with 
reference to the implications for the assertion of corporate rights:  
 
The implication of corporate personality is power to act only within a certain 
sphere - the corporate sphere. There is nothing absurd in the statement that there 
are no such things as the natural rights of corporations. Certain of them are in 
their nature impossible. Such are rights of family and other rights by their nature 
incompatible with collective exercise. There is no need to visualize further the 
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Deiser does not explore why some rights are necessarily to be regarded as incompatible 
with corporate life, nor does he seek to identify exhaustively the rights in question. 
Arguably, there is a pressing need to visualise further the company as a juristic person, 
not so much to “feel certain of its existence” but more especially, to understand the 
atomic structure of its existence and the basis on which corporate rights are founded. 
There are clearly more questions to be asked. One such question is whether a corporate 
claim to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination constitutes a right which Deiser 
would say is “incompatible with the collective exercise”? As already mentioned, this issue 
is addressed in Chapter 7. 
 
5.4 CORPORATE RIGHTS IN THE CIVIL COURTS 
 
The judicial perspective adds an interesting dimension in the quest to understand the 
theoretical basis on which corporate rights can be asserted. Although the reasoning in 
court judgments on both sides of the Atlantic is articulated in pragmatic rather than 
theoretical terms, the decisions shine a spotlight on the factors which the courts will 
consider when a company petitions to protect a right to which it believes it is entitled. In 
particular, the review focuses on cases in the United States, where companies have sought 
to enforce a right which is discrete and free-standing, existing independently of a 
contractual arrangement made between the company and its shareholders, and its 
instruments of creation. In determining these claims, the judicial approach contributes to 
a better understanding of the contours of corporate existence, even though the judgments 
may not have been expressed in the language of contract, concession, or real entity theory.  
 
However, before considering the leading cases from the United States involving the 
assertion of corporate rights, it is worth noting that the established approaches for 
analysing the existence of corporate rights do not always provide a foundation for 
resolving a corporate claim in a case where the issue has arisen in the context of a 
contractual dispute between the company and a third party with whom the company has 
had dealings. The application of established principles of contract law where a company 
brings a civil law claim for breach of contract neatly demonstrates the point. It is trite to 
observe that there are countless cases in the courts each day in which a company seeks to 
assert its contractual rights for breach of contract or tortious actions for breach of duty. 
Cases at the edge are more complicated, where the circumstances in which the assertion 
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of a corporate right is less common. Here, a sound understanding of the basis on which 
the law recognises the existence of company rights would be helpful.  
 
A case involving a corporate claim for non-pecuniary loss is a nice example. It is an 
established principle at common law that damages for breach of contract may be awarded 
to a claimant for loss of amenity, injured feelings, or physical inconvenience. Typically, 
for example, a holidaymaker may obtain damages for loss of enjoyment in a claim for 
breach of contract against the travel company which provided the holiday.374 Suppose, 
however, the holiday had been booked by a company for the benefit of an employee who 
had won its “employee of the year” award. If the quality of the holiday fell below the 
contractual representations, how should a court respond to a claim by the company for 
loss of enjoyment in these circumstances? The conventional response that “a corporation 
is a legal person just as much as an individual”375 is inadequate since the company, as an 
artificial construct and lacking emotional capacity other than by reference to its individual 
members, is incapable of suffering non-pecuniary loss. Albeit both legal persons, the mere 
fact of legal personhood is not enough to place an individual and a company on an equal 
footing. 
 
This issue has not been addressed by an English court. At first blush, a company’s inability 
to recover damages for non-pecuniary loss might be regarded as palpably obvious. But 
conceptually, there is no impediment which prevents a company from claiming the right 
to recover damages for non-pecuniary loss. By reason of its employee’s poor experience, 
the company has been exposed to the adverse impact of the breach. In addition to 
sustaining pecuniary loss for the cost of allowing the employee a replacement holiday, the 
company has suffered non-pecuniary loss, having been discredited in the minds of its 
employees for choosing a travel company which failed to deliver. No single individual has 
sustained any loss, but the company’s reputation for competence has been damaged. The 
company’s ability to recruit high quality workers is diminished, and this impacts upon its 
standing in the marketplace.  
 
Similarly, if a company contracted with a photographer to take photographs of new 
recruits but the photographer failed to appear, the company’s ability to recover its aborted 
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costs is uncontroversial. The company’s inability to use photographs until another 
photographer is engaged would not give rise to loss capable of financial calculation, but 
nonetheless the company has been damaged, in the sense of inconvenienced, by the 
photographer’s failure. An award of damages for non-pecuniary loss may be nominal, but 
in principle there is no conceptual impediment to an award. Again, this proposition is 
uncontentious, since it is well established that a company may claim for damage done to 
it in its corporate capacity.376 This includes a libel affecting its property, or a libel reflecting 
on the management of its trade or business.377  
 
5.4.1 Corporate rights in the United States  
 
The limitations inherent in the traditional approaches to providing a sound foundation 
for the assertion of corporate rights are exemplified in a consideration of three seminal 
cases which have arisen in the United States where the right to be exercised is not 
associated with a claim for breach of contract or tortious duty. Invariably, these cases 
have concerned the assertion of corporate rights, viewed from the perspective of the 
United States constitution. The courts determined that there were cases where a company 
could assert constitutional rights which the State was bound to protect.  
 
In reaching these conclusions, the United States Supreme Court applied one of two 
approaches. In the first two cases to be considered, First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti378 
and Citizens United v Federal Election Commission,379 the Supreme Court recognised that the 
acknowledgment of corporate rights can be supported by reference to broad societal 
interests, in this instance the freedom of speech. In the third instance, Burwell v Hobby 
Lobby Stores,380 the outcome was realised by a different route. Instead of recognising the 
ability of a company to assert a right in a manner which stands independently from the 
rights of its individual members, the American courts viewed the source of corporate 
rights as flowing from the need to safeguard the rights of individuals who were the 
company’s shareholders. Studied through the American prism and the paramountcy 
attributed to the provisions of the United States constitution, if the position had been 
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otherwise, the constitutional protections afforded to the company’s stakeholders would 
have been rendered nugatory. 
 
In First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti,381 several banks challenged the constitutional 
propriety of a State enacted criminal statute which prohibited business corporations from 
making donations directed at influencing the outcome of a public referendum. Having 
lost before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the banks successfully appealed 
to the Supreme Court, arguing that the legislation was unconstitutional because it 
contravened the prohibition against any legislative measure which abridged free speech. 
The Supreme Court was clear that a company should not be deprived of its constitutional 
freedom to make political donations simply because it could not show that the issues 
materially affected the corporation’s business.382 Delivering the majority opinion of the 
Court, Justice Powell explained that if the speakers, in this case the donors, had not been 
companies, it would not have been suggested that the State could silence their proposed 
free speech: 
 
It is the type of speech indispensable to decision making in a democracy, and this 
is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an 
individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing 
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, 
association, union or individual.383 
 
This approach was endorsed thirty years later when a majority of the Supreme Court in 
Citizens United v Federal Election Commission384 determined that a Federal law in Washington 
DC prohibiting companies from using their funds to support electioneering 
communications was unconstitutional. The company, a non-profit corporation, had 
released a documentary which was critical of Hilary Clinton at a time when she was 
candidate for the Democratic Party’s Presidential nomination. The company became 
concerned that it might be prosecuted for contravening the Federal law and sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief. Citing the decision in Bellotti, Justice Kennedy giving the 
opinion of the Court made clear that there was “simply no support for the view that the 
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First Amendment … would permit suppression of political speech by media 
corporations”.385  
 
A different analysis underpinned the decision in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores.386 Here, the 
Supreme Court recognised the application of corporate rights where legislation 
concerning a person’s exercise of religion was involved. In this instance, however, the 
Court’s reasoning was focused more on the need to protect the interests of the company’s 
owners than the recognition of corporate rights as an attribute of corporate personality. 
In Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores,387 three companies operated employers’ group health plans 
to provide preventative care and screenings for women pursuant to regulations made 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2010. Care would also include 
coverage for contraceptive methods which the Government’s Food and Drug 
Administration had approved. The three companies objected to the requirement that they 
should offer contraceptive coverage because it offended their sincere Christian beliefs 
that life begins at conception. This requirement amounted to a violation of their religious 
beliefs protected under State legislation in the form of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act 1993 which prohibited the Government from “substantially burdening a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general application”. The 
companies also relied upon the First Amendment of the Constitution which stipulated 
that the legislature shall not make any law “respecting an establishment of religion”.  
 
Robustly rejecting a submission that a company could not claim an infringement of a 
right affecting religious practice, the majority of the Court said that this suggestion was 
entirely baseless. The conventional understanding of a reference to a person in legislation 
included a legal person and there was no need to depart from this construction here.  
 
Giving the majority judgment, Justice Alito explained that: 
 
… Congress provided protection for people like [the companies’ owners] by 
employing a familiar legal fiction: It includes corporations within [the legislation’s] 
definition of “persons”. But it is important to keep in mind that the purpose of 
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this fiction is to provide protection for human beings. A corporation is simply a 
form of organisation used by human beings to achieve a desired end. An 
established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people 
(including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a 
corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or 
statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of 
these people. For example, extending Fourth Amendment protection to 
corporations protects the privacy interests of employees and others associated 
with the company. Protecting corporations from government seizure of their 
property without just compensation protects all those who have a stake in the 
corporation’s financial well-being. And protecting the free-exercise rights of 
corporations [like the claimants in this case] … protects the religious liberty of 
the humans who own and control those companies.388 
 
Consideration of the decision in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores389 reinforces the stereotypical 
image of the company as a proxy for the individual.390 However, the discussion in the 
United States cases is not without interest. Two points emerge. First, the United States 
Supreme Court is comfortable with the ability of a company to assert rights widely where 
there is a public interest to support, even where the exercise of the right does not 
materially affect the company’s business.391 
 
Secondly, in his dissent, Justice Rehnquist in First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti392 
expressed the view that corporate rights would be recognised where the need for 
protection was central to the company’s existence. As he explained, “Since it cannot be 
disputed that the mere creation of a corporation does not invest it with all the liberties 
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enjoyed by natural persons, our inquiry must seek to determine which constitutional 
protections are ‘incidental to its very existence’”.393 
 
In presenting this line of thought, Justice Rehnquist drew on Chief Justice Marshall obiter 
dictum in Dartmouth College v Woodward,394 where he expressed his view that a company 
possesses “only those properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either 
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence”.395 It follows that, in the absence of the 
constitutional influence in these corporate rights cases, a narrower conception supports 
the recognition of a corporate right where its affirmation is “incidental to [the company’s] 
very existence”. 
 
As Martin Petrin explains: 
 
[A] legal entity’s rights (constitutional, statutory, and common law) should reflect 
its core economic function and purpose. For instance, it is justifiable to protect 
corporate commercial speech – although there may be limits – in order to increase 
sale of products. Beyond this obvious case, a legal entity may also be given other 
rights, including rights to privacy, political speech, and even religious rights, albeit 
on the preliminary condition that there is a sufficiently strong link to its economic 
goals.396 
 
Certainly, recognition of corporate rights can be supported by reference to social and 
economic factors which are essentially utilitarian in nature. Giving effect to a corporate 
right to privacy provides a striking example. Although interests protected by privacy such 
as dignity and personal autonomy are unquestionably human values, privacy rights can be 
equally important to a company where an invasion of impacts adversely on a company’s 
economic interests. Failure to protect a company’s copyright, intellectual property and 
trade secrets can be financially damaging to the company as well as adversely impactful 
on the wider economy. The relevance of corporate purpose, together with utilitarian and 
consequentialist concerns, to the discourse on the recognition of corporate rights, is 
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considered at greater length in the next chapter. Suffice it to note at this point that Justice 
Rehnquist’s approach is valuable. If the attribution of corporate personhood has 
meaning, the ability of a company to assert rights which are “incidental to its very 
existence” must be recognised. 
 
5.5 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS  
 
In contrast to cases in the civil courts which have focused on the exercise of rights, cases 
in the criminal courts have concentrated on responsibility for corporate action by 
attributing the acts or omissions of the company’s directors and officers to the corporate 
form. Again, the approach of the criminal courts is interesting in so far as it assists in an 
understanding of the nature of corporate personhood, and how corporate accountability 
has been recognised in light of the relationship between the company as a legal entity on 
the one hand, and the conduct of its directors, employees, and shareholders on the other.  
 
Historically, the base line in common law is that the law fixes a company with criminal 
liability only where the acts or omissions of a company officer or senior employee is 
identified as the acts of the company, so that the conduct is attributed to the company as 
the acts or omissions of the company. This first model of corporate criminal liability is 
commonly conceptualised as liability by attribution or identification theory. The leading 
authority is Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass,397 where the House of Lords held that actions 
could be attributed to a company, or identified with a company, only where the actions 
were undertaken by a company officer or senior employee who represented “the directing 
mind and will” of the company. Shareholders have no role to play in the attribution of a 
director’s conduct to the company, and in so far as attribution theory addresses the nature 
of corporate personhood, it recognises the company’s legal standing but judges its actions 
by specific reference to the individual conduct of its directors. 
 
However, this is not to say that criminal law does not have a valuable contribution to 
make in an effort to understand the attributes of corporate personhood. On the contrary, 
in a different category of cases where the legislature imposes criminal responsibility for 
organizational fault, this approach directly confronts the internal workings of the 
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company and how this may reflect on the character of corporate personality.  This is the 
second model of corporate criminal law, and unlike the first model which is the subject 
of much criticism and regular review,398 this “failure to prevent” model is popular with 
the legislature and has much contemporary traction.399 The defining characteristic of these 
criminal offences is that the company has failed to prevent the commission of a crime, 
and the offences are loosely described as “corporate offences” on the basis that they can 
be committed only by a corporate person. Proof of the commission of the crime renders 
a company strictly liable for offending conduct, subject to a statutory defence where the 
company can show that it took reasonable precautions to prevent the occurrence of the 
offending conduct in question.400 In this model of corporate criminal liability, a company 
is held legally responsible as a result of its internal functional failings and not as a result 
of an individual person’s culpable conduct where the actions of the individual can be 
attributed to the company. 
 
The expansion of criminal liability under the second model reinforces the law’s treatment 
of a company as a real entity with responsibility for its own wrongdoing, independent of 
the conduct of any individual with whom the company may be associated. As the dynamic 
of corporate criminal liability continues to move away from liability based on the acts of 
individuals in favour of liability founded on organisational failings in its role as an entity, 
the need to articulate a narrative for the recognition of corporate rights detached from 
the interests of the individual becomes more pressing.  
 
5.5.1 Criminal responsibility at common law 
 
The starting point for English common law is that, as a matter of general principle, 
criminal liability will not be established without proof that the offending conduct was not 
 
398 In November 2020, the UK Government instructed the Law Commission to review the law on corporate 
criminal liability and consider, in particular, whether the attribution/identification approach should be 
reformed. <www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/corporate-criminal-liability/> accessed 27 December 2020. 
399 The UK Government is considering the enactment of a corporate offence for the failure to prevent 
economic crime. The Ministry of Justice responded to an earlier Call for Evidence 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/9
32169/corporate-liability-economic-crime-call-evidence-government-response.pdf> accessed 27 
December 2020. See also a speech by Lisa Osofsky, Director of the Serious Fraud Office, 9 October 2020, 
<www.sfo.gov.uk/2020/10/09/future-challenges-in-economic-crime-a-view-from-the-sfo/> accessed 27 
December 2020. 
400 There is another model of criminal corporate liability involving the enactment of statutory offences of 
absolute liability where proof of fault is not required. This model of criminal liability does not add anything 
to a discussion on the nature of corporate personhood. 
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only committed but was committed intentionally, recklessly, or negligently. If a company 
is required to accept responsibility in a criminal court for its offending conduct, the 
criminal law presents a formidable challenge which involves the location of the company’s 
mind and identification of the way in which the capacity for forming the requisite mental 
state of mind is accomplished. The question is powerful since it sheds light not only on 
the extent of a company’s responsibilities in law but also by hermeneutical methodology 
(a fortiori), the recognition of company rights involving due process. It would be surprising 
if legal theory could accommodate such an asymmetrical arrangement whereby a 
company could be held criminally liable for breach of its responsibilities but lacks any 
entitlement to claim the benefit of rights exercisable to safeguard due process in any 
engagement with the criminal process. 
 
The courts have responded to the challenge of imposing criminal liability on a company 
by enquiring whether the individuals in control of the company had the requisite mental 
intent to accompany the offending conduct. As Viscount Haldane explained in Lennard’s 
Carrying Co v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd: 
 
A company is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a 
body; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person of 
somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the 
directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the 
personality of the corporation.401 
 
In this way, the court attributes the director’s level of mental awareness to that of the 
company and treats the company as if was an individual for the purposes of establishing 
criminal responsibility. The company is personalised for this purpose and clothed with 
the attributes of human behaviour. Lord Reid famously articulated the point in Tesco 
Supermarkets v Nattrass402 when he said that it is the person in control of the company 
whose guilty mind becomes identified with the company, “so that his guilt is the guilt of 
the company”.403 The veil of incorporation remains intact, and the courts are not 
 
401 Lennard’s Carrying Co v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705, 715. 
402 Tesco Supermarkets (n 397). 
403 ibid 170D. 
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penetrating the company’s legal personhood in order to hold the company criminal liable 
for the acts of its directors and most senior officers.  
 
As Lord Sumption observed in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd,404 the phrase “piercing the 
corporate veil” “is an expression rather indiscriminately used to describe a number of 
different things. Properly speaking, it means disregarding the separate personality of the 
company”.405 This not what is happening here. In the criminal jurisdiction, the company 
is held responsible in its capacity as a legal person, with the mental ingredient of the 
criminal offence established by reference to the conduct of its director or other senior 
officer.  
 
Although the corporate veil remains in place, there is an anthropomorphic element to 
establishment of criminal liability in this way. Inexorably, the company’s liability depends 
on the acts or omissions of an individual, in this instance a director or senior officer, 
which are imputed to be the acts or omissions of the company. In this way, if corporate 
criminal liability by attribution is to be theorised within the norms of company law theory, 
it is real-entity theory rather than any contractual or concessional model which offers the 
snuggest fit. Neither the contractual theory nor the concession theory of corporate 
personhood has a dialogue with a model of corporate criminal liability by attribution or 
identification of a director’s guilty mind.  
 
As Mark Hager explained, “[i]f contract or State concession established corporations, 
“they could not possess their own ‘personality’ or ‘will’.406 The wrongful "state of mind" 
requisite to criminal and tort liability could not therefore be imputed to them”.  As Hager 
proceeded to explain, “[t]he real entity theory … avoided these difficulties by recognizing 
that corporate actions could be real, even if they were illegal, that is, ultra vires. No 
anomaly would arise in holding corporations liable for such actions”.407  
 
Apart from anything else, there is a public policy argument underlying this approach. 
Mark Dsouza argues there is much value in retaining the attribution doctrine in the 
 
404 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] 2 AC 415. 
405 ibid 478–79, [16]. 
406 Mark Hager, ‘Bodies Politic, The Progressive History of Organizational Real Entity Theory’ [1989] 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 575, 586. 
407 ibid 587. 
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application of corporate criminal liability since it sits happily with a lay person’s concept 
of the criminal law which is based on individuals taking responsibility for their criminal 
acts: 
 
The identification doctrine reinforces this association by conceiving of a company 
anthropomorphically, and thus demonstrating to the general public the close 
parallel between the criminal law (including its principles of culpability) as applied 
to individuals, and as applied to corporations.408 
 
Judicial support for the retention of the attribution principle was recently afforded in 
Serious Fraud Office v Barclays plc409 when, in the course of affirming the decision in Tesco v 
Nattrass,410 Lord Justice Davis noted that the focus of criminal law more generally rests 
on culpability, which envisages liability where a defendant is shown to have been at 
fault.411 
 
However, although this speaks loudly to the basis on which the common law recognises 
the criminal liability of an entity invested with corporate personhood, it says little about 
the nature of corporate personality, other than to see the company as a cloak in which 
the conduct of the directors and senior officers has been wrapped. It is in a study of the 
second and more contemporary model of English criminal liability that the search for 
answers about the nature of corporate personality can be advanced. 
 
5.5.2 Criminal responsibility for organisational fault 
 
In addition to the model of corporate liability in common law, there is a second model of 
fault-based corporate criminal liability which runs in parallel with corporate attribution 
theory. This model imposes criminal liability on a company in circumstances where the 
company has failed to prevent an undesired outcome. As Jeremy Horder notes, the 
impetus behind this development was pioneered in the nineteenth century for reasons of 
 
408 Mark Dsouza, ‘Lessons from Analogizing Natural and Corporate Persons in the Criminal Law’, Working 
Paper delivered at University College London, 29 May 2018. 
409 Serious Fraud Office v Barclays plc [2018] EWHC 3055 (QB). 
410 Tesco Supermarkets (n 397). 
411 ibid [67]. 
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social protection, especially in the context of consumer safety in the early days of railway 
travel.412  
 
Nicola Lacey anthologizes this model of criminal liability as demonstrating a shift in 
emphasis away from attribution towards an understanding of requiring responsibility for 
harmful outcomes in corporate cases where criminal intent could not be shown.413 Lacey 
notes that the second model of criminal liability has traction in the case a company, where 
a division between “real crime” and “regulatory crime” began to develop: 
 
One important and distinctive aspect of the increasing deployment of criminal 
law as a tool of modern regulatory governance had to do with the emerging legal 
framework governing corporations. Once again, the gradually emerging doctrines 
of corporate criminal capacity strongly reflected the distribution of both 
economic and political interests, with strict liability offence serving the regulatory 
interest of political elites as well as serving legitimation functions in relation to 
corporate power.414 
 
Today, the trend in favour of imposing corporate criminal liability for failing to prevent 
the occurrence of harmful conduct manifests itself in the form of new corporate criminal 
offences such as failing to prevent bribery or failing to prevent the facilitation of tax 
evasion offence.415 Instead of judging the level of a company’s responsibility by reference 
to the conduct of its directors or officers who stand independent from the company and 
external to it, in this second model a company’s exposure to criminal liability for harmful 
conduct is measured by reference to the internal workings of the company which 
characterize its organisational character.  
 
 
412 Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2016) 165. 
413 Nicola Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility (OUP 2016) 89–91. 
414 ibid 90. 
415 See Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s 1; Bribery Act 2010, s 7; Criminal 
Finances Act 2017, ss 45, 46. For a discussion of the ‘failure to prevent’ model, see Nicholas Lord and 
Rosemary Broad, ‘Corporate Failures to Prevent Serious and Organised Crimes: Foregrounding the 
Organisational Component’ [2017] European Review of Organised Crime 27; Liz Campbell, ‘Corporate 
Liability and the Criminalisation of Failure’ [2018] 12(2) Law and Financial Markets Review 57. 
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In its recent development, this model of corporate criminal liability has been stimulated 
by a Council of Europe Recommendation in 1988.416  This promotes the broadly 
configured principle that generally a company should be held liable for the criminal 
actions of its employees unless it can be shown that it has taken all the necessary steps to 
prevent its commission. By focusing on the steps which company management ought to 
have taken to prevent the commission of harmful conduct, the criminal law is requiring 
companies to perform their compliance obligations at a high level. As Andrew Ashworth 
explains, “[t]he avowed purpose of corporate failure to prevent offences is to change 
corporate culture by giving companies an incentive to put preventative procedures into 
place”.417 In this way, the burden of these offences lies in the notion of organisational 
fault. In terms, the company is held criminally liable because, in its standing as a corporate 
organisation, there has been a failure in its governance processes. In a case where 
negligent directors have been replaced by competent directors, the company would 
remain criminally liable for its organisational failure, even though the failure had occurred 
on the previous directors’ watch.  
 
The clue to the significance of this approach lies in the term which is used. By referencing 
“organisational fault”, the language makes clear that it is the company in its capacity as 
an entity which is at fault, and that the fault is systemic and not limited to an isolated 
failure. James Gobert and Maurice Punch explain the concept of organisational fault in 
the following way: 
 
Organisational fault inheres where a company has organised its business in such 
a way that person and property are exposed to criminal victimisation or the 
unreasonable risk of harm, when the company has failed to devise and put into 
place systems for avoiding criminological risk, when its monitoring and 
supervision of those whom it has put in a position to commit an offence or cause 
harm is inadequate, and when the corporate ethos or culture is such as to tolerate 
or encourage offences.418 
 
416 Liability of enterprises for offences: Recommendation No. R (88) 18 adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on 20 October 1988 and explanatory memorandum 
<https://rm.coe.int/16804c5d71> accessed 24 April 2021. 
417 Andrew Ashworth, ‘A new generation of omissions offences?’ [2018] Criminal Law Review 354, 360. 
418 James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths 2003) 81. See Jonathan 
Clough, ‘Bridging the Theoretical Gap: The Search for a Realist Model of Corporate Criminal Liability’ 




Endorsing Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite’s work on the development of “reactive 
fault”, Horder notes this requires a court to assess the adequacy of measures taken to 
prevent the occurrence of a prescribed harm: 
 
Rather than struggling to establish some antecedent fault within the corporation, 
the prosecution would invite the court to infer fault from the nature and 
effectiveness of the company’s remedial measures after it has been established 
that it was the author of a harm-causing or harm-threatening act or omission. The 
court would not find fault if it was persuaded that the company had taken realistic 
measures to prevent a recurrence, had ensured compensation to any victims, and 
had taken the event seriously in other respects.419 
 
By focusing on the adequacy or otherwise of the company’s internal processes, the 
concept of organisational fault endows the company for better or worse with a character 
which is reflected within its corporate personality and culture.  
 
Harry Glasbeek expresses the position forcefully: 
 
The message is clear. An organisation is to be held responsible because those 
responsible for its system of operations, knowing of the rights created on behalf 
of the organisation, did not, on its behalf, take appropriate case to eliminate them. 
The organisation is to be certainly criminally responsible because it creates the 
risks, and it can and should reduce them … Those who create risks and are in a 
position of control have a duty to avert the materialisation of those risks; it is right 
and proper to hold them responsible if they fail to meet the standard of this duty. 
They need not do anything positive to invite the wrath of the law. An omission 




419 Gobert (n 418) 171. See Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (CUP 
1993). 
420 Harry Glasbeek, Class Privilege (Between the Lines 2017) 113. See also, Harry Glasbeek, Wealth by Stealth 
(Between the Lines 2002) 7 ‘No one has ever seen a corporation, smelled a corporation, touched a 
corporation, lifted a corporation, or made love to a corporation’. 
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5.6 LIMITS OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 
 
The recognition of individual engagement returns the narrative to the key questions under 
consideration in this chapter, namely, whether a company is entitled to assert a right in 
the same way as an individual, and if so, on what basis? The review of the traditional 
approaches to company law theory suggests that the conventional answer to these 
questions is “sometimes”, depending on the nature of the right, the company’s social and 
economic objectives, and the circumstances in which the exercise of the right falls to be 
considered. In addition, the review demonstrates there are conceptual limits to the weight 
which can be placed on the principle of legal personhood as a vehicle for carriage of 
corporate rights without resort to some form of anthropomorphic association.  
 
MacCormick expresses the position well. Legal personhood is no more, and no less: 
 
… a device for recognising the unitary and purposive character of various kinds 
of group activity among human beings. By this device, certain actions or events 
are recognised in law as bringing into existence a group that has its own 
personality distinct from that of any individual human beings who are in law its 
members, servants, or agents.421  
 
The consequence of this analysis is that “certain acts, decisions and intentions can be 
imputed to the group as its acts, decisions or intentions”.422 This is undoubtedly correct, 
but the converse is equally true, so when determining the nature of the company’s rights 
and responsibilities, it is the “acts, decisions and intentions” of individuals which must be 
explored. On occasions, these individual interests require protection and when this 
acknowledged, recognition of the right is derivatively based. A company is not able to 
claim the protection solely by reason of its legal personhood.  
 
As MacCormick explains: 
 
Especially as to the fundamental rights of persons, it should be noted that the 
most fundamental are human rights and hence primarily for the protection of each 
 




and every human person. No doubt the protection of humans sometimes requires 
the protection of corporations derivatively, and some human interests – e.g., in 
freedom of worship – are distinctively corporate rather than individualistic in 
kind. But in principle that passive protection which human beings constitute is 
protection for humans, and there should be no presumption of an extension 
thereof to corporate persons in their own right rather than as human 
instruments.423 
 
MacCormick’s view that “there should be no presumption of an extension … to 
corporate persons in their own right” is noted. To be clear, in relation to individual rights, 
MacCormick is saying that legal personhood does not have a role to play in a conception 
of individual rights, other than as a transparent barrier through which an individual right 
may be asserted.  
 
One of the difficulties with MacCormick’s approach is that the distinction between an 
individual right and a corporate right is not always easy to delineate. The substance of the 
right may overlap or be coterminous. Consider, for example, the case of a one-man 
company, where the director/shareholder is the same person. Whilst the director and sole 
shareholder is alive, conceptualisation of his rights as derivative rights is persuasive. A 
corporate right to privacy, for example, in the maintenance of the company’s financial 
records stands as no more than a derivation of the privacy rights of the director and sole 
shareholder. But when the director and sole shareholder dies, the position is radically 
altered. Unless the corporate ability to claim the right to privacy is conceptualised as 
flowing directly from the ontology of corporate existence, a company’s ability to assert 
any right to privacy falls away. A similar point can made with reference to the United 
States Supreme Court cases where the Court recognised a corporate right to free speech 
could not be explained within the scope of a derivative approach to the recognition of 
corporate rights.  
 
The traditional limitation on recognising corporate rights based on its standing as a legal 
person on the one hand and treating corporate personhood as a vehicle for the protection 
of individual rights on the other, suggests that neither approach can provide a sustainable 
 
423 ibid 96. 
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foundation for the articulation of corporate rights in a contemporary narrative. The 
dichotic approaches share an interest in the notion of personhood, in the sense that they 
personify the company as if it were an individual or treat it as a conduit for an individual’s 
interests. But a weakness is revealed since by human personification of the company, the 
attributes of a company as a legal personality and social organisation is significantly 
diminished, if not extinguished.  
 
5.6.1 Detaching individuals from the personification of the company 
 
The narrative of derivative rights does not sit happily with the reality of much corporate 
business in the twenty first century, especially where international companies and groups 
of companies are concerned. Today, a combination of high-net-worth individuals and 
venture capitalists have eclipsed the single entrepreneur conducting business through a 
private company. In the case of public limited companies whose shares are traded on 
recognised exchanges, the dominant force in the control of a company is institutional, 
with the key investors consisting of pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, 
merchant banks, and sovereign wealth funds. An institutional investor may be heavily 
invested in a company, but in no sense does the company personify the investor or its 
interests. It is fair to say that in much large-scale business activity, the second half of the 
twentieth century witnessed a detachment between the director and shareholder, and the 
human personification of the company. Decision-making within the company no longer 
always vests with a dominant individual. Decisions are made collectively, by a 
combination of executive and non-executive directors drawn from a wide spectrum of 
the business community. The chairperson and chief executive officer represent the public 
face of the company, but the ultimate decision-making function has become anonymous. 
 
The consequence of this change is far-reaching. Historically, a company was viewed as a 
vehicle through which an investor could engage in a commercial venture, with the extent 
of financial exposure capped by the amount of his contribution in the purchase of shares. 
This was the advantage of incorporation, and an investor’s motive was the undiluted 
maximisation of profit which would be re-invested in the company to facilitate its 




Today, the description of the corporate motive is more sophisticated. Section 172 of the 
Companies Act 1980 articulates a director’s duty to promote the success of the company, 
but in so doing he has wider considerations to consider. The success of the company 
connotes much more than the singular maximisation of profit. As part of a director’s duty 
to act in the way he considers is most likely to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members as a whole, the interests of the company's employees must also 
be considered, alongside the impact of the company's operations on the community and 
the environment, and the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high 
standards of business conduct. 
 
As Meir Dan-Cohen reflects: 
 
When a corporation can no longer be identified with a relatively homogeneous 
group of shareholders, when its behaviour can no longer be portrayed as the inert 
mechanical execution of an owner’s will, and as our attention is drawn to the 
distinctive organisational properties and processes, the posture of simply equating 
the corporation via personification or aggregation to a natural person loses 
whatever surface plausibility it might once have had.424 
 
Eric Orts makes the same point when he emphases the contemporary strength of the 
corporate personality as a legal construct which bears rights and responsibilities in a 
manner which is divorced from its directors and shareholders. In his concluding thoughts 
on the legal theory of the company, Orts explains: 
 
Although they are artificial fictions, business firms have become socially real 
through widespread practice and belief. Business firms act as persons in the world. 
Firms own property, make contracts, and shoulder legal rights and 
responsibilities. We say and mean “Exxon Mobil” or “Patagonia” just as we say 
and mean the “United States of America” or the “People’s Republic of China”. 
Theories that disregard these social facts will be discarded into the proverbial 
dustbins of history.425  
 
 
424 Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organisations (2nd edn, Quid Pro Books 2016) 17–18. 





In conclusion, it is clear that the traditional approaches to the conceptualisation of the 
company and legal personhood do not provide a sound unitary foundation for the 
recognition of corporate rights. The contractual, concession and real-entity theories 
reflect different approaches to the theorization of legal personhood, and in relation to the 
recognition of corporate rights, each theoretical construct has a role to play. But there is 
no unitary or overarching principle which can be applied, and there are limits to the 
conventional understanding of legal personhood which constrain its ability to fill the void. 
In the traditional conception of company law theory, three approaches can be identified 
as supporting different species of corporate rights. First, the law recognises corporate 
rights which flow from the incidents of a company’s creation. Secondly, there are 
corporate rights to which the law gives effect where they are inextricably associated with 
a company’s purpose and ability to function. Thirdly, the law acknowledges a corporate 
right where it is necessary to protect the interests of individuals whose human rights 
would otherwise be compromised. None of the three approaches can claim exclusivity, 
and the review of corporate rights in their traditional conception produces a pluralist 
outcome. 
 
There is no reason why the justification for the recognition of corporate rights should 
not be multi-faceted, as with a contract of employment where Alan Fox was able to 
espouse a pluralist view of the relationships between the contracting parties. As Fox 
explained in a paper written for the Donovan Report, it was possible to articulate the 
nature of the employment relationship in one of two ways.426 On the one hand, an 
employment contract could be viewed as a relationship of social membership which 
promoted a common interest. On the other hand, the employment arrangement could be 
said to reflect a negotiated, contractual relationship which satisfied the interests of 
separate albeit interdependent groups. Just as different conceptions of the employment 
relationship can sit happily together, different approaches to corporate rights could also 
share the same space as fellow roommates.  
 
 
426 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer’s Associations 1965–68 (the Donovan Report), 
‘Research Paper 3 by Alan Fox, Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations’ (HMSO 1966). 
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The difficulty with a pluralist outcome, however, is that it ignores the actuality of the 
contemporary narrative. The three models of corporate theory provide a sound footing 
to secure a framework for the creation and management of a company, but they fail to 
provide a uniform approach for the recognition of corporate rights to which a company 
may lay claim. The momentum of the contemporary narrative is evidenced not only by 
modern real entity thinking which embraces group culture and organisational elements, 
but also by movement in the conception of corporate criminal responsibility away from 
individual conduct in favour of a collective responsibility on the part of the corporate 
entity. The impact of this development for the recognition of corporate rights is 
significant if not transformative, since it provides a firm platform for the development of 
corporate rights based on an understanding of corporate value rather than elemental 
components of the company’s existence and individual rights. As the thesis proceeds to 
demonstrate, this includes a corporate assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination 










The struggle to locate a single foundation for a theory of corporate rights within 
traditional conceptions of company law theory presents the jurist with a strong challenge. 
The existence of certain corporate rights (such as a right to property and a right to sue) 
are readily identified, but in the absence of a thread which binds recognition of these 
rights, the basis on which a company can assert an entitlement lacks coherence and raises 
the risk of inconsistent outcomes. A corporate right may be articulated in company 
contract theory where a company seeks to enforce a right against its members, but in 
other instances, such as a claim to protect property or reputation, a corporate right is 
more cogently developed within concession or real entity theory. The law offers different 
routes to the recognition of different rights, with the juristic support for each right 
considered individually. The outcomes are piecemeal and there is no generic conception 
which supports the recognition of corporate rights.  
 
In recent years, the increasing realisation of corporate personality has precipitated 
renewed academic interest in presenting a company as a moral agent, with implications 
for an understanding of the basis on which corporate rights can be founded. This 
represents a more controversial understanding of the notion of corporate personality, 
with an analysis which sees a company’s claim to assert rights as deriving from a 
company’s standing as a moral agent. This chapter offers a critique of this theory and 
contests whether it can support a theory of corporate rights. The thesis argues that a 
corporate moral agency model fails to answer why the law should extend its recognition 
of individual rights to corporate persons. The problem is that the theory omits to develop 
an adequate connection between the existence of corporate moral agency and the 
recognition of a corporate right. The argument in support of a claim to a corporate right 
is an inherently moral one, and it rests on the bedrock of a proposition which needs to 
be established rather than assumed. If a company has moral agency as an incident of its 
corporate personality, a corporate moral agency model suggests that recognition of a 
basket of moral rights follows as a logical consequence. The law must then determine 
whether legal recognition should be afforded to some, or all, of these rights, and it is here 
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the model falls short since it does not offer a moral basis for determining how a corporate 
right is enlivened. A dependency on a company’s status as a moral agent is not enough. 
A moral foundation for the law’s recognition of corporate rights needs to be found. 
 
The thesis argues that the answer is to be found in an alternative analysis of corporate 
rights which grounds the foundation of a corporate right in an understanding of the value 
which the exercise of the right serves to protect. In this way, this chapter presents an 
alternative narrative for the formulation of corporate rights which moves away from 
traditional notions of contract, concession, and real entity theories and delivers a coherent 
foundation for the recognition of corporate rights in a modern model which is fit for 
purpose. The declared intention is to provide a convincing basis for understanding why 
the law should extend its recognition of individual legal rights to a corporate person and 
enable a company to assert certain legal rights which facilitate the protection of its 
interests. 
 
The crux of the theory, which this thesis terms as “the corporate value theory”, lies in 
conceptions of value flowing from the functions which companies perform. As a 
participant in the corporate sector, a successful trading company contributes to the 
strength of the economy. It is the vehicle through which economic growth is generated, 
and when the value of the beneficial contribution of each company is aggregated, the 
positive contribution of the corporate sector to the national economy is immense. A 
successful corporate sector is the powerhouse of a strong economy. Alongside aggregate 
value, each company has individual intrinsic value to its officers427 and employees, whose 
lives are shaped by their involvement in the company’s activities. The benefits flowing 
from an individual’s association with a trading company are manifold and range from the 
provision of income to sustain the individual and his family to the maintenance of 
relationships and enjoyment of daily activities which contribute to life’s meaning.  
 
Although aggregate value and individual value are presented as separate branches, they 
are hewn from the same tree. The common characteristic is the successful operation of a 
company as the legally acknowledged vehicle through which these benefits are enabled. 
 
427 A company officer is defined in s 1437 of the Companies Act 2006 ‘as including a director, manager or 
(company) secretary, and any person who is to be treated as an officer of the company for the purposes of 
the provisions in question’. 
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Therefore, in response to the question why the law should extend its recognition of 
individual rights to corporate persons, the answer is clear. The law should recognise a 
company’s ability to assert rights in order to facilitate the protection of the company’s 
interests and the value it delivers to the economy and individual interests.  The narrative 
rests on a consequentialist view of corporate rights. In each case, a corporate right is 
recognised where its assertion is supported in value-based terms. 
 
The chapter develops the case for setting the recognition of corporate rights in the 
context of value in stages. An understanding of the corporate value theory is presented 
in summary form. This is followed by an exploration of how value interests are protected 
by law, with especial reference to the law’s protection of values inherent in the application 
of criminal law. Then, in the context of value protected by the assertion of corporate 
rights, this line of thinking explores the aggregate value which flows from the operation 
of a strong corporate sector in a free market economy. The chapter identifies additional 
interests at play, and important pockets of value are explored in a more granular form. 
Here, the focus rests on the provision of intrinsic value to individuals associated with a 
company, principally its officers and employees. By acting to support companies and 
prevent the occurrence of harmful consequences, the law’s recognition of the corporate 
right has a moral dimension. If the State failed to recognise the right, it would have a 
“moral spill-over effect” for the company and its active participants, as well as the 
corporate sector at large. The morality of preventing these harmful consequences 
catalyses the recognition of a corporate right. In addition, it would be unfair for the law 
to deny recognition of corporate rights in circumstances where companies deliver benefits 
which enhance the lives of individuals and, more broadly, the interests of society as a 
whole. The law’s recognition of a company’s assertions of rights is consistent with the 
principles of a fair legal system in which the rights of all persons – individual and 
corporate – are equally respected. 
 
6.2 THE COMPANY AS A MORAL AGENT 
 
A narrative of corporate rights founded on a corporate value theory does not require a 
company to be acknowledged as a moral entity. If there is value protected by the assertion 
of corporate rights from the perspective of the State and the company’s officers, 
employees, and shareholders, this ranks independently of the company irrespective of 
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whether the company is regarded as a moral agent or not. However, company law 
theorists who recognise a company as a moral agent view the matter differently. For these 
jurisprudential thinkers, the existence of corporate rights is seen as deriving from a 
company’s standing as a moral agent. The challenge for a corporate moral theorist is not 
to identify whether or not a company can lay claim to a basket of moral rights, but rather, 
within the basket, how moral rights can be identified, and which moral rights should be 
legally recognised. In this section of the chapter, the approach of the corporate moral 
theorist is critiqued. 
 
6.2.1 Defining moral agency 
 
The notion of agency in social science conveys the idea of freedom to act independently 
and to make choices. The concept stands at the heart of Western philosophical thought 
associated with the ideas of John Locke and his theory of liberty.428 Thus, when a 
company is described as an agent, this means no more than the company is an 
independent entity with freedom to act. When agency is qualified as moral, this signifies 
that the company’s freedom to act must be exercised with reference to some idea of right 
and wrong. To this extent, the obligation to act morally may constrain the agent’s actions 
and make it accountable for its conduct. To define terms carefully, moral agency in this 
context is the referencing of a state of awareness by a company that it is responsible for 
its actions.  
 
As individuals, directors have capacity as moral agents to act on behalf of a company, but 
when acting collectively, their actions do not convey moral agency to the company. Since 
a company has a personality which is independent from those of its stakeholders, the key 
question is whether moral agency is embedded in a company’s personality as a separate 
and distinct attribute.429 There is strong disagreement amongst academic thinkers about 
the answer to this question. Attributing legal personality to a corporate entity is one thing, 




428 See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (OUP 1975) Peter H. Nidditch (ed). 
429 For a discussion on the attribution of moral agency, see Joel Parthemore and Blay Whitby, ‘What makes 
any agent a Moral Agent? Reflections on Machine Consciousness and Moral Agency’ [2013] 5(2) 
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6.2.2 ‘Idealist claims dressed up in empirical garb’ 
 
G R (Bob) Sullivan vigorously rejects the idea that there is any basis for claiming that a 
company acts as a moral agent which can commit corporate wrongs.430 Sullivan believes 
there is nothing in terms of corporate development which suggests that a company has 
an independent moral personality which is capable of detection.431 Sullivan adds that 
claims to recognise corporate moral agency are “merely idealist claims dressed up in 
empirical garb”.432 This is because, according to Sullivan, “[c]orporations and 
bureaucracies rest on human agency and do not transmute that agency into some form 
of non-human phenomena”.433 Robin Loof goes further and considers the issue of moral 
personality to be irrelevant in so far as the application of the criminal law is concerned.434 
The fact that a company has agency to act does not mean that it has moral agency; rather, 
the company demonstrates no more than the fact that it has a “rational and physical 
capacity” to commit crime. In the same way as the criminal law holds an individual 
responsible for his actions in circumstances where he lacks moral discernment, Loof 
perceives the position of a corporate entity is no different.435 A company has corporate 
agency to commit crime, and whether this agency is laced with morality is none to the 
point.436 
 
In the eyes of those who deny corporate moral agency, this narrow conception of 
corporate personality to exclude the element of moral agency should not restrict a 
company’s potential liability in criminal law. After tracing the anthropomorphic approach 
to corporate criminal liability which rests heavily on individual identification and 
attribution ideas, Sullivan advocates a corporate criminal liability system which treats 
vicarious liability as the sole basis for determining criminal responsibility.437 Meanwhile, 
Loof argues that causation of loss should be the pivot around which corporate criminal 
liability should turn.438 Corporate moral agency does not enter Sullivan’s or Loof’s 
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conception of corporate criminal liability in a system which moves away from established 
identification and attribution principles. 
 
Similarly, from a philosophical standpoint, Yuval Noah Harari views the limited company 
as no more than a legal structure through which commercial enterprises are run. A 
company exists in the legal aether, with little or no connection to the physical world.439 
Harari considers the example of a car manufacturer whose legal existence would continue 
even if a disaster befell the company, causing the death of all its employees and the 
destruction of its factories and offices. Nothing physically would exist, but the company 
would retain its legal construct. Conversely, if a court ordered the dissolution of the 
company, the legal construct would disappear, but as individuals the employees would 
survive, albeit not in their roles as employees. During its existence, a company owns 
property and functions fully within the financial community, but as a legal construct it 
remains, in Harari’s words, no more than “a figment of our collective imagination”.440 
Harari comments that the technical term for a company in the US is “a corporation”, 
“which is ironic because the term derives from [the word] ‘corpus’ (‘body’ in Latin) – 
which is the thing these corporations lack”.441 It seems clear there is no room for moral 
personality in Harari’s conception of the modern company. 
 
Whether the proponents of a narrow view of corporate agency absent any moral 
ingredient are correct in their analysis is a matter for debate. In this chapter, the discussion 
is acknowledged, but not resolved. As previously noted, if a company has moral agency, 
for adherents of a corporate moral agency model this has significant implications in the 
search for a narrative which supports the recognition of corporate rights. 
 
6.2.3 Legal personhood as ‘cluster property’ 
 
The weakness in the reductionist view of corporate personality lies in its failure to 
appreciate the consequences which flow inherently from the way in which the common 
law has held a company responsible for the commission of a criminal offence. In the last 
chapter, when exploring the parameters of corporate criminal liability, attention was 
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focused on the way in which a company was deemed to have acquired a mental state of 
awareness by the attribution or identification of the conduct of its officers with that of 
the company. Here, attention attaches to the importance of the law requiring the company 
to take responsibility for its actions. Whereas the former discussion focuses on the 
pragmatic circumstances in which a company is to be held criminally liable, the latter 
draws attention to the theoretical imperative which requires a legal person, in this instance 
a company, to accept responsibility for its actions.  The relevance of the point is that the 
company is required by the law to accept responsibility for an inherently immoral act. 
Since the law requires a company to accept responsibility in this way, the company must 
be something more than a legal fiction which lacks the component of moral agency.  
 
In his recent work, Visa Kurki demonstrates that legal personhood constitutes much 
more than an artificial shell and is best understood as “a cluster property”, by which he 
means to explain that the notion of legal personhood connotes the bearing of rights and 
duties which the law has assigned or ascribed.442 Kurki accepts that companies are formed 
as “collectivities of human beings”,443 and, consistent with an understanding of real-entity 
theory discussed in the last chapter, there are some acts that are performed as legal 
persons in their own right, separated from the actions of their members.444  
 
Kurki demonstrates the point by employing an example from Ronald Dworkin’s work in 
which he posits a scenario involving a car manufacturer which produced defective motor 
vehicles and caused multiple deaths. Moral responsibility is ascribed to the company in 
its role as a collective of individuals rather than to any particular individual in question. 
“The moral requirement for group responsibility is accentuated in such a situation, where 
a wrong has clearly taken place but placing the blame on any particular individual would 
be unjust”.445 The key point, as Matthew Kramer explains, also quoted by Kurki, is that 
although individual interests are components of the corporate structure, the group 
interests “do not amount to a sum or welter of individual interests, since its interests are 
those which characterise its members qua collectively rather than those which characterise 
its members qua individuals”.446 If the position were otherwise, the notion that a company 
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is no more than a legal wrapper for the conduct of business would amount to a denial of 
its corporate personality, even if its standing as a legal person remained intact. 
 
6.2.4 Corporate apology 
 
The contemporary willingness of a company to deliver a corporate apology is a strong 
indication of the acceptance that a company does not operate in a hermetically sealed 
legal vacuum but rather engages in society and recognises its responsibility which may be 
moral rather than legal in nature. An expansive academic literature has emerged in recent 
years which has explored the role of a corporate apology in the context of dispute 
resolution.447 After examining the impact of an apology in civil actions, Jonathan Cohen 
concluded that an apology can facilitate a settlement, especially where it is well timed and 
appropriately nuanced.448 Whilst critics might suggest the notion of a corporate apology 
reflects no more than a cynical form of “virtue-signalling” which is lacking in substance,449 
this would be unfair. Apart from anything else, irrespective of whether the motive is 
malign or altruistic, the fact remains that an apology is tendered by the company, in 
recognition of its responsibility as a company. Even if a company is engaged in “virtue 
signalling”, the fact of its engagement suggests that some level of moral sensibility is 
extant. 
 
Aaron Lazarre noted the effect of an apology may be transformative in nature. It 
represents “an exchange of shame and power between offender and the offended,450 and 
“[b]y apologizing, you take the shame of your offence and direct it to yourself”.451 
Lazare’s notion of shame travelling between the offence and the offender may be 
artificial, but again, as with virtue signalling, an offender’s acknowledgment of the 
shameful nature of the offending is a positive step in the direction of accepting 
responsibility for wrongdoing. Since a company has an identity independent of its 
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members and officers, and no single individual can be identified as responsible for 
damaging conduct, the making of a corporate apology is a function of its role as a legal 
personality with moral agency. An implied duty to apologize flows from the company’s 
standing as an agent with moral responsibilities. The essence of making an apology is a 
moral act. As Lee Taft said, “[a]pology is moral because it acknowledges the existence of 
right and wrong and confirms that a norm of right behaviour has been broken”.452 
 
6.2.5 The company as a moral agent 
 
Assuredly, the common law has demonstrated its willingness since Victorian times to hold 
a company criminally liable for corporate misconduct, and if moral responsibility is a 
prerequisite for the imposition of criminal punishment, the existence of a company as a 
moral agent is implicitly acknowledged. 
 
Gardner explains the purpose of a criminal trial “affirms the moral agency and moral 
responsibility of the offender”,453 with the measure of moral agency and responsibility 
judged by reference to a person’s “blameworthiness or culpability”.454 Blameworthiness 
has four constituent elements. “To be blameworthy, one must (a) have done something 
wrong and (b) have been responsible for doing it, while lacking (c) justification and (d) 
excuse for having done it”.455 Since criminal liability is imposed on a company by 
reference to the acts and omissions of the company’s directing mind, the element of 
corporate blameworthiness and culpability is established. In this way, the company is 
justly punished for the commission of its criminal conduct as a morally responsible agent 
in its own right.  
 
Nick Friedman describes the justification of corporate criminal liability as the “Agency 
Defence”.456 It is a curious phrase, by which Friedman seeks to signify the defence of the 
law’s imposition of corporate criminal liability on the ground that the company is a moral 
agent. Friedman articulates a broader foundation for the Agency Defence which neatly 
coheres with the notion of moral responsibility in criminal law, and he draws on the idea 
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that a company’s intentions can be discerned from its internal decision-making processes 
which determine its personality and character.457 Friedman quotes from Peter French’s 
work, where French explains that a company’s internal structure “accomplishes a 
subordination and synthesis of the intentions and acts of various biological persons into 
a corporate decision”.458  
 
Philosophical support for the Agency Defence is found in the idea promoted by Philip 
Pettit that a company is a morally responsible agent which can act in accordance with its 
own intentions.459 Friedman references Pettit’s hypothetical “discursive dilemmas” in 
which company executives vote on different proposals, resulting in a compromise 
proposal which is adopted but which none of the executives supported at the outset of 
their discussions. For Pettit, company attitudes can include the holding of beliefs and 
attitudes. “It is the ability to make … value judgments that supply the benchmarks of 
responsibility”.460 
 
6.2.6 Moral agents have moral rights 
  
During the course of his work, Friedman makes clear the significance of his approach for 
the assertion of corporate rights. For Friedman, once it is established that a company is a 
moral agent with moral responsibilities, recognition of a company’s ability to claim rights 
is necessarily asserted:  
 
If corporations really are moral agents, what basis can there be for denying that 
they are eligible, on the traditional account, to be holders of human rights? The 
traditional account … holds that moral agency is both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for being a human rights holder … Thus, if corporations share this 
capacity – as the Agency Defence claims – it seems there is a powerful argument 
that corporations should be saddled with not just the responsibilities, but also the 
rights and privilege which usually attend that status. In fact, French expressly 
acknowledges this consequence: because “corporations can be fully-fledged 
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moral persons”, he says, they “have whatever privileges, rights and duties as are, 
in the normal course of affairs, accorded to moral persons”.461 
 
Friedman reiterates the point later, describing corporate moral agency as a “powerful 
theoretical basis” for the judicial recognition of corporate rights.462  
 
As a broad approach to the basis on which corporate rights may be founded, this 
understanding is interesting. But it omits any insight on the nature of the rights which a 
company can assert, and whether, for example, the privilege against self-incrimination is 
one such right. In addition, the possibility that the legal treatment of companies is 
asymmetrical cannot be entirely discounted. Whilst companies are recognised as moral 
agents for the purpose of imposing duties, recognition of corporate rights does not 
necessarily follow. Friedman is aware of this limitation in his work and notes that:  
 
[T]he simple fact that a corporation is a moral agent still leaves open which 
particular rights it would be appropriate for a corporation to hold … It is more 
likely that questions about what human rights there are and what their content is 
– for humans as well as corporations – turn on more complex moral arguments 
in which moral agency plays only a part.463 
 
Friedman notes that the moral content of human rights is “dynamic and subject to 
contestation” and “derived from fundamental moral arguments about the nature and 
demands of moral agency”.464 
 
The determination of which rights a company can assert is not straight-forward. Friedman 
acknowledges it is difficult to limit the scope of corporate rights claims once the principle 
of corporate moral agency has been established.465 The cases in the United States Supreme 
Court discussed in chapter 5 demonstrate the width of corporate rights extending beyond 
due process and privacy rights, as they have applied to political and religious expression. 
The fundamental point here is that the establishment of “corporate moral agency changes 
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the debate from a conversation of one order – about whether corporations are eligible 
for human rights at all – to a conversation of a different order – about which human 
rights it makes sense for them to have”.466 As foreshadowed, the next chapter discusses 
whether the privilege against self-incrimination is a right to which a company may lay 
claim, and if so, on what basis.  
 
Friedman envisages that the recognition of companies as moral agents able to assert 
human rights may facilitate a claim to rights which had thought to have been confined to 
individuals. By way of analogy and metaphor, there are “legally intelligible arguments” 
that a company’s premises are its home, with rights to privacy and free speech duly 
safeguarded: 
 
If that is so, it is not obvious why, as a legal matter, a corporation could not cast 
a “vote” in an election, why a merger could not be defended on grounds of a right 
to “marry”, why a corporation threatened with dissolution could not plead its 
right to “life”, or why corporations could not rely on similar legal analogies to 




However, Friedman’s approach is vulnerable to several criticisms.  
 
First, Friedman does not explain why it follows that a company can assert a moral right 
simply by virtue of its identity of a moral agent. The fact that a company is obliged to 
discharge certain legal and moral responsibilities does not necessarily entitle a company 
to exercise moral rights. There needs to be something in the texture of a connection 
between the existence of corporate moral agency and the recognition of a corporate moral 
right which remains to be developed. Friedman’s analysis explains how group activity can 
constitute more than the sum of the individual parts, but without explaining how an inert 
corporate body can spring into moral life by virtue of formalistic creation.  
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Secondly, by failing to assemble a codex for identifying which moral rights a company 
can exercise, the ability of a company to lay claim to particular moral rights is left hanging 
in the air. Friedman acknowledges the criteria for determining recognition will turn on 
“more complex arguments in which moral agency plays only a part”,468 but he fails to 
identify, let alone develop, these arguments or any other arguments which bear down on 
the issue. The answer, it is suggested, lies in an application of a corporate value theory, 
scrutinising value in the form of benefits enjoyed by a company’s stakeholders, and the 
wider public. The need to protect these benefits underpins the law’s recognition of a 
corporate right to protect its interests against hostile action and prevent harmful 
consequences which would otherwise follow. Whilst individual human rights are 
necessarily implicit in the dignity of man, if it is the case that recognition of a corporate 
right requires an additional justification, the need to protect corporate value is the 
criterion which should be applied. 
 
Writing shortly before Friedman’s article was published, Avia Pasternak attempted to 
address these two aspects with partial success.469 Pasternak is clear that companies as 
corporate moral agents have moral entitlements which may require legal protection. “The 
corporate moral agency thesis suggests that corporate entities are members of our moral 
community – they are capable of moral reasoning and are the appropriate subjects of 
more responsibility”. 470 However, unlike Friedman, Pasternak advances the proposition 
that corporate moral agency does not, of itself, support a company’s claim to assert moral 
rights. Instead, to substantiate a claim to a moral right, the moral right must be “necessary 
for the protection of individual rights”.471 This is important because it explains why the 
law should give effect to some moral rights but not others. In determining whether a 
company is entitled to claim moral rights, and if so, which rights, Pasternak identifies two 
connections. The first connection is conceptual and consists of an exploration of whether 
“[corporate moral agency] is the type of thing to which [corporate moral rights attach]”. 
The second connection is substantive. “Here, we investigate whether there are sufficiently 
strong normative reasons to grant a [corporate moral agent] a right”.472  
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There is a third criticism to which Friedman is vulnerable. The argument for locating 
corporate rights in the notion of a company as a moral agent is further complicated by 
the fact that the exercise of a legal right is not always morally supported. The facts of the 
case in First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti473 provide a good example. The Supreme 
Court determined that the company had a legal right to make a political donation, but 
even though the legal right was supported by a moral right, it did not follow that the 
company was morally right to exercise the legal right. It may be argued that although the 
company was legally entitled to donate to a political cause, it was not morally permissible 
for a donation to be made. The making of a political donation is sometimes a divisive act, 
and very often it does not advance the financial interests of the donor company. The 
same tensions arise in an assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. A company 
may have a legally and morally grounded right to assert the privilege, but whether it is 
morally appropriate to assert the privilege is another matter. Suppose, for example, a 
company is responsible for an aircraft accident in which 300 passengers were killed. The 
company asserts the privilege against self-incrimination in response to efforts to obtain 
information which evidences the company’s criminal culpability. The company’s legal 
right to assert the privilege at common law is firmly established, but the moral 
implications of remaining silent are more obscure. A theory which recognises corporate 
rights as an appendage of corporate moral agency does not address this issue. 
 
Fourthly, a strong point can be made that an obligation to treat companies with moral 
concern by recognising their right to protect themselves against hostile action is not 
dependent on recognition of a corporate entity having status as a moral agent. The State 
becomes obliged to treat companies with moral concern not by virtue of their status as  
moral agents, but rather because they add aggregate value to the corporate sector as a 
whole, and instrumental and intrinsic value to individual lives. Moral concern arises in 
circumstances where conduct has the potential to affect the lives of people, in either a 
positive or negative respect. In the case of aggregate and individual value delivered by 
companies the societal impact is resoundingly positive. Accordingly, a corporate 
entitlement to exercise rights is more easily founded on recognition of moral value 
delivered by companies than the more controversial conception of companies as moral 
agents.  
 




6.3 A CORPORATE VALUE THEORY  
 
6.3.1 A consequentialist approach to corporate rights 
 
The vision for a corporate value theory which sustains the recognition of corporate rights 
is a consequentialist one, with a focus on the value that morally justifies the law’s 
recognition of the corporate right in question. The emphasis on value protected by the 
recognition of the right gives the approach a utilitarian tilt,474 since the beneficial 
consequence of the action provides the support for the law’s recognition of the right.  
 
In his work, Meir Dan-Cohen locates the conceptual foundation for corporate rights in a 
theory of organizational rights, and harvesting Benthamite ideas, he argues that the 
identification of these rights falls to be determined by principles of consequentialist 
utilitarianism.475 Utility is a value-driven concept with the maximisation of utility as the 
litmus test. In the corporate context, its boundaries are sufficiently wide to embrace the 
interests of employees and the wider community alongside those of the company and its 
shareholders. In a consequentialist model, the recognition of corporate rights depends 
not upon notions of individual or corporate personhood but rather on the sufficiency of 
social utility, value or worth which underpins recognition of the right in question. Social 
utility embraces economic interests as well as broader notions pertaining to society’s well-
being. The law’s recognition of the corporate right is morally sound since the 
consequence of the right’s recognition promotes both economic and public interests. 
Acknowledgment of a corporate property right is a case in point. As with other 
proprietary interests, economists justify the recognition of the right by acknowledging 
that the right facilitates a stable and efficient allocation of financial resources which 
benefits social welfare.476 
 
Dan-Cohen offers an approach to the recognition of corporate rights which circumvents 
the rigidity of personalisation and provides a model which accommodates the modern 
conception of a company. A corporate right is not reliant on any notion of individual 
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personhood but rather stands independently of it. There is no crutch of dependency 
founded on a legal fiction which transposes recognition of individual rights into the 
corporate arena. Instead, in the terms of a consequentialist vision, the existence of a 
corporate right depends on its value in terms of social and economic worth. Therefore, 
if the recognition of a corporate right contributes to improving the economic and social 
well-being of the general population, or enhances the rule of law, the utilitarian 
consequence of the conduct is established.  
 
In some instances, the level of benefit flowing from the law’s recognition of a claim to 
exercise a corporate right is obvious. In the previous chapter, examples involving the 
assertion of contractual, tortious and property rights were considered, and as a supporting 
accessory to sustain the company’s financial standing, a sophisticated analysis of value 
was not required. The outcome of such an analysis is less obvious in other cases where a 
company seeks to assert a right which does not fall into this category. The right to 
corporate privacy, or to assert a claim to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, 
are good examples of rights where there is consideration of the benefit in terms of social 
value which can be said to flow from an acknowledgement of rights of this sort. Here, a 
consequentialist approach requires a more detailed exploration of value, in terms of an 
analysis of the benefit protected by a company’s assertion of the right in question. The 
question to be asked is whether consequentially, the outcome of the law’s 
acknowledgement of corporate rights is morally good in terms of its contribution to 
support the economy and the individual value afforded to those actively associated with 
a company, or morally bad because the assertion of the corporate right serves to harm 
the common weal. If the former, a consequentialist utilitarian approach can sustain the 
recognition of corporate rights in abstracto.  
 
6.3.2 Value-based analysis 
 
In an application of a value-based analysis of corporate rights, attention is focused on the 
value which society places on individual and collective interests to be protected in terms 
of benefit and worth.  In the context of a claim to assert corporate rights, value may be 
assessed in social and economic terms, as a cost/benefit analysis. The law’s 
acknowledgement of corporate rights is the cost, and the positive contribution to public 
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and private welfare is the benefit. Yehezkel Dror477 explains that the relationship between 
social values and the law is not so much an inextricable link as a dependency: 
  
By its very nature, law consists of a number of norms which constitute obligatory 
rules of behaviour for the members of the society. These legal norms are closely 
related to various social values, being either a direct expression of them or serving 
them in a more indirect way.478 
 
In this way, “the operation of law depends on the existence of extra-legal values which 
support the substantive content of the legal norms”.479 Dror was much influenced in his 
analysis by Lon Fuller’s approach which regarded the law’s purpose as its value content: 
 
It is impossible to assign meaning to any part of the law and apply it to concrete 
cases without regarding the purpose (or purposes) which that part of the law is 
designed to serve; that purpose constitutes the value or values reflected in the 
law.480 
 
6.3.3 Value protected by criminal law  
 
The criminal law provides a useful illustration of the way in which value, or multiple 
values, promote the establishment of criminal offences and punishments. Developing this 
analysis, Jeremy Horder explains how different formulations of value function within the 
contours of criminal law, supporting the law’s application especially when new criminal 
offences are enacted and their foundational support is unclear.481 To begin with, an 
understanding of the notions of ultimate value, intrinsic value and instrumental value is 
required: 
 
In the secular state, an individual’s life has ultimate value, value not derived from 
any higher value. What gives real meaning and significance to individual life, over 
its course, is engagement in activities and relationships, and with other things – 
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“goods” – that have “intrinsic” value. That which is intrinsically valuable has value 
separate from or beyond being - like a bus ticket or a shoelace – simply a means 
to an end. Things that have intrinsic value are activities, relationships, and other 
goods that are valued for their own sake, because they contribute constitutively 
to (they are an integral part of) a way of life.482 
 
Identifying the intrinsic value of a good as a candidate for the criminal law’s protection is 
an essentially existential exercise. “The intrinsic value of a good may be expressed in the 
way we are, in the way we think, in what we say, and in what we do”.483 But what, in this 
context, is “a good”? Horder notes that it is not exclusively individualistic and in actuality 
references the interests of the collective, in the form of “public goods” through which 
the lives of individuals take place.484  
 
Horder quotes from Joseph Raz’s definition of a public or common good as a good which 
“refers not to the sum of the good of individuals but to those goods which, in a certain 
community, serve the interests of people generally in a conflict-free, non-exclusive and 
non-excludable way”.485 In Horder’s view, the law may become engaged in the protection 
of public goods where the goods have become “fragile”. Horder defines fragile public 
goods as “goods whose value or existence may be threatened by over-use (commonly, in 
virtue of scarcity), or which are likely to be prone to injustice in point of access (perhaps, 
because of the way supply is used to satisfy demand).” 486  An example of a fragile public 
good is faithfulness to the rule of law which would be upheld by the courts on behalf of 
the State.  
 
The concern to protect the value of “fragile public goods” coheres with an understanding 
of the benefits delivered to the wider community, and not as a narrower perception of 
benefit afforded to any particular member of the community. It is not that the individual 
does not enjoy benefit; rather, the benefit to the individual is enjoyed in his capacity as a 
participant in the wider community. The benefit to the individual is a communitarian one. 
There is value in both community and individual interests, and this justifies the law’s 
 
482 ibid 42. 
483 ibid 42. 
484 ibid 44. 
485 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Clarendon Press 1994) 52. 
486 Horder (n 481) 47. 
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protection. This is not to suggest that this conceptualisation of benefit to an individual is 
exhaustive. It is not. As explained shortly, a successful company has significant intrinsic 
value to an individual such as a company officer or employee, for instance, by providing 
him with the means for sustaining his lifestyle and well-being, and that of his family too. 
Whilst Horder’s approach focuses on a communitarian benefit, his analysis paves the way 
for a wider value-based analysis which explores instrumental and intrinsic value in the 
context of a company, and the delivery by the company of benefits to its members, 
officers, and employees. 
 
6.3.4 Corporate rights: a traditional paradigm 
 
In company law, there are instances where it is possible to theorise juridical support for 
an established corporate right within the terms of a value-based analysis. The decided 
cases show that when the exercise of a corporate right promotes value and worth, the 
courts will recognise the existence of the claim and facilitate its acknowledgment. In this 
way, the recognition of a corporate right is supported, whether it is a substantive right 
such as the right to property or a procedural right such as the right to a fair trial. The 
notion of value is utilised as an optical prism through which the recognition and exercise 
of corporate rights is viewed. In some instances, there is a singular value or worth which 
can be identified. In other cases, there is a plurality. This line of thinking begs the question 
as to how the value and worth of the exercise of a right is to be articulated. The immediate 
response might surely focus on the construction of a narrative which draws attention to 
the economic value or worth of the right to the company itself, and its stakeholders. 
 
A company’s ability to take legal action when defamed is a paradigm case for the 
importation of value into a construct for corporate rights. A company may bring legal 
proceedings for defamation where a libel affects its property, or the management of its 
trade or business.487 The company has neither a right to a good reputation, nor a right for 
its reputation not to be attacked. But it does have a right to take legal action where its 
reputation has been attacked by a falsehood. The law recognises and protects this right. 
The law’s response is unsurprising, since a company’s good reputation has enormous 
value for the company, and the company’s ability to continue trading successfully has 
 
487 Halsbury Laws of England, vol 16 ‘Companies’ para 301. 
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wider value for the economy and society at large. In the Sixth Edition of Salmond on 
Torts published in 1924, the text noted that: 
 
An incorporated company or other body corporate has in truth no reputation to 
be injured. It is a fictitious person and cannot in the nature of things be brought 
into hatred, ridicule, or contempt by any manner of falsehood. The reputation 
that is in reality assailed by a charge against a corporation is the reputation of the 
members or other agents by whom the affairs of the corporation are conducted. 
Yet by attacking in this manner the reputation of its members and agents damage 
may be caused in the corporation itself in respect of its business and property. 
For any defamatory statement, therefore, which produces such actual damage the 
corporation may sue …488 
 
Notwithstanding the artificial nature of a corporate construct, Salmond recognised the 
company had a right to protect its interests by commencing legal proceedings in respect 
of the damage which it had suffered. The legal requirement that the false accusation 
impacted adversely on the company’s property or management of its business coheres 
with the narrative of value and worth. By providing a legal remedy for the aggrieved 
company to pursue, the law is protecting an interest which has economic or social value 
to the company, and society at large. In this instance, the value is articulated as the 
company’s continuing ability to trade successfully in a manner which delivers benefit for 
the economy and society at large. The law safeguards the company’s ability to sue because 
the interests protected by the right have social utility and worth. The presence of value 
protected by the assertion of the right is a necessary component of this analysis. A value 
does not precipitate the existence of a right, but if a legal right is to be asserted, existential 
value in the protected interest has to be shown.  
  
6.4 AGGREGATE VALUE 
 
6.4.1 Aggregate value and a strong corporate sector 
 
 
488 John Salmond, Salmond on the Law of Torts (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1924) Ch 14 para 134.2. For the 
most recent edition, see RFV Heuston and RA Buckley, Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 1996) 408. 
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One wider interest in which there is clear value for the State is the importance of 
facilitating a strong and flourishing corporate sector in a free-market economy.  It is 
axiomatic that the State welcomes economic growth with its attendant benefits in the 
provision of employment and contribution to public revenue. In this analysis, the 
development of a corporate value theory of corporate rights is fixed on the contribution 
made by the corporate sector as a whole, rather than an individual company’s value or 
worth to its officers and employees. Here, the value to the corporate sector is an aggregate 
value which reflects the collective efforts of single companies whose contributions, when 
combined, deliver enormous benefits to the economy. Instead of determining 
consequential value by looking at the worth of a particular company, in this understanding 
of value it is the recognition of aggregated value delivered by the corporate sector to the 
national economy which underwrites the law’s recognition of corporate rights. The 
purposeful and beneficial effect of the corporate sector has intrinsic value to the nation, 
and the law becomes obliged, acting through the legislature and the courts, to develop 
rules which protect and promote this value by facilitating individual companies in the 
ability to assert their rights. If the State fails to support the corporate sector, it leads to an 
increase in unemployment and a reduction of public revenue, and the State’s desire to 
promote economic growth is undermined.489 
 
It is none to the point whether the business of an individual company does, or does not, 
make a positive contribution to the economy and social well-being. In either case, the 
company’s ability to exercise its rights are respected. This means the law is obliged to 
recognise and protect the exercise of company rights, even in the case of an individual 
company whose contribution to the economy is negative. The right to privacy, or 
procedural rights involving due process, are typical examples of rights which the law 
permits a company to claim, notwithstanding the company’s lack of any positive 
contribution to the corporate sector and society at large. In this instance, the law affords 
protection not because it sees worth in a company which has no value from the 
perspective of the State, but rather because it recognises the positive value in supporting 
 
489 In its report on corporate governance, the Government has acknowledged that ‘major corporate 
collapses cause serious economic and social damage’, and ‘the effects are felt far and wide with job losses 
and the British taxpayer picking up the tab’. See Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 
‘Restoring trust in audit and corporate governance’ (MP 382, March 2021) Executive Summary and 
accompanying press release (18 March 2021). 
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the corporate sector as a whole which is an essential requisite for the successful 
functioning of free markets in a liberal democracy.  
 
6.4.2 The importance of the corporate sector 
 
The importance of a strong corporate sector to the UK economy cannot be 
underestimated. Today, the company is the chosen vehicle for the organisation and 
delivery of business activity, both domestically and internationally. As Lord Sumption 
said in Prest v Pretodel Resources Ltd490 when describing the separate nature of corporate 
personality as a fiction on which the whole of English company and insolvency law rests, 
“limited companies have been the principal unit of commercial life for more than a 
century. Their separate personality and property are the basis on which third parties are 
entitled to deal with them and commonly do deal with them”.491  
 
The beneficial contribution made by companies to the success of the UK economy is 
huge. Statistics from Companies House for June 2020 confirm that in the UK there are 
4.3 million companies listed on the companies’ register.492 In March 2020, companies and 
public corporations represented 73.6% of total UK businesses. The figure is continuing 
to rise and between March 2019 and March 2020, there was an increase of 1.2% in the 
number of corporate businesses in existence.493 The UK’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
was worth approximately £2,019 ($2,827) billion in 2019, representing 2.33% of the world 
economy.494 In taxation revenue, total net corporation tax receipts in 2018–2019 were 
£54.6 billion,495 and represented almost 10% of the UK’s total income from all forms of 
taxation levied across the economy.496 This economic contribution is driven by the work 
 
490 Prest (n 404).  
491 ibid 476 [8]. 
492 UK Government statistics <www.gov.uk/government/publications/companies-register-activities-
statistical-release-2019-to-2020/companies-register-activities-2019-to-2020> accessed 18 February 2021. 
493 UK business; activity, size and location: 2020 
<www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/activitysizeandlocation/bulletins/ukbusinessactivi
tysizeandlocation/2020> accessed 29 December 2020. 
494 UK gross domestic product <https://tradingeconomics.com/united-kingdom/gdp> accessed 29 
December 2020.  
495 UK Government Statistics 2020, 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/9
19769/CT_stats_commentary_2020.pdf> accessed 29 December 2020. 
496 UK Government Statistics 2019 <www.statista.com/statistics/284319/united-kingdom-hmrc-tax-
receipts-corporation-tax/> accessed 29 December 2020.  
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of smaller companies. Since 2004, private limited companies have consistently accounted 
for over 96% of all corporate body types.497 
 
6.5 INDIVIDUAL VALUE 
 
6.5.1 Intrinsic value and well-being 
 
So far, the value protected by law has been articulated from the perspective of the State’s 
interest in supporting a strong corporate sector. However, for company officers and 
employees involved in the activities of a company on a daily basis, the value to be 
protected by the assertion of corporate rights which protect the company’s interests is 
much more personal. As Horder points out, when a person engages in occupational, 
commercial, or recreational activity, the ability to participate in company affairs has 
intrinsic value and contributes to a person’s general well-being: 
 
In other words, for such people it is engaging in the activity itself or, in some 
occupational cases, engaging in the role that one’ activities give one (say within 
the local community), rather than simply securing a given outcome (say, profit) 
of the activity, that contributes to their well-being and hence to their individual 
autonomy. As Raz puts it, ‘freedom [autonomy] consists of valuable forms of life, 
and … its value derives from the value of that pursuit’ (my emphasis).498 
Moreover, for Raz, forms of life include ‘socially defined and determined pursuits 
and activities’,499 meaning recognised and socially organised hobbies as well as 
(say) occupations serving the community.500 
 
Raz discusses that nature of well-being in the context of an assumed duty common to 
every individual “to protect and promote the well-being of all people”.501 Raz explains 
that well-being “has a strong active aspect”, consisting of “the (1) whole-hearted and (2) 
successful pursuit of (3) valuable (4) activities”.502 Above all, the central element of well-
 
497 UK Government statistics (n 492). 
498 Raz (n 330) 395. See also 145–46 and 308–13. 
499 ibid 309. 
500 Jeremy Horder, ‘Strict liability, statutory construction, and the spirit of liberty’ [2002] LQR 458, 460. 
Horder’s argument is that ‘[t]he imposition of strict liability in a regulatory context may seriously threaten 
the participation of individuals in activities of intrinsic value to their pursuit of an autonomous life’. 




being is the autonomic quality of personal self-determination to enable the enjoyment of 
a good life. Raz gives several examples of intrinsically valuable activities, which include 
“devotion to one’s family, conscientious performance of a job, good neighbourliness, 
weekends spent bird-watching, volunteer work for social or political causes, etc”.503 As 
success in such activities enhances their intrinsic value to the individual participating in 
these activities, failure detracts from well-being to a point where individual self-esteem 
may be irreversibly undermined. Raz gives an example of a university teacher who is made 
redundant for financial reasons. The compelled departure from his chosen career 
represents “a blow to his life from which, depending on age and circumstances, it may be 
impossible for him to recover”.504 
 
In his consideration of the content of the general part of the criminal law, John Gardner 
notes that the focus of criminal law fixes on “activities” and the preservation of “active 
well-being”.505 This leads Gardner to an extensive consideration of the meaning of value 
and well-being. Emphasis is placed on the nature of the activity rather than the end-result. 
Drawing on Raz’s understanding of well-being, Gardner gives an example of a 
mountaineer who climbs to the top of the mountain. “It was not that one ended up on 
top of a mountain that made the contribution to one’s well-being. It was the fact that one 
climbed the mountain all the way to the top … Climbing the mountain to the top was 
what ultimately mattered”.506 Echoing Raz’s view, Gardner re-iterates that “well-being, 
actively conceived, consists in the successful and wholehearted pursuit of worthwhile 
activities, and however the activities may come to be worthwhile, one’s well-being is 
constituted by one’s successful and wholehearted pursuit of them qua activities”.507 
 
Specifically referencing commercial activity, Horder considers the contribution to well-
being made by the large number of small businesses operating in the UK. Quoting Judith 
Freedman, Horder notes the individual contribution of these businesses to the economy 
may be small, but, in Freedman’s words, “this is not a matter for criticism, since these 
firms have a real value for their owners and users”.508 Horder concludes that: 
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The autonomous character of the lives of millions of individuals and families, in 
small businesses, is commonly sustained by the intrinsic value of such 
wholehearted participation, perhaps particularly when it serves a local 
community.509 
 
6.5.2 Intrinsic value and corporate rights 
 
The resonance of this analysis for the law’s recognition of corporate rights is clear. As 
already established, a company promotes activity which has intrinsic value in the lives of 
company’s officers and employees. In the case of an employee, a company provides 
rewarding employment and a career structure. An employee makes plans and lifestyle 
choices with reference to his extensive association with the company’s activities. His 
decisions, made in the capacity as an autonomous individual with choices, affect his 
choice of place to live with his family, and the location of the schools to which his children 
attend. In short, an employee becomes heavily invested in the daily life of corporate 
activity, and the intrinsic value of this investment is significant. In these circumstances, 
the law is morally justified in facilitating the exercise of a company’s claim to protect these 
interests.  
 
It follows that, if a company is unable to protect its interests in response to hostile action 
from the State or a private sector actor, the interests of its officers and employees are 
adversely impacted. Here, the intrinsic value enjoyed by those working in the company is 
threatened, and in cases where hostile action undermines the ability of the company to 
function successfully, the intrinsic value enjoyed by the company’s officers and 
shareholders is severely damaged, if not destroyed. This scenario posits the occurrence of 
a multitude of harmful consequences, ranging from unemployment to economic hardship 
and family breakdown. These damaging consequences can be described as the “moral 
spill-over effect” of unrestrained hostile action. Typically, a “spill-over effect” occurs 
where an incident in one context has an adverse impact in another. The Oxford English 
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Dictionary defines “spill over” to mean an “incidental development; a consequence, a 
repercussion, a by-product”. 510 
 
In this analysis, the law recognises the company’s entitlement to assert rights which 
protect its interests in order to safeguard the intrinsic value of the company to its officers 
and employees, and to prevent the occurrence of resultant harmful consequences. The 
corporate right is supported by reference to the intrinsic value which would be lost if the 
ability to assert a corporate right was not acknowledged. Indeed, it is a moral imperative 
for the law to support the assertion of a corporate right in these circumstances. This is 
not to say the law can be mobilised to protect a company from other threats which may 
impact adversely on the company’s interests or those of its officers and employees. There 
is no expectation that the law should support a company by insulating it from the 
vicissitudes of commercial life, even though a company’s trading failure may severely 
injure the interests of the company, its officers, and employees. In this respect, the State’s 
obligation to afford protection to a company is different from the nature of protection 
afforded by the State to an individual.  
 
The State’s protection of an individual involves the taking of appropriate measures to 
safeguard an individual’s interests and prevent others from interfering with these 
interests. Typically, the obligation requires a State to act proactively.511 Here, in the 
corporate context, the law’s recognition of a company’s right to safeguard its interests is 
mostly reactive. It is triggered as a response to hostile attack where the intrinsic value of 
the company to the lives of company officers and employees is vulnerable to diminution. 
As Ovadia Ezra notes, “[t]he State, per the parens patriae doctrine is supposed to guarantee 
not only the freedoms and negative rights of its residents, but also their positive rights”.512 
For example, State intervention may be required to protect the interests of children, or 
individuals with severe physical or mental challenges. There is no suggestion the parens 
patriae (literally, “parent of the nation”) doctrine applies to companies.513 Where the law 
 
510 Oxford English Dictionary <www.oed.com/view/Entry/186647?redirectedFrom=spillover#eid> 
accessed 7 April 2021. 
511 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Frequently Asked Questions on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (Fact Sheet No. 33, 2008) 11. 
512 Ovadia Ezra, Moral Dilemmas in Real Life, Current Issues in Applied Ethics (Springer 2006) 15. 
513 Margaret Hall, ‘The Vulnerability Jurisdiction: Equity, Parens Patriae, and the Inherent Jurisdiction of 
the Court’ (2016) 2(1) CJCCL 185, 188 defines the parens patriae doctrine as ‘the State’s responsibility to 
protect the members of identified “vulnerable populations”: persons who are deemed incapable of 
protecting their own interests by reason of their particular personal characteristics’.   
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gives effect to a corporate right, a different justificatory basis such as a value-based 
analysis has to be found. 
 
6.5.3 Socioemotional wealth 
 
In support of this analysis, the importance of preserving the experience of well-being 
resulting from corporate participation emerges from academic literature involving a 
consideration of the incidence of bribery in family-controlled companies. Shujun Ding, 
Baozi Qu and Zhenyu Wu suggest that family control of a business reduces the incidence 
of bribery committed by the business in countries where corporate governance 
mechanisms to prevent bribery are perceived to be weak.514 In reaching this conclusion, 
the authors draw on a body of literature which explores the effect of family involvement 
on the way in which a business makes its decisions. According to Ding, Qu and Wu, the 
reason for a reduced level of bribery in a family-controlled business is explained by a 
family’s desire to preserve its “socioemotional wealth” and sense of well-being.515  
 
The authors take the definition of socioemotional wealth from earlier studies which 
addressed decision-making processes in family-controlled businesses: 
 
[Socioemotional wealth] is the ability to exercise authority; the satisfaction of 
needs for belonging, affect, and intimacy; the perpetuation of family values 
through the business; the preservation of the family dynasty; the conservation of 
the family firm’s social capital; the fulfilment of family obligations based on blood 
ties rather than on strict criteria of competence; and the opportunity to be 
altruistic to family members.516 
 
Thus, socioemotional wealth reflects a sense of well-being which has intrinsic value to 
the family and each of its members. The concern of family members to maintain their 
socioemotional wealth ensures that a business trades ethically, without resort to payment 
or receipt of bribes. If a family-controlled business acted otherwise and behaved 
 
514 Shujan Ding, Baozhi Qu and Zhenyu Wu, ‘Family Control, Socioemotional Wealth, and Governance 
Environment: The Case of Bribes’ [2016] J Bus Ethics 639. 
515 ibid 640. 
516 ibid 641. The authors note this definition was first put forward in work by LR Gomez-Mejia, M Nunez-
Nickel and I Gutierrez, ‘Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risks in Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence 
from Spanish Olive Oil Mills’ [2007] 52 Administrative Science Quarterly 106. 
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corruptly, it would impact adversely on the firm’s image and reputation. The firm’s sense 
of well-being, and that of its family members, would be significantly weakened and 
undermined. The value of socioemotional wealth to family members lies in their 
enjoyment of autonomy and the ability presented by this wealth to facilitate the 
maintenance of family life. It is the same value encapsulated as a sense of well-being, 
which company officers and employees enjoy from their participation in a company with 
which they are associated, and which the exercise of corporate rights serves to protect. 
 
6.5.4 Instrumental value  
 
To this point, the discussion about individual value has focused on the value which flows 
from the active participation of company officers and employees in the affairs of a 
company, without consideration of the value which a company delivers to its 
shareholders. Assuming the shareholders are not also company officers or employees, it 
is artificial to conceive of their benefit as having intrinsic value since their involvement in 
the company’s affairs is more passive. Rather, the value of a company to its shareholders 
presents as a mechanism for the investment of the shareholder’s capital in pursuit of 
financial gain, and in this sense the value of a company to a shareholder is instrumental 
rather than intrinsic. This is not to say that, from the perspective of a shareholder, there 
is no value for the shareholder which the law should support a company in protecting. 
On the contrary, a company has value to the shareholder, but this value is differently 
defined from the value of a company to its officers and employees. A shareholder’s 
interests are profoundly associated with the financial success of the company in which 
the shareholder has investment, and whilst not intrinsic value, the instrumental value of 
the company to the investor is clear.  
 
It follows that the instrumental value of the company will be safeguarded automatically 
where the intrinsic value of a company to its officers and employees is protected. The 
instrumental value of a company to the shareholder is necessarily protected as a by-
product of the law’s recognition of the company’s right to safeguard the intrinsic value 
of the company’s worth to its officers and employees. As a legally recognised entity with 
which trade can be undertaken, the instrumental value of the company for debtors and 





6.5.5 Morally doubtful corporate purpose 
 
In a situation where a corporate purpose is morally doubtful, instrumental value and 
intrinsic value remain extant. An example of a company with a purpose which might be 
thought to be inimical to the public good is the formation of a company established solely 
for the purpose of minimising liability to taxation. The tax avoidance scheme is lawful, 517  
but the public good is damaged by the arrangement. As Lord Goff explained, referring 
to the establishment of companies for this purpose: “These structures are designed to 
achieve an adventitious tax benefit for the taxpayer, and in truth are no more than raids 
on the public funds at the expense of the general body of taxpayers, and as such are 
unacceptable”.518 
 
In this instance, the company delivers an effective tax avoidance arrangement, and to this 
extent it has instrumental value to those involved in its activity. But it is not the 
instrumental value of the company to its officers and employees which provides an 
argument for the law’s recognition of the company’s right to protect itself. It is the 
intrinsic value of the company which provides employment to its officers and employees 
and contributes to their sense of well-being. Even in the most morally deplorable of 
corporate purposes, the establishment and functioning of the company remains lawful. 
The State has power to place limits on corporate objectives, and in the absence of 
legislative intervention to this effect, company officers and employees continue to behave 
lawfully in the enjoyment of intrinsic value which association with the company delivers, 
and which the assertion of corporate rights is required to protect. 
 
6.5.6 Fairness in the protection of interests 
 
The development of a position which ascribes consequential value to the law’s 
recognition of a corporate right avoids a situation whereby there would be an unfair 
 
517 ‘… the distinction between lawful tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion is well-known. Tax-saving 
schemes that involve transactions having little or no commercial benefit apart from the scheme are a 
common feature of commercial life. In the absence of statutory criminal prohibitions, the transactions 
involved in the scheme and the scheme itself are lawful. Whether the scheme is effective depends on the 
provisions of the tax legislation in question. Tax-saving crosses the border from lawful to criminal when it 
involves the deliberate and dishonest making of false statements to the Revenue …’, R v Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue and Kingston Crown Court, ex p John [2001] EWHC Admin 581 [2] (Stanley Burnton J). 
518 Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v Stokes [1992] 1 AC 655, 681. 
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differentiation between the law’s treatment of an individual on the one hand, and a 
company on the other. A variety of policy considerations come into play. Distinctions 
made between different types of legal persons must be based on defensible criteria, for 
otherwise the law becomes arbitrary and capricious, and inimical to the rule of law. In the 
case of a company, the State has established a statutory framework which clothes a 
company with legal personhood and endows it with capacity to enter into legal 
relationships, as a result of which duties and responsibilities are owed. The State requires 
a company to answer in the civil and criminal courts for corporate wrongdoing it may 
have committed, and there is legislation which provides for corporate regulation. Further, 
as established in this chapter, companies provide significant aggregate value to the 
economy, and extensive individual value to their officers, employees, and shareholders.  
 
In the case of an individual, the law treats the individual with moral concern even where 
the individual is felonious and does not contribute positively to society’s welfare. This is 
because, by nature an individual is recognised as a moral agent. In the case of a company, 
as discussed earlier in the chapter, there is no consensus as to whether a company has 
standing as a moral agent. Nonetheless, a company is entitled to treatment with moral 
concern, not because of any status as a moral agent, but by virtue of the overall aggregate 
and individual intrinsic value of corporate activity which is generated. The value of 
corporate activity to the State does not convert a company into an entity which has moral 
agency, but rather, it explains why the law should treat a company with moral concern, as 
if it were a moral agent, with the ability to assert corporate rights to protect its interests 
when necessary.  
 
In these circumstances, the law’s recognition of corporate rights reflects a fair outcome. 
It would be manifestly inconsistent for the State to receive the benefits flowing from 
corporate activity whilst at the same time denying a company the ability to protect its 
interests, and those of its officers, employees, and shareholders. If the position were to 
be otherwise, the value enjoyed by company officers, employees, and shareholders, would 
be unprotected, in circumstances where, if the members were trading as a collective of 
self-employed individuals, the law’s protection against hostile action would be afforded. 
The State’s denial of protection would constitute a threat to well-being enjoyed by 
company officers and employees, and the failure to recognise a company’s claim to assert 




The importance of fairness as a component of the rule of law cannot be exaggerated. In 
its original formulation, Albert Dicey explained that the rule of law requires the legal 
system to respect, amongst other things, “the rights of private persons in particular cases 
brought before the courts”.519 The importance of the rule has become embedded in 
English law, with Lord Steyn noting some years ago that the rule of law “enforces 
minimum standards of fairness, both substantive and procedural”.520 The commitment to 
fairness in law has infused society’s governing institutions. It is not just a hallmark, but 




In conclusion, an exploration of corporate rights utilising a value-based approach has 
considerable traction and serves as a model for the recognition of individual corporate 
rights by reference to uniform criteria. Essentially a consequentialist argument, a 
corporate value theory provides a compelling framework within which the justification 
for the law’s recognition of individual corporate rights can be supported. The question 
why the law should recognise corporate rights in the same way as individual rights is 
answered by reference to the value which a company delivers to those actively associated 
with the company’s operation. The company has intrinsic value to its officers and 
employees, and it is this value, or sense of well-being, which an assertion of corporate 
rights defends. The law’s protection prevents the occurrence of harmful consequences 
which would otherwise result from hostile action, whether initiated by the State or a 
private (individual or corporate) actor. Alongside the value to individuals produced as a 
result of their corporate participation, the combined or aggregated value of companies 
delivers strong support to the economy. This approach posits that the State’s appreciation 
of value in the flourishing of the corporate sector is reflected in its recognition of 
corporate rights. The benefit from the preservation of a robust corporate sector, 
composed of a collection of successful trading companies, redounds to the State. From 
this perspective, it is the State which has an interest in the prospering of economic activity 
produced by the corporate sector. Finally, it would be an unfair state of affairs if the law 
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recognised the rights of individuals but not companies. Indeed, the State having provided 
a legal architecture for a company’s establishment and regulation, it would be morally 
wrong for the law not to afford companies the same rights as individuals, where 
companies deliver significant instrumental and intrinsic value to the economy and 
individuals who are actively participating in the affairs of the company. 
 
The idea that a foundation for the recognition of corporate rights can be associated with 
the conceptualisation of a company as a moral agent adds an additional dimension to the 
discussion. Although there are weaknesses in a vision of corporate rights founded on the 
platform of corporate moral personality, Friedman and Pasternak’s work in this area 
commands attention. The problem with an approach to corporate rights based on a 
corporate moral agency model is that it leaves a gap between recognition of a company’s 
status as a moral agent and the identification of the moral rights to which the company 
may claim. The gap is filled by a corporate value theory which is both morally 









This chapter addresses the fourth research question which explores the extent to which the 
law should recognise a company’s ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination 
in circumstances where the disclosure of information exposes the company, or its officers 
or employees, to the risk of criminal prosecution. The chapter advances a sound 
theoretical foundation for the recognition of a corporate right rooted in an 
acknowledgement of value which an assertion of the privilege protects, viewed from the 
triple perspectives of the State, a company, and a company’s stakeholders.  
 
The chapter includes a critique of the judgments in the leading cases in common law 
jurisdictions where the ability of a company to assert the privilege has arisen. A study of 
the cases is interesting for three reasons. First, where a corporate right to assert the 
privilege is recognised, the cases illuminate the value of a company’s right to assert the 
privilege which the law is willing to protect. Secondly, in cases where a court has denied 
a company a right to assert the privilege, the outcome demonstrates the attendant risk of 
harmful consequences which flow for a company and its stakeholders. Thirdly, the 
critique reveals the sharply divergent judicial approaches in this area.  
 
The different views reflect the division between those who see a company as having an 
ontological existence, and those who view the corporate entity as no more than an 
artificial legal construct lacking a moral component. Broadly speaking, the ontological 
school of thought locates support for the ability of a company to assert the privilege in 
an innate sense of justice which requires equal treatment for different types of legal 
persona. The constructionist approach rejects this line of thinking. In this conception, 
the idea that a company can assert libertarian rights as if it acts as an individual is an 
anathema, since a company is no more than an artificial creation which is permitted to 
function within parameters set down by the State. One parameter is the requirement that 
it should not be permitted to conceal from the State authorities any wrongdoing with 




The difference between the two approaches harks back to the division of opinion 
between company law theorists who conceive the attributes of corporate personhood 
narrowly, and those who believe that a company has a separate identity which is 
independent from the collective sum of its members. The latter views a company as 
something more than a ventriloquist’s dummy. The conflicting judgments bear out the 
concern articulated in the last chapter that the absence of a coherent narrative leads to 
inconsistent decisions across jurisdictions in the orbit of the common law. The diverging 
approaches demonstrate the need for a singular narrative for the recognition of a 
corporate right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination which delivers consistent 
outcomes within and between jurisdictions. 
 
The problem of divergent outcomes is resolved if the issue of corporate rights recognition 
is approached through a value-based analysis. The chapter argues there is a sound basis 
for recognising that the privilege against self-incrimination falls into a basket of corporate 
rights which the law should acknowledge, within the terms of a modern morally based 
model which focuses on the value which the exercise of a corporate assertion of the 
privilege protects.  The chapter argues that a judicial approach which denies a company 
the ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination is misconceived, unjust and 
unsustainable. 
 
7.2 VALUE PROTECTED BY THE PRIVILEGE  
 
The chapter presents the value protected by an assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination as uncontroversial. Axiomatically, an assertion of the privilege protects a 
company from the risk of prosecution for the commission of a criminal offence arising 
from the disclosure of factual information which is self-incriminating. In addition, where 
factual information would incriminate a company officer or employee, a claim by a 
company to assert the privilege protects the company officer or employee from the risk 
of personal prosecution where, if the disclosure of incriminating information had been 
made, its participation in criminal wrongdoing would have become apparent. In this 
context, information may be self-incriminating where it falls short of a confession to the 
commission of a criminal offence. An admission of activity which constitutes some but 
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not all the elements of a criminal offence, or an admission of facts which connect a 
company officer or employee to criminal activity, will be equally incriminating.521 
 
Consideration of the value delivered by an assertion of the privilege is a study in 
negativity, in the sense that the value becomes visible in circumstances where the ability 
to claim the privilege is denied. An assertion of privilege operates as a shield. It is 
defensive in nature and raised in response to an attack on the company’s interest by a 
hostile actor which seeks the production of self-incriminating information. The shield 
does not deliver positive benefits. Instead, it prevents the infliction of a myriad of negative 
consequences which would flow if the shield is lowered or removed completely. Most 
obviously, self-incriminating information is disclosed and the risk of criminal prosecution 
of the company and its officers or employees is increased. The more incriminating the 
information, the greater the likelihood of criminal prosecution. Therefore, the value of 
the privilege lies in the prevention of harm which its assertion averts. The participants 
benefitting from an assertion of the privilege are the company, its officers, and employees. 
Wider beneficiaries are the company’s other stakeholders such as its members and trading 
associates, and the State itself.  
 
The extent of damage inflicted on a company, its officers and employees may vary 
according to the nature of the self-incriminating information which would be disclosed. 
But even where the damage is small, recognition of a company’s right to assert the 
privilege continues to be sustained by an application of corporate value theory. The 
aggregated value of the corporate sector reflecting the collective efforts of single 
companies, alongside the intrinsic value contributed by an individual company to the 
sense of well-being to its officers and employees, remains extant. 
 
The point is borne out by a consideration of the ultimate scenario where the assertion of 
the privilege forms a course of conduct which damages the interests of a company. If a 
company’s wrongdoing becomes known to the State authorities after the privilege against 
self-incrimination has been asserted, the benefits of self-reporting are lost. In this 
instance, by exercising its discretion to assert the privilege, a company’s officers will have 
 
521 The privilege against self-incrimination applies where the information adds to the existing risk of 
prosecution, or where its disclosure may lead to prosecution or the discovery of further evidence of an 
incriminating nature, Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380, 443 (Lord 
Wilberforce), 446 (Lord Fraser). See also Den Norske Bank ASA v Anotonatas [1999] QB 271. 
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made an error of judgment which prejudices the company’s interests. But this is not to 
say that, if the law fails to recognise a company’s right to assert the privilege, no harmful 
consequences follow. As well as encroaching on a company’s right to control the 
dissemination of its private information, the mandatory reporting requirement removes 
from a company its ability to decide how it wishes to proceed. A determination whether 
to make a self-report is an exercise in the management of risk, and it enables a company 
to take a decision which reflects its values and shape its destiny. Denial of a company’s 
ability to make this determination reduces the extent of a company’s autonomy. A 
company is weakened where the extent of its agency is diminished. 
 
7.2.1 Harmful consequences 
 
Certainly, a company convicted of a criminal offence is vulnerable to the imposition of 
an unlimited fine. In some instances, the fact of criminal conviction may impact more 
adversely on a company’s interests than the payment of a fine. Significant legal costs may 
be incurred. Confidence in the management of the company is undermined, and the 
reputation of the company’s good name besmirched. Public sentiment may turn against 
a company, and in the case of a company whose shares are listed on a recognised public 
exchange, share value falls. Where a company is operating in a regulated sector of activity, 
the fact and circumstances of conviction need to be disclosed to the company’s regulator. 
Similarly, if the nature of a company’s activity requires the company to be a licence holder. 
In both instances, a company’s authorisation or licence to continue trading activities may 
be terminated or subjected to restriction. Disclosure of the facts and circumstances to a 
company’s insurer may be required, and possibly to a company’s bankers as well. The 
bank may withdraw lending facilities or increase the cost of borrowing. There is also the 
question of future public procurement contracts. Although conviction of a “failure to 
comply” offence does not automatically exclude a company from public contracts under 
regulation 57 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015522 and Article 57 of the Public 
Procurement Directive,523 a public authority is likely to consider when awarding a public 
contract that a corporate applicant had declined to cooperate with the authorities when 
investigating serious fraud. There are other circumstances such as where a company is 
 
522 Public Contracts Regulations 2015, SI 2015/102. 
523 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA relevance) [2014] OJ L94/65. 
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convicted of an offence of bribery. In this instance, debarment from public contracts is 
automatically imposed. If a company is listed on a recognised stock exchange, a disclosure 
would need to be made, and publicity of the conviction would be most unwelcome.  
 
These consequences, individually and cumulatively, would have a seriously adverse impact 
on the economic interests of the company, and in terms of a coercive influence on a 
company to answer questions or furnish information, the spectre of criminal conviction 
constitutes an extremely powerful threat to a company’s financial well-being. Irrespective 
of a company’s size and standing in the marketplace, the value of preventing the 
occurrence of these harmful consequences is huge in terms of benefit to company 
stakeholders and the wider economy. It is for this reason that these considerations weigh 
heavily on company directors when deciding whether to enter into a DPA with a 
prosecuting authority after some form of corporate wrongdoing has been uncovered. An 
agreement enables a company to manage the harmful consequences which would 
otherwise follow if the company were criminally prosecuted and convicted at trial. As the 
UK Government’s Consultation Paper on Deferred Prosecution Agreements noted, this 
form of disposal “enable[s] commercial organisations to be held to account – but without 
unfairly affecting employees, customers, pensioners, suppliers, and investors who were 
not involved in the behaviour that is being penalised”.524 Constantine Grasso notes that 
from the company’s perspective, the company is able to “mitigate the potentially 
destructive damage to its reputation”.525 As an alternative to assertion the privilege against 
self-incrimination, by negotiating an arrangement which suspends criminal prosecution 
or reduces the seriousness of the charge, harmful consequences are avoided. The ability 
of a company to determine whether its interests are best served by an assertion of the 
privilege against self-incrimination or alternatively make a voluntary disclosure to the 
State authorities is a matter which goes to the heart of a company’s autonomy.  
 
The State has an interest in avoiding harmful consequences too. If a company is 
financially diminished to the extent where its profitably suffers a long-term reduction, the 
State’s interest in the encouragement of a flourishing economy is undermined. The extent 
of the undesirable impact will vary, depending on the size of the company which is 
 
524 Ministry of Justice, Consultation on a new enforcement tool to deal with economic crime committed by 
commercial organisations: Deferred prosecution agreements (Cm 8348, 2012). 
525 Constantine Grasso, ‘Peaks and Troughs of the UK Deferred Prosecution Agreement: The Lesson 
Learned from the First-ever DPA between the SFO and ICBC SB Plc’ [2016] 5 JBL 388. 
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involved and the degree of damage which is inflicted. Even in the case of a small company 
with a single director and shareholder, the adverse impact will be measurable. The value 
of a company to the State is weakened if a company contributes less corporation tax 
because of a fall in trading income. If a company reduces the number of its employees, 
the State loses income tax revenue and may be required to pay social benefits. Further 
State support may be required, depending on the nature of any collateral damage which 
the company’s stakeholders may suffer. It follows that if the State is seriously motivated 
to encourage a flourishing economy, the need to support individual companies is a strong 
economic reason for the State to recognise that a company should be afforded legal 
benefits in order to secure its rights and protect its property against exposure to hostile 
attack. Although the State has a legitimate interest in securing a conviction where a 
company has committed wrongdoing, a hostile attack can include the risk of criminal 
prosecution where a company seeks to protect itself by asserting rights of due process. 
 
The intrinsic value enjoyed by a company’s employees is also severely diminished by a 
devaluation in a company’s financial prospects. If a company’s interests are threatened, 
the spectre of lost employment hangs heavily over the company’s employees. The harmful 
consequences are speculative and fact-specific, but in principle an employee’s benefit 
from daily interaction with the company may be lost, leading to unemployment and 
financial hardship, with a consequential adverse impact on the employee’s family. In this, 
an employee suffers a severe loss in his personal autonomy as his ability to live as he 
chooses becomes circumscribed. Moreover, where the self-incriminating information 
references the criminal wrongdoing of a company officer or employee, the potential 
exposure is greater. There is the spectre of loss of liberty if a company officer or employee 
is prosecuted for the commission of criminal conduct. The intrinsic value delivered by a 
company which is enjoyed by its shareholders, creditors and suppliers could be similarly 
affected. The company’s ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination as a shield 
prevents the occurrence of these harmful consequences. There are sound moral 
arguments which support this outcome. There is considerable moral value in the assertion 
of the privilege against self-incrimination in order to avoid these injurious consequences.  
The law’s support for a restraint which prevents this harm is conveyed by its recognition 
of a company’s right to assert the privilege. The law’s recognition of the right to assert 
the privilege is not dependant on the standing of a company as a moral person which is 
debatable. Rather, the argument for sustaining the privilege is a moral one, motivated by 
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the concern to prevent loss of intrinsic value generated by a company for the benefit of 
its officers and employees. The State’s acknowledgment of a company’s right to assert 
the privilege against self-incrimination reflects the State’s commitment to respect 
fundamental rights when a company is faced with a requirement to disclose self-
incriminating information. 
 
7.2.2 Unfair and unjust 
 
As Lord Bingham explained in his seminal work on the Rule of Law,526 Government 
should exercise its powers fairly527 and adjudicative procedures provided by the State 
should be fair and just.528 As foreshadowed in paragraph 6.5.6 of   chapter 6, in a situation 
where the legal personhood of a company is recognised in law, there are strong reasons 
which suggest it would be unfair and unjust for a legal system to withhold recognition of 
a corporate right on the ground that the company is no more than a legal construct. It is 
unnecessary to repeat these reasons here.  
 
More particularly, with specific reference to the corporate assertion of the privilege 
against self-incrimination, there are additional matters to consider, especially where the 
respective positions of a company and its officers are juxtaposed. By way of illustration, 
if the corporate ability to assert the privilege is denied, self-incriminating information 
would be compulsorily disclosed by a company in circumstances where if the officer had 
been approached for disclosure of the information as an individual, the privilege against 
self-incrimination could – and most probably would - have been asserted. This outcome 
is legally incoherent since it means that if the corporate privilege is unrecognised, a 
company officer would be required to give self-incriminating answers in circumstances 
where, if working as a self-employed individual, the privilege against self-incrimination 
would have been engaged. The effect would render commercial participation through a 
company more hazardous, and potentially it would discourage senior executive managers 
from accepting employment as company officers in the corporate sector. The fact that 
criminal wrongdoing has been committed in the corporate context is none to the point.  
 
 
526 Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin Group 2010). 
527 ibid 60. 
528 ibid 90. 
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In the review of leading cases later in this chapter, a line of argument advanced by some 
judges which seeks to justify a discriminatory approach between individuals and 
companies is criticised as misconceived. One aspect of judicial concern focuses on the 
fact that, as an entity permitted to operate by permission of the legislature, a company 
should be obliged to disclose information to the State as it sees fit, whether self-
incriminating or not. This concern would have some validity if there were no other routes 
by which the State can discover information about the conduct of the company’s affairs, 
but this is not the case. Suffice it to note that routinely companies are required by multiple 
legal requirements to disclose more information about their annual activity than 
individuals who carry on business as self-employed traders. For example, in the case of a 
UK company, unless a company is subject to the small companies’ regime, the directors’ 
annual report must contain a business review which conveys a fair review of the 
company’s business, and a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the 
company.529  
 
Beyond the requirements for disclosure of corporate information in respect of which 
there is legislative provision, information relating to a company’s affairs is private 
information, and the State should respect the company’s right to privacy in this regard. It 
would be unfair and unjust for the State to impose burdens on companies which 
individuals do not bear, whilst acknowledging the ability of individuals to assert protective 
fundamental rights of which their corporate counterparts have been deprived. As a 
fundamental right and civil liberty, it behoves the State to support a company’s assertion 
of the privilege against self-incrimination. The idea that the right to exercise the privilege 
could be permitted by one category of legal person but not another does not sit happily 
with a wholehearted commitment on the part of the State to the principle of fairness in 
the application of the rule of law which Bingham identified. Where there is a risk of 
criminal prosecution, the contemporary rationales supporting an assertion of the privilege 
against self-incrimination by an individual applies equally to the coercive disclosure of 
self-incriminating information which is sought against a company during the course of an 




529 Companies Act 2006, s 417(1). 
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7.2.3 Abrogation, but not negation 
 
The fact there are many instances in which the legislature has intervened to set aside, or 
restrict, the ability of a person (human and corporate) to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination does not undermine the recognition of the value which is protected by an 
assertion of privilege where there is a risk of criminal prosecution in the absence of 
legislative intervention. When legislating to abrogate the application of the privilege in 
specified circumstances, the legislature does not assume an absence of valuable interests 
to be protected. Rather, the legislature determines that in the particular circumstances of 
the case, the public interest in requiring persons suspected of committing criminal 
offences trumps the value, in the form of harmful consequences, which otherwise would 
have been averted by the assertion of the privilege. Effectively, the legislature decides to 
discount the value in favour of other interests such as the detection of crime, in its 
perception of what best reflects the public good.  
 
The provision contained in section 2(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 is a case in point, 
where the legislature implicitly provided that a person suspected of committing serious 
or complex fraud was not entitled to assert the privilege to avoid the giving of self-
incriminating answers.530 The legislative compromise provides that self-incriminating 
answers cannot be adduced as a part of a prosecution case against a suspect who is the 
subject of an interview, although the answers may be used against the suspect if 
inconsistent statements are made during the defence case at trial.531 In situations where 
the legislature has neither expressly nor impliedly enacted a provision overriding the 
application of the privilege against self-incrimination, the clear inference is that the 
legislature continues to recognise the importance of the value protected by the privilege 
when it is asserted. By its failure to abrogate the privilege, the legislature acknowledges 
that the privilege constitutes an interest which it is appropriate for the State to protect. 
The operation of the privilege is extant in English law, unless and until it is overridden.  
 
As a consideration relating to the possible abrogation of the privilege against self-
incrimination by legislative intervention, recognition of a company’s ability to assert the 
privilege against self-incrimination in cases where there is a risk of criminal prosecution 
 
530 See Saunders v United Kingdom App no 19187/91 (ECtHR, 17 December 1996). 
531 Criminal Justice Act 1987, s 2(8), (8AA). 
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does not impede the efforts of the State to regulate companies and reduce corporate 
wrongdoing. This is because the privilege has no place in the framework for the use of 
administrative sanctions to regulate businesses which have grown exponentially in the last 
fifty years. Increasingly, companies have become subject to regulatory regimes in which 
civil penalties are imposed. In a report on regulatory justice in 2006 commissioned by the 
UK Government Cabinet Office, Richard Macrory recorded that regulatory authorities 
undertook more than 3.6 million enforcement actions each year. In terms of civil 
enforcement, the regulators performed 2.8 million inspections a year and issued 400,000 
warning letters, and 3,400 cautions, and 145,000 statutory notices.532 In addition, there 
were approximately 25,000 criminal prosecutions brought for regulatory non-compliance. 
In these cases where sanctions for non-compliance are imposed, the privilege against self-
incrimination is not engaged since the participation of a business in the sanctions regime 
is essentially consensual. The requirement to disclose self-incriminating information is 
not supported by threat of penal action. 
 
The movement towards regulatory sanctions has grown from an awareness that the 
criminal justice system had failed to control companies and inhibit the incidence of 
corporate crime.533 As John Braithwaite explains, regulatory sanctions are needed to 
“blossom into control strategies more potent than our forlorn existing armoury of 
weapons against corporate crime”.534 The regulatory model requires companies operating 
in their specialist field of activity to develop their own regulatory standards, with 
supervision from a regulatory authority. In this way, the rule-making task is localised, 
conferring ownership and responsibility to the company for the creation of its regulatory 
rules. The company monitors itself for non-compliance, and where there are rule breaches 
the company acts internally to punish wrongdoers and minimise the opportunity for any 
recurrence. This form of self-regulation is not entirely voluntary, in the sense that its 
efficacy is dependent on the appointment of a compliance officer whose function requires 
 
532 Richard Macrory, ‘Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective’ (Final Report November 2006) E.3 
<https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121205164501/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file44593.p
df>  accessed 29 March 2021. See also HM Treasury, ‘Philip Hampton Review, Reducing administrative 
burdens: effective inspection and enforcement’ (March 2005). 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20090704105121/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/bud05hamptonv1.pdf> accessed 29 March 2021. 
533 See, for example, Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (Norton & 
Co 1976); Marshall Clinard and Peter Yeager, Corporate Crime (The Free Press 1980); Sally Simpson, Corporate 
Crime, Law and Social Control (CUP 2002) ch 4. 
534 John Braithwaite, ‘Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control’ [1982] 80 
Michigan Law Review 1466. 
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him to report to the regulatory authority any management failing to devise, implement or 
monitor the self-regulatory process which has been described. A compliance officer who 
fails to perform this requirement becomes guilty of a serious criminal offence.  
 
The application of this model is intended to lead to the discovery of a larger number of 
cases in which wrongdoing has occurred, and these become visible to regulatory 
inspectors upon examination of the company’s records. The criminal process is invoked 
only where a compliance officer reports a corporate default, and in this event the 
recommendations of the compliance officer together with the company’s default 
constitute powerful evidence for a prosecutor to place before the court. The criminal 
process is also invoked in cases where a compliance officer fails to make a report about 
an uncorrected violation, and the regulatory authorities need to maintain a system for 
external auditing of companies so that these rare instances could be discovered and acted 
upon.535 As Braithwaite explains, “[o]nce an offence had been discovered, the agency 
would subpoena the relevant compliance unit reports and uncover any failure of the 
compliance director to report an unrectified violation. Even a small number of 
prosecutions for this offence would probably be sufficient to encourage compliance 
directors to put the company’s head on the chopping block – instead of their own”.536 
Companies and their officers subject to regulatory investigation are not exposed to the 
risk of criminal prosecution for any underlying criminal offending, and, in the language 
of the autonomous jurisprudence of the ECtHR, they are not the subject of a criminal 
charge.537 
 
7.3 THE CASES IN SUPPORT 
 
In the next part of the chapter, the leading cases on the ability of a company to assert the 
privilege against self-incrimination are critiqued. Different courts have reached different 
determinations, and it is impossible to discern a common thread running through the 
decisions. The decisions are characterised by the influence of policy considerations rather 
than incisive legal analysis, and there is no suggestion in the judgments that a value-based 
 
535 Simpson (n 533) ch 4. 
536 Braithwaite (n 534) 1499. 
537 In Fleurose v Securities and Futures Authority Association [2001] EWCA Civ 2015, the Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) held that the privilege against self-incrimination did not arise during the course of an investigation 
which was regulatory and not criminal in nature. 
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analysis has been applied. As foreshadowed at the start of this chapter, the different 
approaches replicate the debate between those who see a company as having a distinct 
persona with legal personality, and constructionists who view a company as no more than 
a legal wrapper within which a company’s members have agreed to be bound. Two points 
of interest emerge from the critique. First, the cases illuminate the interests to be 
protected in any consideration of circumstances in which the corporate privilege against 
self-incrimination may apply. Secondly, the divergent approaches serve to emphasise the 
importance of developing a coherent approach for the recognition of corporate rights to 
avoid inconsistent outcomes.  
 
7.3.1 England and Wales 
 
In England and Wales, the English courts have proceeded on the simplistic basis that 
there is clear equivalence to be drawn between the position of an individual and a 
corporation in circumstances where there is a risk of criminal prosecution. This outcome 
was established shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War in Triplex Safety 
Glass Company Limited v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Limited538 where a company acting by 
its company secretary refused to answer interrogatories in civil proceedings for libel on 
the ground that the answers would tend to incriminate the company and one of its 
directors. On appeal, the company argued that since it could be prosecuted for criminal 
libel, the company was entitled to the same protection as its directors and the Court 
agreed. Sitting with Sir Wilfred Greene MR, Du Parcq LJ explained that the court could 
not see any reason in principle why the application of the privilege against self-
incrimination should be limited to natural persons and could not be claimed by a limited 
company: 
 
It is true that a company cannot suffer all the pains to which a real person is 
subject. It can, however, in certain cases be convicted and punished, with grave 
consequence to its reputation and to its members, and we can see no ground for 
depriving a juristic person of those safeguards which the law of England accords 
even to the least deserving of natural persons. It would not be in accordance with 
 
538 Triplex Safety Glass Company Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395. 
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principle that any person capable of committing, and incurring the penalties of, a 
crime should be compelled by process of law to admit a criminal offence.539 
 
In this way, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the company’s entitlement to claim the 
privilege as an assertion of its birth right. The privilege reflected an ancient feature of the 
common law, and by virtue of its status as a legal person, a company should not be 
deprived of this protection simply because it was corporeal and not human in form. In 
the absence of any reason why equivalence between these two different categories of 
persons should not be acknowledged, the court defaulted to a liberal position. In its 
reasoning, the Court was clearly influenced by the principled concern to ensure fairness 
of treatment between individual and corporate persons. The maintenance of a fair and 
just legal system would have been diminished by a different outcome. It is also interesting 
to note that in the eyes of an English court, there was no basis on which to withhold 
equivalence between human and corporate persons. This contrasts with the approach of 
the Supreme Court in the United States to which reference is made shortly. The difference 
in approach may reflect a closer adherence in the English courts to a contractual theory 
of company law, whereas the Supreme Court in the United States has focussed more 
intently on a concessionary approach.540 
 
The decision in Triplex Safety Glass has been applied consistently in the English courts, 
and in 1977 it was explicitly approved by the House of Lords in Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation 
v Westinghouse Electric Corporation.541 The parties proceeded on the assumption that a 
company stood to be regarded as “a person” for the purposes of section 14(1)(a) of the 
Civil Evidence Act 1968 which recognised “[T]he right of a person in any legal 
proceedings other than criminal proceedings to refuse to answer any question or produce 
any document or thing if to do so would tend to expose that person to proceedings for 
an offence or for the recovery of a penalty”. This assumption was not open to criticism 
since section 19 of the Interpretation Act 1889 had stipulated long ago that unless a 
contrary intention appeared, any reference in legislation to a “person” included “a body 
of persons corporate …”. 
 
 
539 ibid 409 
540 The differences between a contractual and concessionary approach to company law theory are discussed 
in chapter 5. 
541 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547 (HL). 
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Whilst the courts have been clear in their recognition of a company’s ability to assert the 
privilege where there is a risk of the company’s prosecution, the courts have not permitted 
a company to claim the privilege in order to protect an associated third party such as a 
company officer or employee. In Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 
Lord Diplock noted that “the privilege against self-incrimination was restricted to the 
incrimination of the person claiming it and not anyone else”.542 He added that there was 
“no trace in the decided cases that it is of wider application; no textbook old or modern 
suggests the contrary”.543 Where a company officer’s answers are not personally 
incriminating but incriminate the company, a company officer is able to assert the 
privilege on behalf of the company. Conversely, where a company officer’s answer is 
personally incriminating but does not incriminate the company, the company is unable to 
assert the privilege on the company officer’s behalf. This outcome is consistent with an 
analysis which affords equivalence between human and corporeal forms as disconnected 
persons, but the question arises whether it is unduly harsh on the company officer where 
individual criminal vulnerability is starkly exposed.  
 
The situation becomes more acute where a company officer’s answers are both personally 
incriminating and also incriminate the company. In this situation, is the company officer’s 
personal exposure subsumed in the exercise of the privilege by the company? The answer 
is affirmative for if it were to be otherwise, any protection afforded to the company would 
be rendered nugatory. At some stage, this point is likely to come before an appellate court 
for further consideration. Lord Diplock’s obiter dicta is strong, but it is not necessarily 
conclusive. In the same case, Lord Wilberforce observed544 that although this issue raised 
a novel point, it was not necessary to decide it. Viscount Dilhorne expressed no opinion 
on the point, except to say that “it renders a company's privilege of little value if it can be 
got round in that way.”545 Lord Keith did not comment.546 If the approach taken in Triplex 
Safety Glass is followed, a Court would acknowledge the entitlement of a company to 
assert the privilege so as to protect its officers in these circumstances. Certainly, an 
application of a value-based analysis suggests that the law should recognise a company’s 
 
542 ibid 637–38.  
543 Cited with approval in Sociedade Nationale de Combustiveis de Angola v Lundqvist [1991] 2 QB 310, 336 
(Bedlam LJ); see also Gold Nuts Ltd v Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs [2016] Lloyds Rep FC 249, 
[233]–[245] (Judge Redston). 
544 Rio Tinto (n 541) 617 
545 ibid 632. 
546 ibid 653ff. 
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ability to assert the privilege in circumstances where incriminating information involving 
a company officer would be disclosed. 
 
7.3.2 New Zealand 
 
The Court of Appeal in New Zealand applied Triplex Safety Glass in a significant decision 
in 1986, New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Master & Son Limited.547  In that case, 
a company operating a greengrocer’s shop had been prosecuted for failing to permit a 
government inspector to examine its fruit and an examination would have provided the 
inspector with incriminating information. The relevant statute provided that no offence 
would be committed where a person incriminates himself by providing information to a 
government inspector, and the High Court had no difficulty in determining that this plea 
was available to corporate bodies as well as individuals. Relying on the principle that the 
law recognised a company as a distinct but equivalent legal personality, the Court repeated 
the sentiment expressed in Triplex Safety Glass that there was no policy reason why a 
corporation should not claim the privilege against self-incrimination since it is identified 
in law with the actions of its officers and employees. The Court of Appeal added that 
there were “sound practical reasons” for recognising that a company could claim the 
benefit of the privilege: 
 
There are over 140,000 companies registered in New Zealand, indicating the 
extent to which the commercial enterprise is carried on by them. One writer, 
somewhat extravagantly perhaps, has described the limited liability corporation as 
the greatest single discovery of modern times (cited in Sealy, Company Law and 
Commercial Reality, 1984, at page 1). Many small family businesses, including 
corner dairies and fruit shops, have a corporate status. It would be unrealistic to 
deny the directors and other officers of those companies the right to plead 
incrimination just because they have changed the legal status of the business for 




547 New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Master & Son Ltd [1986] 1 NZLR 191. 
548 ibid 197. 
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This passage is interesting because it shows the High Court tilting towards the 
identification of economic considerations as a supporting justification for permitting a 
company to assert the privilege against self-incrimination in circumstances where a 
company, its officer or employee could be incriminated by the compulsory production of 
damaging information. It is a consequentialist approach towards the recognition of 
corporate rights. In this instance, the right is the privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
7.3.3 European Court of Justice 
 
To date, the ECtHR has not been required to determine whether a company can assert 
the privilege against self-incrimination under Article 6(1) of the ECHR in the same way 
as an individual. The ECJ, however, has considered the issue and its determinations have 
been influenced by the concern to protect a company from self-incrimination in cases 
where corporate criminal liability can be incurred. The Court has also been concerned to 
ensure that company officers are protected where their vulnerability to criminal 
prosecution may be exposed as collateral damage if a company’s right to assert the 
privilege is not recognised. Again, although not articulated in this way, the Court has 
recognised the importance of fairness as a fundamental value in the legal system. 
 
The issue arose in Orkem v Commission549 after the European Commission served a notice 
requiring a company to provide information and disclosure of documents during an 
investigation into whether the company had breached European competition law. As the 
ECJ had explained in an earlier decision,550 the European Commission had been clothed 
by a European Council Regulation551 with power to serve a notice of this sort to enable it 
to discharge its policing function of ensuring that the rules on completion were applied 
in the common market, so that competition would not be distorted to the detriment of 
the public interest, individuals, and consumers. The Regulation required a company under 
investigation to co-operate actively with the Commission, and in the absence of any 
provision permitting a company to refuse to provide information or produce documents 
on the ground that they would be self-incriminating, the ECJ was required to determine 
 
549 Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283. 
550 National Panasonic (UK) Ltd v Commission [1980] ECR 2033. 
551 Article 11(5) of EEC Council: Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty [1962] OJ 13/204. 
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the extent to which the general principles of European Union Community law fell to be 
interpreted in accordance with a general understanding of fundamental rights.552  
 
The matter was not entirely straight-forward, for as the Court noted, “[I]n general, the 
laws of the Member States grant the right not to give evidence against oneself only to a 
natural person charged with an offence in criminal proceedings”.553 Accordingly, it was 
necessary to consider whether, in the case of a company, any equivalent limitation should 
be implied on the exercise of the Commission’s investigatory powers in order to protect 
defence rights.554 On this point, the Court had received some trenchant guidance from 
the Judge-Rapporteur who advised in the following terms: 
 
Neither the International Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] nor the 
European Convention [on Human Rights] distinguishes between natural and legal 
persons. Several States, bound by those international instruments, in particular 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America, expressly recognise the 
criminal liability of legal persons. Community competition law expressly regards 
them as capable of committing acts classifiable as criminal offences … The 
pronouncement of penalties against undertakings may also have repercussions for 
the executives thereof – natural persons – against whom a right or recourse may 
be enforced in civil proceedings or who may have criminal penalties properly so 
called imposed upon them.555 
 
Plainly influenced by this guidance, the ECJ held that although the Commission could 
require production of information and disclosure of documents which could be used to 
establish a breach of competition laws, it would not be able to compel a company through 
its officers to provide answers to questions where the answers would amount to an 
admission or acknowledgment that competition law had been infringed.556 The Court’s 
reasoning was two-fold. First, aligned with the reasoning in Triplex Safety Glass, there was 
no basis for holding that a corporate person should not enjoy the same protection as an 
individual person. Secondly, if the corporate right to assert the privilege were denied, the 
 
552 Orkem [28]. 
553 ibid 29. 
554 ibid 32. 
555 ibid 3295 (Judge-Rapporteur Schockweiler). 
556 ibid [35]. 
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vulnerability of the company’s officers to criminal prosecution would have been exposed. 
Acknowledgment of a corporate right to assert the privilege was necessary in order to 
protect an individual right which would otherwise have been compromised.  
 
Although the decision has been applied in a series of competition cases where issues 
relating to due process have been raised,557 the subsequent judgments do not develop the 
Court’s reasoning in Orkem v Commission that a company can assert the privilege against 
self-incrimination where it is exposed to criminal liability as an entity in its own right. In 
DB v Commission Nazionale per le Societa e law Borsa,558 the Court recognised the ability of an 
individual to assert the privilege against self-incrimination in administrative proceedings 
where the potential sanction is criminal in nature.559 The Court ruled that the right to 
silence is infringed “where a suspect is obliged to testify under threat of sanctions and 
either testifies in consequence or is sanctioned for refusing to testify”.560 The Court added 
that the right to silence is not confined to admissions of wrongdoing but “also covers 
information on questions of fact which may subsequently be used in support of the 
prosecution and may thus have a bearing on the conviction, or the penalty imposed on 
that person”.561 Accordingly, it is clear that in so far as the ECJ is concerned, recognition 
of the privilege against self-incrimination is entrenched, for an individual and  a company 
alike. 
 
7.3.4 European Court of Human Rights 
 
It is the exposure of individuals to potential criminal prosecution by reason of their 
incriminating statements which will almost certainly provide the rationale for a decision 
of the ECtHR when ultimately it is asked to determine whether a company can assert the 
privilege against self-incrimination alongside other due process rights protected by Article 
6(1) of the ECHR.  
 
557 T-34/93 Societe-Generale c Commission [1995] ECR II-545; T-112/98 Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG v 
Commission [2001] ECR II-929; C-244/99 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375; 
T-236/01 Tokai Carbon Co v Commission [2004] ECR II-1200; T-474/04 Pergan v Commission [2007] ECR II-
4225; C-301/04 Commission v SGL Carbon [2006] ECR I-5915. 
558 Case C-481/19 DB v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa EU:C: 2021:84 (ECJ, 2 February 2021). 
559 ‘Three criteria are relevant to assess whether penalties are criminal in nature. The first criterion is the 
legal classification of the offence under national law, the second is the intrinsic nature of the offence, and 
the third is the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned is liable to incur’, C-537/16 
Garlsson Real Estate and Others EU:C:2018:193 (ECJ, 20 March 2018) [28]. 
560 Garlsson (n 559) [39]. 




Certainly, as the starting point, it is clear the ECHR operates to protect the rights of a 
legal person, notwithstanding its nomenclature as a convention for the protection of 
human rights. Marius Emberland explains that the history of the ECHR reveals the 
drafters had always intended the Convention to apply to companies as well as individuals. 
The first draft of the ECHR’s text envisaged that a right of petition to the international 
court would be afforded to “any natural or corporate person”, and although the language 
changed to “any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals”562 there 
was nothing to suggest that a company would be excluded from these categories.563 
Emberland notes that it is a “striking aspect of the travaux preparatoires” that they “seem 
to take for granted that companies and other for-profit actors were to be included in the 
Convention”.564 
 
There is no shortage of decided cases illustrating the application of Convention rights to 
companies. The ECtHR has not hesitated to determine that the protection of a company’s 
business premises and its correspondence fall within the ambit of Article 8(1) which 
guarantees respect for a person’s private and family life, his home, and his 
correspondence. In Niemietz v Germany,565 the ECtHR concluded that the notion of 
“private life” should not be taken to exclude activities of a professional or business nature 
since it is often difficult to delineate the boundary between domestic life and business 
activities with any precision. On the facts of this case, the Court held that a lawyer could 
claim an infringement under Article 8(1) in circumstances where his business premises 
had been searched. This outcome, the Court said, was “consonant with the essential 
object and purpose of Article 8, namely, to protect the individual against arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities”.566 Here, although the applicant’s claim focused on 
the unlawful invasion of his privacy at work, he was not operating as a corporate entity. 
But if his law practice had been incorporated, the Court’s determination would almost 
certainly have been the same.  
 
 
562 Article 34(1) ECHR. 
563 Marius Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies (OUP 2006) 4 fn 20. 
564 ibid 35. 
565 Niemietz v Germany [1992] ECHR 80. 
566 ibid [31]. 
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In Societie Colas Est v France,567 three companies asserted that their rights to privacy under 
Article 8(1) had been violated when a French Government investigative authority entered 
the companies’ premises and seized various documents containing evidence of unlawful 
agreements. The investigation concerned an allegation that the companies had colluded 
in rigging local tendering procedures for roadwork contracts and the operation of mixing 
plants. The French Government resisted the claim on the ground that the ruling in 
Niemietz was limited to the situation where a natural person was performing his 
professional activities. The Government argued that whilst companies could enjoy similar 
rights under the Convention to those afforded to individuals, companies could not claim 
a right to protection of their business premises with the same degree of persuasion as an 
individual.568 The ECtHR rejected the argument, holding that the protection afforded 
under Article 8(1) “should be construed as including the right to respect for a company’s 
registered office, branches or other business premises”.569 It is a pity that the Court did 
not develop its reasoning and explain why it considered that Article 8(1) should be 
construed in this way. 
 
Similarly, the ECtHR permits a limited company to claim that its rights had been infringed 
contrary to Article 6(1) of the Convention which guarantees the fairness of the trial 
process. The high watermark is found in Yukos v Russia570 where the applicant was a 
holding company established by the Russian Government to own and control several 
stand-alone companies specialising in oil production. The Russian tax authorities 
subsequently claimed the holding company owed large amounts of outstanding tax, 
initiating legal proceedings in Moscow which culminated in the holding company’s 
liquidation and asset sale. The ECtHR determined the case in the holding company’s 
favour principally on the basis that it had not been afforded enough time to prepare its 
defence at first instance. In addition, the Court also found that in certain respects the 
company’s right to property had been violated under Article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR. 
Although the importance of the case in political terms was high, the Court’s recognition 
of the violation of the holding company’s rights was unexceptional. The first sentence of 
Article 1 Protocol 1 makes clear that “every natural or legal person” is entitled to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.  
 
567 Societie Colas Est v France App no 37971/97 [2002] ECHR 418, 962. 
568 Niemietz (n 565) [30].  
569 ibid [41]. 




In fact, it is suggested there are very few ECHR rights, if any, which cannot apply to a 
company.571 It is often said that it is impossible to conceive how the right to life (Article 
2), the prohibition against torture (Article 3) or slavery (Article 4) and freedom from 
arbitrary detention (Article 5) could sensibly be applied in the case of a company. This is 
because these rights are thought to be inherently human and can have no application to 
corporate life. But this does not necessarily follow. There are circumstances in which a 
court may make orders which can impact on a company’s ability to sustain itself. If a 
court makes an order for a company’s liquidation, its right to life will have been adversely 
impacted (Article 2).  
 
Whilst at first blush the lifespan of a company may be characterised alongside the lifespan 
of inanimate objects such as a car or a book, there is a distinction to be drawn between 
the two situations. Unlike a car or a book, a company is recognised as a person in its own 
right, with equivalent legal standing to an individual. With an eye to a company’s 
entitlement to protect its property within the terms of Article 1 Protocol 1 of the 
ECHR,572 the courts in England and Wales have held that a winding-up order should not 
be made if it would cause disproportionate injustice.573 If company assets are unlawfully 
expropriated, the right to property will have been infringed, and the company degraded 
by this treatment (Article 3). It is not inconceivable to imagine in a totalitarian regime that 
the State could impose a law requiring a company to provide its services for no reward 
(Article 4). Similarly, a law which restricted a company’s ability to continue its business 
by service of a prohibition order could be said to constrain its liberty (Article 5). 
 
The academic understanding of these cases suggests that the ECtHR’s philosophical 
approach is more closely concentrated on the need to protect an individual’s fundamental 
 
571 For a contrary view, see Company X v Switzerland [1979] 16 DR 85 where the European Commission on 
Human Rights determined that an application by a Swiss company was inadmissible after it sought to 
challenge an obligation to pay ecclesiastical taxes as an infringement of its right under Art 9(1) of the 
Convention which guaranteed to everyone the right of freedom or thought, conscience and religion. 
Although a company had the right to bring a petition, a limited company could neither enjoy nor rely upon 
the right which was protected under Art 9(1). See also Verein Kotakt-Information-Therapie v Austria [1988] 57 
DR 81 where it was said that Arts 3 and 9 are ‘by their very nature not susceptible of being exercised by a 
legal person such as a private association’. It is unlikely that this approach would be followed today.  
572 Article 1 Protocol 1 provides that ‘every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions’. 
573 Breyer Group plc v RBK Engineering Ltd [2017] EWHC 1206 (Ch) [48] (Daniel Alexander QC). See also 
Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform v Amway (UK) Ltd [2008] EWHC 1054 (Ch) 
upheld on appeal [2009] EWCA Civ 32. 
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rights rather than the rights of a company itself. In the narrative articulated by Winfried 
Van den Muijsenbergh and Sam Rezai, the ECtHR’s willingness to recognise the 
application of corporate rights in an international convention is explained by a focus on 
the protection of individual human rights and fundamental freedoms.574 Paraphrasing 
Van den Muijsenbergh and Rezai’s position, the ECtHR recognises corporate rights for 
the purpose of giving effect to individual rights which the ECHR was signed to protect. 
The Court’s recognition of corporate rights is catalysed by the need to ensure that the 
fundamental rights of the company’s officers and other stakeholders are fully protected, 
in the same way as they would have been protected if the corporate vehicle had not 
existed. A company’s entitlement to assert a corporate right is not the focus of attention. 
Instead, the corporate vehicle is characterised as an obstacle to the protection of 
individual rights which must be cast aside in order to afford full protection to the 
individual and maintain the Convention’s values.575 Van den Muijsenbergh and Rezai 
consider that the decision in Yukos v Russia576 did not involve elevated legal analysis of 
whether ECHR rights could be claimed by a company. “Instead, the interesting feature 
of this high-profile case entails its potent and compelling demonstration of the 
importance of the mere availability of the Court, as an international independent judicial 
venue, for a brutalized corporation which simply had nowhere else to go”.577 It was the 
individual interests of the majority shareholder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, which were 
prejudiced by Russia’s oppressive conduct in this case.  
 
Emberland sees the Court’s methodology differently. For Emberland, it is not so much 
an individual’s interests qua shareholder that fall to be protected. Rather, it is the 
company’s commercial interests which require protection, as inextricably associated with 
the protection of fundamental liberties for the public at large. In connection with the 
recognition of a company’s right to assert an infringement of the right to free speech 
which is protected by Article 10(1) of the ECHR, Emberland noted that: 
 
[T]he Court adheres to a special teleological approach whereby it accepts that 
protection of a company applicant’s commercial interests is worthy of protection 
 
574 Winfried van den Muijsenbergh and Sam Rezai, ‘Corporations and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ [2012] 25 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J 43. 
575 ibid 52–53. 
576 Yukos (n 570). 
577 van den Muijsenbergh (n 574) 62. 
217 
 
since that protection is instrumental for the protection of the freedom of 
expression of the public at large or society in general.578 
 
Whichever foundation for the recognition of corporate rights is adopted, one aspect is 
reasonably certain. It is only a matter of time before the ECtHR recognises a corporate 
right to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, whether as a necessary outcome 
in order to protect the individual rights of its stakeholders (qua Van den Muijsenbergh 
and Rezai), or as an entitlement in its own right (qua Emberland). In this way, following 
the Court of Appeal’s line of thinking in Triplex Safety Glass,579 a corporate right to assert 
the privilege becomes founded on the recognition of an individual right to benefit from 
the privilege which would be discarded if a corporate right were unacknowledged.  In the 
language of value-based analysis, the value in preventing harmful consequences for a 
company and its individual stakeholders by enabling the company to protect itself from 
attack is recognised as the consequential justification for the recognition of the corporate 
right. 
 
7.4 THE CASES AGAINST 
 
However, as noted, there is no unanimity of approach. In other common law 
jurisdictions, the courts have been hostile to a corporate claim which seeks to assert the 




The position in Australia was firmly established by the High Court in Environment Protection 
Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd580 There, following commencement of a prosecution 
for pollution offences, the prosecution served two notices on the defendant company, 
each requiring production by the company of identical documents relating to the offences 
with which the company had been charged. The sole purpose of the notices was to obtain 
evidence and information for use against the company in the prosecution. After a seminal 
review of the history of the privilege against self-incrimination and its application to 
 
578 Emberland (n 563) 145. 
579 Triplex (n 538). 
580 Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd [1993] 178 CLR 477. 
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companies in different jurisdictions, the Court concluded the privilege could not be 
claimed by a company.  
 
First, the Court noted the traditional justification for the privilege could not apply in the 
case of a company, since a company could not be subjected to physical punishment.581 
Consequently, the historical reasons for the creation and recognition of the privilege do 
not support its extension to corporations. Moreover, the Court made the point that at the 
time when the privilege developed in 17th century English law, although there were 
companies proclaimed by Royal Charter, other companies did not exist.582 Also, the Court 
felt that the treatment of the privilege as a human right promoting human dignity was not 
convincing in the case of a company.583 “The discouragement of ill-treatment of suspects 
and the extraction of dubious confessions … cannot apply to the compulsion by process 
of law to produce documents”.584 More fundamentally, there was a strong public interest 
in depriving companies of the ability to claim the benefit of the privilege. The notion of 
corporate limited liability and the complexity of some corporate structures had been used 
by fraudsters, and since most fraud cases involved a large volume of documentary 
evidence, the adverse impact of a corporate assertion of the privilege would be 
disproportionate in these cases.585  
 
As Chief Justice Mason and Justice Toohey explained, “[i]t makes no sense at all to make 
the privilege available to a corporation in respect of these books and documents when 
officers of the corporation are bound to testify against the corporation unless they are 
able to claim the privilege personally”.586 Justice McHugh acknowledged there were 
powerful reasons for allowing a company to assert the privilege as “a natural, although 
not a necessary, consequence of the adversary system”.587 This is because “[i]t is a 
fundamental rule of the common law that, whatever the charge and wherever it is tried, 
the onus of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the Crown and never shifts to the 
accused”.588 However, there was a stronger countervailing policy argument concerning 
the production of documents which influenced the court. Justice McHugh asked: 
 
581 ibid 498. 
582 ibid 498. 
583 ibid 500. 
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Why then should this evidence be allowed to remain hidden in the files of the 
corporation when it is relevant to an issue to be tried in criminal proceedings? It 
is difficult to see how the administration of justice, even under the adversary 
system of criminal justice can be advanced by allowing a corporation to refuse to 
produce documents on subpoena simply because the documents tend to 
incriminate the corporation. If a corporation can refuse to produce documents, 
the public interest in detecting and punishing crime is diminished so that the 
integrity of the adversary system can be maintained for the benefit of an artificial 
entity. This is much too high a price to pay for allowing corporations to claim the 
privilege.589 
 
It is quite clear that, basing itself on its perception of where the public interest lies, the 
High Court was unwilling to expand the application of the privilege in circumstances 
where a company could not be subjected to physical pressure. In reaching this decision, 
the Court acknowledged it was establishing differential rules for individuals and 
companies, but it thought that this would not undermine the integrity of the criminal 
justice system since the position of an individual was weaker than a company in its 
dealings with the State. The Court explained that “the resources which companies possess 
and the advantages they tend to enjoy, many stemming from incorporation, are greater 
than those possessed and enjoyed by natural persons”.590 These resources were vulnerable 
to abuse, and, as the Court added, “the complexity of many corporate structures and 
arrangements have made corporate crime and complex fraud one of the most difficult 
areas for the State to regulate effectively”.591 
 
There was a final point to bear in mind. By drawing a clear line between the position of 
an individual and a company when it comes to the application of the privilege, the Court 
took a limited view of corporate legal personhood and the attributes of corporate 
personality. In particular, the Court rejected the idea that a company, as a corporate 
citizen, should be afforded the same benefits of the privilege as an individual.592 As 
McHugh J commented, somewhat sharply, “The current widespread use of the 
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expression ‘corporate citizen’ seems to owe more to the objects of the public relations 




The position in Canada regarding the ability of a company to claim the privilege against 
self-incrimination has evolved. In 1931, the Supreme Court of Alberta decided that a 
claim of privilege could be asserted by a company since the common law had not 
developed any basis for determining otherwise.594 However, subsequent decisions have 
taken a different view. In R v Judge of General Sessions of the Peace for County of York,595 the 
court held that a company officer or employee could not claim the privilege on behalf of 
his company in respect of evidence given at trial.  
 
This was followed by the determination of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Amway 
Corporation596 that the constitutional protection for the privilege against self-incrimination 
did not apply to companies. Admittedly the Court was interpreting a statutory provision 
rather than measuring the bandwidth of the common law, but the tenor of the judicial 
reasoning remains interesting. In denying the ability of the company to assert the 
privilege, the Court focused on the fact that a company could testify only through the 
evidence of its officers and employees. It was the witness who took the oath and who 
would be subject to a prosecution for a perjury, and whose interests which the 
constitutional provision had been established to protect. In this sense, the company did 
not self-incriminate itself. As far as the company officers and employees were concerned, 
if there was a risk of personal self-incrimination, the privilege would be engaged. The 
Court strongly made the point that the privilege was intended “to protect the individual 
against the affront to dignity and privacy inherent in a practice which enabled the 
prosecution to force the person charged to supply the evidence out of his or her own 
mouth.”597 This was not applicable in the case of a company. 
 
 
593 Caltex (n 580) 549. 
594 Webster v Sollway, Mills & Co [1931] 1 Dom LR 831, cited with approval in Triplex (n 538). 
595 R v Judge of General Sessions of the Peace for County of York [1970] 16 DLR (3d) 609. See also R v JJ Beamish 
Construction Co Ltd [1967] 59 DLR (2d) 6. 
596 R v Amway Corporation [1989] 1 SCR 21.  
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Columbia Securities Commission v Branch [1995] 2 SCR 3, [39]– [40] (Sopinka and Iacobucci JJ). 
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7.4.3. United States 
 
A similar position pertains in the United States, although supported by different reasons. 
In Hale v Henkel,598 the Supreme Court established long ago that the privilege against self-
incrimination could not be asserted by a company officer acting on behalf of a company. 
As Justice Brown explained, there was a fundamental difference between the capacity of 
an individual and that of a company:  
 
The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled 
to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. 
He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbours to divulge his business, or to 
open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes 
no such duty to the State since he receives nothing therefrom beyond the 
protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the 
land long antecedent to the organization of the State and can only be taken from 
him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his 
rights are a refusal to incriminate himself and the immunity of himself and his 
property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes 
nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights. 
 
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to 
be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges 
and franchises and holds them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations 
of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not 
authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it 
so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the 
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its 
powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having chartered a 
corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of its 
sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they 
had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers 
for that purpose … While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer 
 
598 Hale v Henkel, 201 US 43 (1906). 
222 
 
incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not 
follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse 
to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.599 
 
In United States v White,600 Justice Murphy supported this outcome by imputing an 
intention to the drafters of the US Constitution that the privilege was never expected to 
be claimed by a company: 
 
The framers of the constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-disclosure, 
who were interested in protecting individual civil liberties, cannot be said to have 
intended the privilege to be available to protect economic or other interests of 
such organisations so as to nullify appropriate governmental regulations.601 
 
The Supreme Court further developed the jurisprudence in Braswell v United States,602 when 
the Court, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that a company officer could not assert 
the privilege against self-incrimination where the information or answers incriminated 
him personally as well as the company. It was none to the point that the information or 
answers would have been protected by the privilege if the company officer had been a 
self-employed trader. The fact remained that the company officer was a representative of 
the company, and he was producing the records in the capacity as a representative of the 
company. Although the company officer was the sole owner of the two companies 
through which he operated his business, both companies had three directors (the 
company officer, his wife, and his mother) and traded actively.  
 
The Court left open for further consideration the position where a company officer can 
show that he is the sole director and employee, and in effect he would be producing the 
records in a personal capacity. The Court’s reservation is surprising since the factual 
distinction is not great, and if this approach were applied, the Court would be required to 
look through the corporate veil in order to secure the interests of an individual in respect 
of whom the company was operating as his alter ego. It was precisely this point which 
underwrote the dissenting opinion in the case by Justice Kennedy, with which Justices 
 
599 ibid 75. 
600 United States v White [1944] 322 US 694. 
601 ibid 699–700. 
602 Braswell v United States [1988] 487 US 99. 
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Brennan, Marshall and Scalia agreed. The minority concern centred around the fact that 
the “collective entity” rule in American law was used by the Court’s majority to prevent 
an individual from asserting the privilege against self-incrimination as a constitutional 
right to which he was entitled. In a key passage from Justice Kennedy’s judgment:603 
 
The question before us is not the existence of the collective entity rule, but 
whether it contains any principle which overrides the personal Fifth Amendment 
privilege of someone compelled to give incriminating testimony. Our precedents 
establish a firm basis for assertion of the privilege. Randy Braswell … is being 
asked to draw upon his personal knowledge to identify and to deliver documents 
which are responsive to the Government's subpoena. Once the Government 
concedes there are testimonial consequences implicit in the act of production, it 
cannot escape the conclusion that compliance with the subpoena is indisputably 
Braswell's own act. To suggest otherwise "is to confuse metaphor with reality." 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California.604 
 
It is not that the dissenting minority wanted to recognise the application of the 
privilege to a corporate claim in its own right. They did not. Rather, the minority’s 
sole concern was that an individual should not be deprived of the benefit of 
protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment simply because he elects to conduct 
his business through a company. As the minority explained, the individual is being 
deprived of his constitutional protection “in order to vindicate the rule that a 
collective entity which employs him has no such privilege itself.605 
  
 
603 ibid 125. 
604 Pacific Gas & Electric Co v Public Utilities Comm'n of California, 475 US 1, 475 US 33 (1986), Justice Rehnquist 
dissenting. 
605 Braswell (n 602) 119. For a critical discussion of the decision in Braswell v United States, see Timothy W 
Barbrow, 'Braswell v. United States: Using the Corporate Fiction to Deny an Individual His Fifth Amendment 




7.5 FLAWED REASONING 
 
On careful analysis, the reasoning put forward by the courts to deny a company’s ability 
to assert the privilege against self-incrimination is flawed and unable to withstand rigorous 
scrutiny. Although the Australian, Canadian, and American courts expounded several 
reasons as to why it would not be unfair, unjust, or inappropriate to deny a company the 




Whilst it is axiomatic that a company cannot suffer physical punishment as an incorporeal 
body, the emphasis in the High Court of Australia on the origin of the privilege as a 
protection against torture is misconceived. As explained in Chapter 4, the rationales for 
supporting the recognition of the privilege have been evolutionary, but the common 
thread has been a concern to ensure the reliability of confessionary statements and the 
absence of undue pressure. It is the intensity of coercion which determines whether the 
privilege is engaged, and no single form of coercive practice can claim exclusivity in this 
regard. In the case of a company, there are multiple coercive factors to which a company 
may be exposed if its claim to assert the privilege against self-incrimination were not 
recognised. Mention has already been made of the requirement in section 2(2) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1987 to compulsorily answer questions during the course of a 
criminal investigation into suspected serious or complex fraud. By section 2(13), failure 
to answer questions is punishable by a maximum sentence of six months imprisonment 
or a maximum fine. The consequences for a company of a criminal conviction recorded 
against it were canvassed earlier in this chapter. In the context of an order to produce 
self-incriminating information in civil proceedings, the physicality of punishment may be 
absent, but if a court held that a company’s failure to comply constituted a contempt of 
court, similar adverse consequences could be expected to follow. By focussing on the 
physicality of punishment inflicted on individuals in the seventeenth century, the High 






7.5.2 Unbalanced financial resources 
 
The suggestion made in the Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd 606 
that the position of an individual is weaker than a company in its dealings with the State 
is based on a false premise. Far from domination by large companies with substantial 
financial resources, the corporate sector is populated by a large number of small 
companies, as referenced in Chapter 6. The factual scenario in Braswell v United States607 is 
a case in point. The reality of the situation is that the resources possessed by most 
companies pales into insignificance when balanced against those of the State, and whilst 
there are a minority of international companies with extensive commercial power, the 
majority of investigations into suspected corporate criminal activity will involve 
companies whose financial reserves are eclipsed by those of the State. The suggestion is 
that the complexity of corporate structures and arrangements facilitates the commission 
of serious corporate crime, but again, this is no reason to deny a company from exercising 
the privilege against self-incrimination. This reasoning applies equally to companies and 
individuals who are beneficial owners of these companies. From the perspective of the 
investigating authorities, incriminating information needs to be unearthed from these 
individuals as well as their companies, but there is no suggestion that the ability to assert 
the privilege should be withheld from a class of individual associated with a company 
where the corporate activity is not transparent. In any event, the number of companies 
vulnerable to abuse is likely to represent a small proportion of companies operating in 
the corporate sector.  
 
7.5.3 Corporate jeopardy for perjury 
 
In its effort to configure a narrow perspective on the characteristics of corporate 
personhood, the Australian, Canadian, and American courts erred in their swiftness to 
point out that in cases involving oral evidence, testimony would be given by an individual 
who could assert the privilege against self-incrimination in the event of any personal 
jeopardy. If an individual gives false evidence, he is the person who is vulnerable to 
prosecution for perjury and not the company. According to this argument, as an artificial 
construct it would not be possible for a company to commit perjury. However, this 
 
606 Caltex (n 580). 
607 Braswell (n 602). 
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analysis fails since it overlooks the obvious point that when a company officer is called 
to give evidence on a matter relating to the company’s affairs, the officer speaks for and 
on behalf of the company. In effect, he becomes the company for this purpose. The 
vulnerability of a company to prosecution for perjury was considered by the Court of 
Appeal in Odyssey Re (London) Ltd (formerly Sphere Drake Insurance plc) v OIC Run Off Ltd 
(formerly Orion Insurance Co plc)608 when this point was taken. As Nourse LJ explained, “the 
acts of the natural person should be identified as the acts of the company” for this 
purpose.609 The perceived lack of corporate criminal liability for perjury is, therefore, no 




In summary, the Australian, Canadian, and American cases failed to consider the multiple 
interests illuminated by the application of a value-based analysis to the recognition of a 
corporate right which acknowledges the assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Whereas the cases supporting a corporate right to assert the privilege can 
be assimilated into a value-based analysis for the recognition of corporate rights, the 
Australian, Canadian, and American cases stand apart. In many respects, these decisions 
represent no more than echoes of a historical approach towards the recognition of the 
corporate form as a body which has no clothes. Apart from anything else, denial of a 
company’s right to assert the privilege does not sit happily with the rights of a company 
to defend itself. To repeat what Justice Rehnquist said in First National Bank of Boston v 
Bellotti,610 it is incumbent on the law to respect “the constitutional protections which are 
‘incidental to its very existence’”.611 In a case where a company’s interests are attacked by 
a demand to disclose self-incriminating information relating to the company, its officers 
or employees, the right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination is a constitutional 
protection in point.  
 
Relationships between companies, their stakeholders, and the State, are more complex 
than they were one hundred years ago, and today new tools are required to shed light on 
 
608 Odyssey Re (London) Ltd (formerly Sphere Drake Insurance plc) v OIC Run Off Ltd (formerly Orion Insurance Co plc) 
[2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 1. 
609 ibid 11–13, 89. Buxton LJ dissented, holding that on the facts of the case the alleged perjurer’s evidence 
could not be said to constitute the directing will and mind of the company. 
610 Bellotti (n 378). Also discussed in Chapter 5. 
611 ibid 824. 
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the incidents of these relationships and the bases on which they can be theoretically 
supported. Applying a value-based analysis to the determination of corporate rights is one 
such tool, and as demonstrated in this chapter there are compelling arguments which 
support the inclusion of a corporate right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, 










Having established there are circumstances where the law recognises a company’s 
entitlement to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, the extent to which a 
company should be permitted to shield itself from the mandatory requirement to self-
report criminal conduct under section 330(1) of POCA 2002 comes into focus. This is 
the fifth research question. The potential application of the privilege to exempt a company 
from the statutory requirement to self-report criminal conduct is directly engaged. 
Necessarily, the self-incriminating information disclosed in a SAR relates to pre-existing 
material, often created long before an investigation into the suspected criminal conduct 
has been initiated. The issue, therefore, is whether the law should recognise the operation 
of the privilege against self-incrimination to relieve a company from an obligation to make 
a mandatory self-report in these circumstances?  
 
As noted in chapter 4, neither the legislature nor the judiciary have addressed the question, 
and the potential engagement between the privilege against self-incrimination and 
mandatory self-reporting under the AML regime cannot be assumed. This chapter 
develops a sound case which supports this engagement. The complexities of the 
arguments are intensified when the maker of the self-report is a corporate entity since, as 
previously noted, the narrative in a SAR may incriminate both the company and its 
officers or employees.  
 
The legal landscape in which the mandatory reporting obligation is situated requires 
careful study, especially in circumstances where the legislation is silent on the potential 
application of the privilege against self-incrimination. Whilst respecting the contours of 
the debate, this chapter argues that a corporate entity is entitled to assert the privilege in 
answer to the mandatory reporting requirement. If a judicial determination were delivered 




As an initial step in the argument, the legislative purpose underlying the mandatory 
reporting requirement and its coercive elements are considered. Next, the chapter 
rehearses the incriminating nature of the reporting process, and how a corporate reporter 
becomes exposed to possible, and on occasions, inevitable, self-incrimination. The 
statutory framework for corporate self-reporting was comprehensively considered in 
chapter 2 of the thesis, and here it is recalled in short form. This review is followed by an 
examination of the factors militating strongly in favour of the law’s recognition of the 
privilege against self-incrimination in answer to the reporting obligation set out in section 
330(1) of POCA 2002. These factors demonstrate how, and why, the law recognises, and 
should recognise, an assertion of the privilege as a valid response to the mandatory 
reporting requirement. The counterarguments are reflected in a comprehensive 
discussion of the decision of the Supreme Court in Beghal v DPP,612 and duly answered.  
 
8.2 LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE  
 
The legislative purpose underlying the mandatory reporting requirement is 
uncontroversial. Miriam Goldby explains that there are tripartite aims of the reporting 
requirement: first, to combat crime, in particular organised crime, by disrupting it and in 
this way reducing it; secondly, to detect, investigate and prosecute money launderers and 
those who have committed predicate crimes; and thirdly, to recover the proceeds of 
crime.613  
 
To recap, as explained in chapter 2, the origin of the reporting requirement can be found 
in the FATF’s publication of the Forty Recommendations to fight money laundering in 
May 1990.614 Recommendation 15 required financial institutions to report suspicions of 
money laundering activity on a discretionary basis.615 In 1996, the reporting requirement 
was elevated from discretionary guidance to a mandatory requirement.616 In its new 
interpretive note to Recommendation 15 the FATF required a financial institution to 
comply with a reporting requirement when “the financial institution has reason to believe 
 
612 Beghal (n 3). 
613 Miriam Goldby, ‘Anti-money laundering reporting requirements imposed by English law: measuring 
effectiveness and gauging the need for reform’ [2013] JBL 367. See also Cabinet Office, A Performance 
and Innovation Report, Recovering the Proceeds of Crime, June 2002, 78 para 78. 
614 FATF, ‘Annual Report 1990–91’ (Paris 13 May 1991) 4. 
615 FATF, ‘Annual Report 1995–96’ (Paris 28 June 1996) where the May 1990 recommendations are 
reproduced as Annex 1, 21–26. 
616 ibid 7 para 21. 
230 
 
that the customer’s account is being utilised in money laundering transactions”.617 Today, 
the mandatory reporting requirement is found in Recommendation 20, with the revised 
interpretative note.618 This development completed the transition from a voluntary 
reporting system to a mandatory model which left behind the concerns articulated at the 
outset in 1990 regarding the harshness of a mandatory approach.619  
 
The obvious advantage of a suspicion-based reporting system is that it enables the law 
enforcement authorities to focus on the activities of money launderers who would 
otherwise escape their attention. Since the money launderer’s paramount objective is 
concealment of the proceeds of crime, the visibility of the law enforcement authorities is 
necessarily limited. Compounded by the absence of an identifiable victim, the imposition 
of a suspicion-based reporting threshold serves to redress this information deficit. As 
Guy Stressens explains: 
 
Reporting duties are intended to provide the competent authorities with 
information on suspicious or unusual transactions (or information which allows 
them to filter such transactions), thus allowing those authorities to reconstitute 
the paper trail towards the predicate offence and its perpetrators.620 
 
8.2.1 Legal duty 
 
In this context, the recognition of a legal duty to report suspicious information relating 
to money laundering, in addition to a moral obligation, is unexceptional.621 Although 
historically the common law has been squeamish about recognising a citizen’s duty to 
compel co-operation with the detection of criminal activity,622 Lord Wilmot CJ said long 
ago that “it is the duty of every man to prosecute, appear against, and bring offenders of 
 
617 ibid 33. 
618 FATF Recommendations, ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and The 
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation’ (February 2012, updated June 2019) interpretative note 20(4), 80. 
619 See Stressens (n 36) 97–98, 161; Scott Mortman, ‘Putting Starch in European Efforts to Combat Money 
Laundering’ [1992] 60 Fordham L. Rev S429, S437 fn 55. 
620 Stressens (n 36) 112. 
621 See Chris Dent, ‘The Introduction of Duty into English Law and the Development of the Legal Subject’ 
[2020] 40(1) OJLS 158. 
622 As Lord Widgery CJ explained in the seminal case of Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414, 419 ‘It seems to 
me quite clear that though every citizen has a moral duty or, if you like, a social duty to assist the police, 
there is no legal duty to that effect, and indeed the whole basis of the common law is the right of the 
individual to refuse to answer questions put to him by persons in authority, and to refuse to accompany 
those in authority to any particular place; short, of course, of arrest’.  
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this sort to justice".623 The offence to which Lord Wilmot was referring was perjury, and 
today, if presented as a legal duty, such an obligation would appear startling at first blush. 
But, as Jeremy Horder explains in his article on the case for the recognition of an excusing 
defence to information-provision offences in the bureaucratic State,624 current legislative 
thinking seeks to persuade, if not coerce, citizens into assisting law enforcement 
authorities in their efforts to achieve their regulatory goals. The AML reporting regime, 
with its focus on the reporting duty in section 330(1) of POCA 2002, is cited by Horder 
as a well-known illustration of this technique: 
 
The main interest is the establishment of an ongoing (unpaid) duty on businesses 
handling money not to miss an opportunity to blow the whistle on possible 
money launderers. This is considered to be the best means over time effectively 
to promote the public interest in an economy fuelled by clean money. The 
synchronic interest in identifying blameworthy wrongdoers in particular cases is 
very much a secondary concern.625 
 
What is unusual here is not the establishment of a reporting duty to report criminal 
conduct, in this instance suspected money laundering, but rather the invocation of an 
obligation supported by criminal sanction which requires a person to disclose information 
about the commission of conduct in which they are criminally implicated.  
 
8.3 MAKING A SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT 
 
Again, to recap,626 pursuant to section 330(1) of POCA 2002, a person (human or 
corporate) commits a criminal offence if he fails to make a SAR when he knows or 
suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that another person is 
engaged in money laundering. The information on which knowledge or suspicion is based 
must come to the person during his business in the regulated sector. In addition, the 
obligation to make a report arises only where a person can identify the other person 
suspected to be engaged in money laundering627 or locate the whereabouts of any of the 
 
623 Collins v Blantern [1767] 2 Wils KB 347, 349. 
624 Horder (n 158). 
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626 The law governing the UK’s AML regime is set out in chapter 2. 
627 POCA 2002, s 330(3A). 
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laundered property.628 Under section 340(11), money laundering is defined as an act 
which:  
 
(a) constitutes an offence under sections 327, 328 or 329; (b) constitutes an 
attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit an offence specified in paragraph 
(a); (c) constitutes aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of 
an offence specified in paragraph (a); or (d) would constitute an offence specified 
in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) if done in the United Kingdom. 
 
Reference was made in chapter 2 to four exemptions from liability which are narrowly 
configured. First, under section 330(6)(a), a person will be exempt from liability where he 
has a reasonable excuse for not making the report. Secondly, if the communication of the 
suspicious information by legal privilege, the information must not be disclosed pursuant 
section 330(6)(b), 330(7B), 330(10) and 330(11). Thirdly, an employee is exempted from 
liability under section 330(6)(c) and 330(7) where he has not been provided with 
professional training by his employer. Fourthly, pursuant to section 330(7A), in a small 
number of designated cases, the criminal offence is not committed where the money 
laundering takes place outside the UK and the money laundering is not unlawful under 
the criminal law applying in that country or territory.  
 
8.3.1 Self-incriminating narrative 
 
When submitting a mandatory report, an extensive narrative is anticipated by the law 
enforcement agencies, with a focus on identifying persons suspected of committing 
criminal conduct. In Guidance published in May 2019, the NCA provides for a narrative 
of up to 1,500 words which addresses the following questions - Who is involved? How 
are they involved? What is the criminal property? What is the value of the criminal 
property (estimated as necessary)? Where is the criminal property? When did the 
circumstances arise? When are the circumstances planned to happen? How did the 
circumstances arise? Why you are suspicious or have knowledge?629  
 
 
628 POCA 2002, s 330(5). 
629 NCA, ‘Guidance on submitting better quality Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)’ (May 2019) 
<www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/42-guidance-on-submitting-better-quality-
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In a case where a mandatory report involves criminal conduct committed by the reporting 
company through the acts or omissions of a company officer or employee, the 
incriminating nature of the narrative will become clear. The company officers and 
employees must be identified, together with a description of the criminal conduct which 




There is no suggestion in the international texts or the UK pre-legislative materials 
whether the mandatory reporting requirement was intended to apply, or should apply, to 
the self-reporting of suspected money laundering by a person, whether individual or 
corporate. Certainly, the mandatory reporting obligation is sufficiently wide to embrace 
self-reporting, and compulsory self-reporting of individual or corporate involvement of 
suspected criminal conduct is a common feature of contemporary legal practice.  
 
Further, the practice of voluntary self-reporting has developed to the point where it has 
become a cultural norm in the professional and commercial sectors. Voluntary self-
reporting is actively encouraged by several law enforcement agencies, and in certain 
instances it is incentivised as one of many factors to be considered when an agency 
decides whether to initiate criminal proceedings. In the context of corporate financial 
crime, a combination of statutory provisions and prosecutorial guidance has operated to 
incentivise the voluntary self-reporting of corporate criminal conduct and declared the 
practice to fall firmly within the boundaries of the public interest.  
 
When DPAs were introduced by Parliament in Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 
2013 for application in serious corporate offences, paragraph 7(1)(a) made clear that after 
agreeing terms for a DPA an application would need to be made to the Crown Court for 
a declaration that entering into the agreement was “likely to be in the interests of justice”. 
The court would also be asked to declare that the proposed terms were “fair, reasonable 
and proportionate”. Guidance issued by the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) on 






Additional Public Interest Factors Against Prosecution: 
A genuinely proactive approach adopted by the corporate management team 
when the offending is brought to their notice, involving self-reporting and 
remedial actions, including the compensation of victims: 
In applying this factor, the prosecutor needs to establish whether sufficient 
information about the operation of the company in its entirety has been supplied 
in order to assess whether the company has been proactively compliant. This will 
include making witnesses available and disclosure of the details of any internal 
investigation.630 
 
Another example may be referenced in connection with the twin corporate facilitation of 
tax evasion offences contrary to sections 45 and 46 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017. 
HMRC has issued guidance encouraging companies and partnerships to self-report their 
failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion.631 The guidance states that a corporate 
self-report may be considered by prosecutors when deciding whether to initiate a criminal 
prosecution or resolve the case in another way.632 
 
The key difference between a corporate self-report pursuant to the guidance issued by 
the CPS and HMRC and a self-report made under section 330(1) of POCA 2002 is that 
the former is voluntary whereas the latter is mandatory, and failure to make the mandatory 
report is punishable by a maximum of five years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. 
It is one thing for a company to voluntarily confess to criminal wrongdoing with, or 
without, identifying its officers and employees; it is quite another for a company to be 
compelled to do so, in circumstances where the wrongdoing of company officers and 
employees are exposed as collateral damage. 
 
8.4 ENGAGING THE PRIVILEGE 
 
It is against this background that the application of the privilege against self-incrimination 
to the mandatory reporting requirement in section 330(1) of POCA 2002 falls to be 
 
630 CPS, ‘Guidance on corporate prosecutions’ <www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/corporate-prosecutions> 
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considered. There are powerful arguments which militate in favour of recognising a claim 
to privilege in circumstances where a person, individual or legal, is required to make a 
report of suspicious criminal activity which discloses that they, or in the case of a 
company, company officers and employees, have been involved. There are three 
determining issues. First, the maker of a self-report of criminal conduct must be exposed 
to a real risk of criminal prosecution. Secondly, the requirement to make a self-report 
needs to be coercive, in the sense that it is legally compelled. Thirdly, the rationales 
underlying the recognition of privilege must inure to its application, and the public 
interest is served. 
 
8.4.1 Risk of criminal prosecution 
 
In its early conception, the privilege against self-incrimination was invoked in cases where 
there was direct association between the use of incriminating answers and their admission 
in legal proceedings which were already taking place or were about to take place. The 
circumstances in which the privilege could be engaged slowly widened, and the courts 
began to recognise the application of the privilege where legal proceedings were not 
extant, but where there was a real or appreciable danger to the potential self-incriminator 
that an incriminating statement might be used against interest, in any future criminal or 
regulatory proceedings which may be brought.633 In the mid-nineteenth century the Court 
of Kings Bench held in R v Boyes634 that the privilege was available to be claimed where 
“there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled 
to answer”.  As Lord Cockburn CJ explained: 
 
[W]e are of opinion that the danger to be apprehended must be real and 
appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course 
of things—not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having 
reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable 
that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct. We think that a 
merely remote and naked possibility, out of the ordinary course of the law and 
such as no reasonable man would be affected by, should not be suffered to 
obstruct the administration of justice. The object of the law is to afford to a party, 
 
633 R (CPS) v Bolton Magistrates Court [2003] EWHC 2697 (Admin). 
634 R v Boyes (1861) 1 Best and Smith 311. 
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called upon to give evidence in a proceeding inter alios, protection against being 
brought by means of his own evidence within the penalties of the law.635 
 
In the case of mandatory reporting, although it is neither inevitable nor probable that the 
self-incriminator will face criminal prosecution, there is a real risk that criminal 
prosecution may be the ultimate outcome.  
 
The substance of the mandatory disclosure will need to be investigated, and at the end of 
an investigation a law enforcement authority may decide to take no further action. 
Alternatively, the case could be referred to the Crown Prosecution Service for review. In 
this event, a criminal prosecution will ensue where the Crown Prosecution Service is 
satisfied that there is enough evidence to prove guilt to the criminal standard of proof, 
beyond reasonable doubt. Also, the Crown Prosecution Service must be satisfied that the 
public interest favours the institution of a prosecution. As the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors states, “there has never been the rule that a prosecution will automatically 
take place once the evidential stage is met … In some cases, the prosecutor may be 
satisfied that the public interest can be properly served by offering the offender the 
opportunity to have the matter dealt with by an out-of-court disposal rather than bringing 
a prosecution”.636  
 
When a SAR is made, it is entered onto the NCA’s database called Elmer. Over two 
million SARS are held on Elmer and can be interrogated by the NCA and other law 
enforcement authorities using search programmes known as Arena and Discover. The 
NCA regards SARs as “a critical intelligence resource” which can be instrumental in 
identifying serious crime. After a SAR is submitted to the NCA, the person making the 
report loses control of the information set out in the report. “A single SAR may be used 
several times by several different users for different purposes e.g., the information within 
the same SAR may inform a) HMRC about taxation, b) local police about fraud or theft, 
and c) a government department about a regulatory issue or a weakness in a financial 
product”. The NCA adds that information provided through SARs “can lead to the 
 
635 ibid 330. 
636 CPS, ‘Code for Crown Prosecutors’ (March 2018) para 4.10 <www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-
crown-prosecutors> accessed on 14 April 2020. 
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instigation of new investigations or enhance ongoing operations” (NCA, SARs In Action, 
Issue 2, August 2019, pages 8 and 9).  
 
Notwithstanding the evidential and public interest gateways through which a case must 
pass before criminal process is initiated, the fact remains that at the time when the 
mandatory duty to disclose suspected money laundering arises, the risk of prosecution is 
real and appreciable. As the Court of Appeal recently affirmed in connection with a claim 
to legal professional privilege, criminal prosecution can be reasonably contemplated 
before a law enforcement authority has decided to subject the matter to formal criminal 
investigation, let alone criminal prosecution.637 
 
8.4.2 Risk in minor cases 
 
Next, it falls to be considered whether the law should recognise that a real and appreciable 
risk of criminal prosecution will arise in every case. Cases will be fact-specific, and level 
of risk will be variable, depending on the subject-matter of the report and the extent of 
independently corroborative evidence available to prove the suspected criminal conduct 
in question. In some cases, where the narrative discloses suspicious criminal conduct 
which is serious and can be supported by reference to documents, the risk of criminal 
prosecution is significant. In other cases, where the narrative of the mandatory report 
reveals suspected criminal conduct of a relatively minor nature, the risk of criminal 
prosecution will be much lower. But the threat cannot be entirely discounted; a residual 
risk remains.  
 
When a person confesses the commission of a criminal offence to a law enforcement 
authority, the confessor loses control of the information, and it may be used by the 
authority as it chooses. The Crown Prosecution Service has a wide discretion when 
deciding whether to initiate a criminal prosecution, including in situations where the 
criminal conduct was relatively minor but for policy reasons criminal prosecution was 
nonetheless justified. The CPS Legal Guidance on Minor Offences states that: 
 
 
637 Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Limited [2018] EWCA Civ 2006, 
[86]–[101] (Sir Brian Leveson). 
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Whether a minor offence merits prosecution will depend on the circumstances of 
the case, such as the nature of the offence and the way in which it was committed, 
the loss or harm caused, the likely sentence, the views of the victim, and any 
previous relevant offending by the suspect.638 
 
Notwithstanding the possibility of an alternative disposal, a real and appreciable risk of 
criminal prosecution for the commission of a minor offence remains extant. A trial Judge 
has no power to stop a criminal prosecution where he considers that as a matter of policy 
the prosecution ought not to have been brought.639 Moreover, the High Court will not 
interfere with a decision to initiate criminal proceedings unless the decision is irrational 
or perverse.640 Once a confession to the commission of criminal conduct is at large, 
whether the conduct is serious or minor, the risk of criminal prosecution is neither 
imaginary nor barely possible. In these circumstances, the argument for the engagement 
of the privilege against self-incrimination is compelling.  
 
In many instances, as Andrew Choo points out, determining whether the requisite degree 
of likelihood of criminal prosecution has been reached may be difficult and quite 
speculative.641 For example, in Weh v Austria,642 the ECtHR was divided in a case where a 
driver had been prosecuted for giving incorrect information in response to a statutory 
request which it was compulsory to answer. The Court noted that at the time when the 
incorrect information was given, there was no criminal prosecution for speeding either 
pending or contemplated, and so the link between the driver’s obligation to disclose and 
the institution of criminal proceedings was hypothetical and remote.643 Three dissenting 
judges took a different view. In their opinion, it was clear that the institution of criminal 
proceedings must have been contemplated against the driver for the commission of a 
traffic offence, and the requirement to provide information was no more than a 
preliminary step in the commencement of prosecution process.644 The minority reasoning 
is preferred, since it accords with the practical reality of the situation.  
 
638 CPS, Legal Guidance: Minor Offences <www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/minor-offences> accessed 14 
April 2020. 
639 DPP v Humphreys [1977] AC  1, 23–25 (Viscount Dilhorne), 46 (Lord Salmon) and 53 (Lord Edmund-
Davies). 
640 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p Mead and Cook [1992] STC 482, 492 (Stuart-Smith LJ). 
641 Choo (n 227) 29. 
642 Weh v Austria [2004] 40 EHRR 37. 
643 ibid [42], [52]– [53], [56]– [57]. 




8.4.3 Derivative evidence  
 
As noted, it is axiomatic that a mandatory report contains incriminating information, and 
in the case of a corporate self-reporter, there will be occasions when the narrative contains 
an admission which incriminates the reporting company as well as its officers and 
employees. In addition to an admission in the narrative, the information contained in the 
corporate self-report may provide the NCA or relevant law enforcement authority with 
the basis for seeking to obtain underlying material of evidential value, such as 
documentary material which can be used to prove the commission of criminal conduct 
which has been brought to its attention. In the context of confessions, English law has 
long recognised that evidence of facts discovered as a result of an inadmissible confession 
(“the fruits of the poisoned tree”) can be adduced in evidence as proof of the confessor’s 
guilt.645 
 
It is no answer to concerns about corporate vulnerability to indicate that mandatory 
reports are documents impressed with public interest immunity and not subject to 
disclosure. Since the rule against non-disclosure is not absolute, the risk to a company 
from producing self-incriminating information remains. Article 39(2) of the EC Fourth 
Directive on Money Laundering recognises that the obligation to conceal the existence 
of a mandatory report on public policy grounds does not apply to disclosure for law 
enforcement purposes.646 In similar vein, judges in England and Wales have ruled that 
circumstances may arise where disclosure of a mandatory report is necessary for the fair 
and just resolution of litigation.647 But ultimately, it is the ability of a law enforcement 
authority to adduce derivative evidence which presents the most significant threat to a 
company in terms of exposure to criminal prosecution.  
 
The NCA explains in its literature that a mandatory report detailing investment activity 
and identifying bank accounts can lead to the instigation of new investigations or enhance 
on-going operations.648 The NCA makes no secret of the fact that mandatory reports are 
 
645 R v Warwickshall [1783] 1 Leach 298; Lam Chi-Ming v R [1991] 2 AC 212; PACE 1984, s 74(4)–(6). 
646 Directive (EU) 2015/849 (n 45). 
647 See Jonathan Fisher, ‘Financial Disclosures - Their Use in Criminal and Civil Proceedings’ Money 
Laundering Bulletin, Informa, 28 January 2014. 
648 NCA, ‘Suspicious activity reports’ <www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-
threats/money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing/suspicious-activity-reports> accessed 24 April 2020.  
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made available to other law enforcement authorities for investigation.649 In its 
Consultation Document on Anti-Money Laundering, the Law Commission confirmed 
that mandatory reports are disseminated in order to assist with an investigation which 
may lead to prosecution. According to the Law Commission, there are over 4,800 trained 
officers from 77 agencies with direct access to the NCA’s database. The mandatory 
reports “are routinely used in general criminal investigations, not just in money laundering 
or terrorism financing investigations”.650  
 
8.4.4 A coercive measure 
 
The coercive aspect of section 330(1) is plain to see. The aspect of coercion stems from 
the fact that the requirement to make the disclosure is legally compelled. In some 
instances, a coerced outcome may result from voluntary action,651 as where a person is 
cajoled but not forced into a course of action. However, under section 330(1) of POCA 
2002, the issue of voluntariness does not arise.652 There is nothing consensual about the 
statutory imposition of a mandatory reporting requirement. Failure to report knowledge, 
suspicion, or reasonable grounds for suspecting that another person is engaged in money 
laundering constitutes a criminal offence and is punishable by a maximum sentence of 
five years imprisonment. In the case of a company which fails to report, the maximum 
sentence is an unlimited fine.  
 
In R v Duff,653 where a solicitor was sentenced to a period of six months imprisonment 
for failing to report reasonable grounds for suspecting another person was engaged in 
money laundering, the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, noting that money 
laundering was “a very serious matter and breaches of the legislation by professional 
people cannot be overlooked”.654 A similar approach was taken by the Court of Appeal 
 
649 ibid. 
650 Law Commission, Anti-Money Laundering: the SARS Regime Consultation Paper (Law Com CP No 236 20 
July 2018) para 4.8. 
651 See Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton University Press 1987) for an interesting contribution to the 
development of a theory of coercion. 
652 In R v White [1999] 2 SCR 417, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld a trial judge’s decision to exclude 
evidence of conversations between a driver and a police officer immediately after the driver had reported 
an accident. The driver’s statements fell to treated as compelled information since the driver honestly and 
reasonably considered she was obliged to answer the police officer's questions. 
653 R v Duff [2002] EWCA Crim 2117. 
654 ibid [22] (McCombe J). 
241 
 
in R v Griffiths655 where, again, a solicitor was convicted of failing to make a mandatory 
disclosure. The Court of Appeal reduced his sentence from eighteen months 
imprisonment to six months imprisonment, whilst taking the opportunity to affirm that 
“society demands a high degree of professionalism from solicitors. They are one of the 
door keepers of financial probity in connection with this legislation and it is one of the 
obligations to which each one will be required to measure up to the hilt”.656 The Court 
concluded its judgment with a warning: “We do not leave the case without underlining to 
all professional people involved in the handling of money and with an involvement in 
financial transactions the absolute obligation to observe scrupulously the terms of this 
legislation and the inevitable penalty that will follow failure so to do”.657  
 
Unquestionably, the mandatory obligation in section 330(1) is coercive.  
 
As explained in chapter 2, the mandatory reporting obligation applies to a company as 
well as an individual. In 2013, Parliament confirmed a company’s vulnerability to criminal 
prosecution under section 330(1) when it included the offence in the list of offences in 
respect of which a DPA can be made.658 A DPA can be made between a relevant law 
enforcement authority and a company, but not an individual.659  
 
8.4.5 Underlying rationales 
 
Reviewing the development of the privilege against self-incrimination from its Biblical 
origin to contemporary times, chapter 4 demonstrated there were multiple rationales 
underpinning the privilege which were not mutually exclusive. Chapter 4 explored how 
in its Tudor and Stuart formulations the application of the privilege rested on the need to 
ensure evidential reliability, so that a court could be confident that the testifier was not 
motivated by impure motives or compelled by threat or use of force to make an admission 
that was untrue. More recently, conceptions of privacy, autonomy and dignity have 
supported the privilege’s existence, in accordance with values which foster the rule of law 
in a fair and just society. In so far as interaction between section 330(1) of POCA 2002 
 
655 R v Griffiths [2006] EWCA Crim 2155. 
656 ibid [12] (Leveson J). 
657 ibid [17]. 
658 Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 17, para 23. 
659 ibid para 4(1). 
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and the privilege is concerned, historic and contemporary rationales are conjoined. As 
chapter 4 demonstrates, it is the inherent values associated with rights of privacy, 
autonomy, and dignity, which, in the context of its engagement with section 330(1) of 
POCA 2002, underpin the application of the privilege today.  
 
In so far as a company is concerned, there are sound reasons for the legal protection of 
these rights, as developed in the corporate chapters of this thesis. There is a sound 
theoretical justification for the recognition of a company’s right to assert the privilege 
against self-incrimination when it arises, and it is unnecessary to repeat the contentions 
rehearsed in chapter 7. This is not to say that the theoretical foundation for the privilege’s 
engagement in the case of a company with the mandatory reporting requirement in 
section 330(1) is exclusively based on considerations privacy, autonomy, and individual 
dignity. The rationale for the privilege is not a binary choice. In modern times, physical 
threats and deprivations have made way for more subtle and sophisticated pressures 
which may undermine the reliability of a statement made to the law enforcement 
authorities where coercive measures such as risks of criminal prosecution, imprisonment 




It would be a mistake to assume that the narrative contained in a mandatory report filed 
under section 330(1) is entirely reliable. In the case of a self-report, the mandatory report 
dons the character of a document prepared in the hope that it will be perceived by the 
law enforcement authorities as neutrally and dispassionately written, when in fact, the 
maker has his own interests to advance. An individual self-reporter is not pressured to 
respond to the asking of hostile questions, and provided he acts relatively swiftly after 
discovering suspected money laundering,660 there is no prescribed constraint on the length 
of time an individual may take before filing a mandatory report. In consequence, it is 
possible for an individual to reflect carefully on the content of the narrative before the 
mandatory report is submitted. Legal advice can be obtained where necessary, with a view 
to minimising the reporter’s acceptance of criminal involvement in a way which is not 
misleading and purports to discharge the letter, if not the spirit, of the reporting 
 
660 Section 340(4) of POCA 2002 provides that a mandatory disclosure must be made ‘as soon as is 
practicable’ after information giving rise to reasonable grounds for suspicion has been received. 
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requirement. Guidance issued by the NCA invites a reporter to consider carefully exactly 
what information is reported. The Guidance urges a reporter not to report too much 
information but instead to focus on transactions that directly relate to suspicious activity, 
“and explain why you think the transaction supports your reason for suspicion”.661 
 
Where a mandatory report is made by a company, there is greater opportunity for a 
narrative which minimises the company’s criminal exposure at the expense of its officers 
or employees. In this situation, the reliability of incriminating statements cannot be 
warranted. In Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank plc,662 where the company made 
admissions in a DPA which implicated the criminal culpability of its employees, the purity 
of the company’s motives was subsequently challenged.  
 
Approximately three months after the DPA had been finalised, one of the former 
employees of Standard Bank’s subsidiary company implicated in the payment of bribes 
launched a claim in the High Court of Tanzania against Standard Bank.663 In particular, 
the claimant alleged that the parent bank offloaded its responsibility for the bribery onto 
the employees of its subsidiary company, in circumstances when it knew about the 
payment of the bribes. The claimant alleged that Standard Bank entered into the deferred 
prosecution agreement for the sole purpose of saving its international business interests 
at the expense of its employees’ reputation and the subsidiary company. The civil claim 
in Tanzania was settled. As a measure of the concern generated by the DPA, a public 
petition launched by a Tanzanian living in The Netherlands sought to persuade the SFO 
to re-open the case on the ground664 that it was misled by the false information which 
Standard Bank had given. 
 
The potential unreliability of self-incriminating information set out in a SAR is an 
insufficiently strong argument to support the disregarding of self-incriminating 
 
661 NCA, ‘SARs Regime Good Practice Frequently Asked Questions Suspicious Activity Reports’ (v2.0 July 
2020) 6 <www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/462-sars-faq-july-2020/file> 
accessed 31 March 2021. 
662 Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank plc (Southwark Crown Court, 30th November 2015) approved 
judgment, Levison LJ. 
663 ‘Shose Sinare goes to Court over Standard Bank Group allegations’ Business Times (Tanzania, 10 March 
2016). 
664 ‘Tanzania: Campaign to Reopen Probe on Standard Bank over $600 (million) Bribery heats up’ Tanzania 




information without engaging the privilege against self-incrimination. Self-incriminating 
information set out in a SAR may be truthfully stated, even where the information has 
been presented in a manner which minimises the extent of corporate offending. To this 
extent, the self-incriminating information is not unreliable, and therefore the potential for 
unreliability is insufficient to protect a company from the dangers which flow from the 
compelled disclosure of self-incriminating information. It is for this reason that it 
becomes necessary for the privilege against self-incrimination to be engaged. In the final 
analysis, the mandatory reporting requirement in section 330(1) is a coercive measure, 
and by virtue of its compulsory element it undermines a company’s right to maintain its 
privacy, dignity, and autonomy.  
 
8.5 BEGHAL v DPP 
 
Having established the foundation for the application of the privilege against self-
incrimination for failing to make a mandatory disclosure under section 330(1), discussion 
would be incomplete without a comprehensive critique of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Beghal v DPP.665 The decision is important because, although the facts of the case 
involved an individual and not a company, the nature of the statutory powers exercised 
in Beghal v DPP comes closest to the AML reporting regime in its consideration of the 
privilege against self-incrimination where there is a statutorily obligation to disclose 
information.  
 
In its application of key provisions of the ECHR, the Supreme Court was divided by a 
majority of four to one, and subsequently, the ECtHR reached a different conclusion.666 
The privilege against self-incrimination featured in the case as an auxiliary argument; 
nonetheless, the judicial observations in both courts merit full consideration, even though 
they are not determinative. Lord Kerr’s dissenting judgment is the most pertinent, in so 
far as consideration of the privilege against self-incrimination is concerned. However, 
ultimately the decision adds little to the interaction between section 330(1) of POCA 2002 
and the privilege against self-incrimination since the application of the privilege is 
necessarily case-specific, with an outcome dependant on the degree of coercive pressure 
brough to bear on the individual, the degree of risk to criminal prosecution, the language 
 
665 Beghal v DPP [2015] UKSC 49. 
666 Beghal v United Kingdom [2019] 69 EHRR 28. 
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used by the legislature in the enactment of the reporting obligation, and the competing 
public policy interests which arise.  
 
8.5.1 The facts 
 
The facts in Beghal v DPP concerned paragraph 2 of Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 
2000, by which Parliament had introduced a power which allowed police officers, 
immigration officers and customs officers at a port or border to require an individual to 
answer questions for the purpose of determining whether a person was associated with 
terrorist activity. Under paragraph 2(4), the power to ask questions for this purpose may 
be exercised irrespective of whether the examining officer has grounds for suspecting that 
the person has been associated with terrorist activity. The examining officer has additional 
powers to require production of documents in a person’s possession, and to search and 
detain the person. There is little guidance on how persons are selected for questioning. 
The Home Office Code of Practice issued in 2014 instructed officers to avoid 
discrimination and arbitrary action, and not to select individuals solely upon their religion 
or ethnic background. Rather, the decision to stop “must be informed by considerations 
relating to the threat of terrorism”.667 This suggests that, generally, the decision to stop 
an individual would be intelligence-led.668 Failure to comply with an examining officer’s 
requirements constitutes a criminal offence and is punishable by a maximum of three 
months’ imprisonment.669  
 
In this case, Mrs Beghal had been stopped and questioned by police at East Midlands 
Airport about, amongst other things, the details of her travel itinerary, and her 
relationship with her husband who had been convicted of terrorist offences. She refused 
to answer questions and was prosecuted. After an attempt to stay the prosecution for 
abuse of process failed, Mrs Beghal pleaded guilty, and the Magistrates Court imposed a 




667 Beghal (n 666) [17] (Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge). 
668 Following the ECtHR decision, the Home Office has given more extensive guidance on the 
circumstances in which an individual may be stopped. See Home Office, ‘Code of Practice: Examining 
Officers and Review Officers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 paras 18 and 19’ (25 September 
2019). 
669 Terrorism Act 2000, sch 7 para 18. 
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8.5.2 The decision 
 
Challenging the failed abuse of process ruling in the Supreme Court, Mrs Beghal argued 
that the Schedule 7 powers constituted a disproportionate invasion of her privacy rights 
protected by Article 8 of the ECHR. The majority of the Supreme Court disagreed, 
regarding the level of intrusion into privacy to be “comparatively light and not beyond 
the reasonable expectations of those who travel across the UK’s international borders”.670 
The Court considered that “…it is not an unreasonable burden to expect citizens to bear 
in the interests of improving the prospects of preventing or detecting terrorist 
outrages”.671 The majority judges explained that the value of Schedule 7 powers to the 
law enforcement authorities eclipsed the level of intrusion into privacy of the individual 
which was viewed as comparatively light, thereby rendering the interference with privacy 
rights to be proportionate.672 
 
Lord Kerr disagreed, expressing concern about the potential reach of the Schedule 7 
powers:673 
 
A person stopped under this provision is required to answer questions even 
though they may not have had the benefit of legal advice. Individuals may have 
many reasons why they do not want to answer questions as to their movements 
and activities. These reasons are not necessarily or invariably discreditable. Some 
may be apprehensive about answering questions without a lawyer being present 
or may lack a full understanding of the significance of refusing to answer. The 
fact that they are open to criminal sanction, which could include imprisonment, 
for failing to answer questions, renders the exercise of these powers a significant 
interference with Article 8 rights, in my opinion. 674 
 
The ECtHR preferred Lord Kerr’s approach, holding that the Schedule 7 power offended 
the principle of legality because there were insufficient safeguards against arbitrary abuse 
to counterbalance the interference with Mrs Beghal’s privacy.675 In the light of this 
 
670 Beghal (n 666) [51] (Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge). 
671 ibid [51].  
672 ibid [48], [51]. 
673 ibid [126] (Lord Kerr). 
674 ibid [127] (Lord Kerr). 
675 Beghal v United Kingdom (n 667). 
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determination, the ECtHR concluded that it did not need to consider Mrs Beghal’s 
second argument that Schedule 7 infringed her right to liberty which was safeguarded 
under Article 5 of the ECHR. The majority judges in the Supreme Court were not 
impressed with the argument since, in the Court’s view, the length of detention for asking 
questions was proportionate and no longer than necessary for the completion of the 
questioning process.676 
  
In so far as Mrs Beghal’s reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination was 
concerned, neither the majority judges in the Supreme Court nor the ECtHR found this 
aspect of the argument persuasive. Mrs Beghal contended that, in response to the 
questions she was asked, she was entitled to assert the privilege against self-incrimination 
at common law, and further, her right to remain silent was protected by Article 6 of the 
ECHR. For Lords Hughes and Hodge, with whom Lords Neuberger and Dyson 
agreed,677 however, it could not be said that the exercise of the Schedule 7 powers 
subjected Mrs Beghal or her husband to a real or appreciable risk of prosecution in 
circumstances where the power was not directed at the obtaining of evidence for use in a 
prosecution.678 The point was fortified by the fact  that Parliament had omitted to mention 
the privilege against self-incrimination in Schedule 7. This suggested that Parliament had 
not considered the privilege to be engaged and there was no common law right which 
needed to be overridden.679 This had to be correct, the Supreme Court reasoned, because 
if the privilege had applied, the Schedule 7 powers would be rendered largely nugatory.680  
 
Protection under Article 6 of the ECHR was not triggered because, at the time when she 
was questioned, Mrs Beghal was not a person “charged” with a criminal offence, within 
the meaning of ECtHR jurisprudence, and there was no ongoing criminal investigation. 
As the Supreme Court concluded in Ambrose v Harris,681 a person is to be treated as 
“charged” when there is suspicion against him, and his case is subject to investigation. 
The change in status occurs at the point when a person is no longer treated as a potential 
witness but a possible suspect. This was the only point on which the ECtHR agreed with 
the majority of the Supreme Court. As the ECtHR noted, “the mere fact of [Mrs Beghal’s] 
 
676 Beghal (n 666) [56] (Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge). 
677 ibid [72] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Dyson). 
678 ibid [64] (Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge). 
679 ibid [63]–[64] (Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge). 
680 ibid [64] (Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge). 
681 Ambrose v Harris [2011] UKSC 43, [44] (Lord Hope). 
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selection for examination could not be understood as an indication that she herself was 
suspected of involvement in any criminal offence”.682 
 
8.5.3 Lord Kerr’s dissent 
 
Lord Kerr saw matters differently. To begin with, for the privilege against self-
incrimination to be engaged, Lord Kerr’s articulation of the test for engagement was more 
nuanced. Citing Roskill LJ’s dicta in Rio Tinto Zinc v Westinghouse Electric Corporation,683 the 
privilege arises unless the risk of prosecution is “so far beyond the bounds of reason as 
to be no more than a fanciful possibility”.  Applied in this case, the risk of prosecution 
was not fanciful. Lord Kerr explained that he could not understand how it could be said 
that the power in Schedule 7 to require answers was not aimed at obtaining information 
for the purpose of prosecution. “The purpose of questioning … is to determine whether 
the person questioned appears to be a terrorist … If [the answer is yes] … why should 
those answers not form the basis of a prosecution? It seems to me inescapable that there 
is a real and appreciable risk of prosecution if the answers to the questions posed prove 
to be self-incriminating”.684  Lord Kerr also disagreed with the majority judgment over 
the application of section 78 of PACE 1984. Lord Kerr considered that “it is by no means 
clear that evidence of those answers will automatically be excluded if there is other 
evidence which directly implicates the person responding”.685   
 
Lord Kerr referenced discussion in the lower court when the Director of Public 
Prosecutions declined to undertake never to adduce evidence in a criminal prosecution 
against an interviewee of answers to questions which the interviewee had given pursuant 
to the Schedule 7 requirement. It followed, as Lord Kerr explained, that “[t]he plain fact 
is … that self-incriminating answers given in response to questions posed under Schedule 
7 can form the basis of a prosecution.”686 The majority of their Lordships considered that 
Lord Kerr overstated the vulnerability to criminal prosecution. Lords Hughes and Hodge 
explained that in their view the risk of an admission obtained in questioning being used 
against the interviewee in prosecution was significantly reduced by the application of the 
 
682 ibid [121].  
683 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547 (HL), 579H (CA). 
684 Beghal (n 666) [115] (Lord Kerr). 
685 ibid [117] (Lord Kerr). 
686 ibid [116]– [118] (Lord Kerr). 
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test for exclusion of evidence in section 78 of PACE 1984.687 This provides that a court 
may exclude prosecution evidence where it would impact adversely on the fairness of the 
proceedings. When making this determination, the court considers the circumstances in 
which the evidence was obtained. If it is inevitable that the evidence would be excluded, 
a risk of self-incrimination does not arise.688 Their Lordships added that if Mrs Beghal 
and her husband had been prosecuted, the possibility that Mr Beghal would adduce his 
wife’s incriminating answers in his defence is “largely theoretical”, and in any event it is 
subject to severance of the indictment into separate trials.689 But as Lords Hughes and 
Hodge  acknowledged, reliance on the exercise of judicial discretion is not to be equated 
with the exercise of a right to remain silent in the face of questioning.690  
 
This hardly provides a safe basis for the articulation of legal principle in a situation where 
the exercise of a fundamental right has been brought into play. Additionally, the majority 
approach rests heavily on the possible adduction of self-incriminating evidence in a 
criminal prosecution of the interviewee. However, the risk to the interviewee is more 
nuanced. As Lord Kerr point out, the greater risk to the interviewee is not that self-
incriminating answers will be adduced as prosecution evidence, but rather that the 
answers prompt enquiries which lead to the obtaining of new evidence.691 In Lord Kerr’s 
view, it is the risk that a person will be prosecuted on evidence obtained as a result of a 
self-incriminating answer which engages the privilege against self-incrimination at 
common law. Also, this risk exposes the individual to criminal charge and is incompatible 
with due process protections in Article 6 of the ECHR.692 It is inevitable that the 
interaction between the privilege against self-incrimination and the obtaining of derivative 
evidence will return to the courts on a future date. Lords Hughes and Hodge recognised 
that there remains a real risk that derivative evidence could be used in the prosecution of 





687 ibid [66] (Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge). 
688 ibid. 
689 ibid [67] (Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge). 
690 ibid [66] (Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge). 
691 ibid [117]–[118] (Lord Kerr). 
692 ibid [118] (Lord Kerr). 
693 ibid [64] (Lord Hughes and Lord Hodge).  
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8.5.4 Distinguishing Beghal v DPP 
 
At first blush, the arguments put forward by the majority judges in Beghal v DPP might be 
taken to undermine the contention in this thesis that the privilege against self-
incrimination is engaged by section 330(1) of POCA 2002. Certainly, some parallel 
considerations come to mind. Both requirements in section 330(1) and Schedule 7 require 
disclosure of information to the law enforcement authorities which may be self-
incriminating and concern involvement in serious criminal misconduct. Similarly, the 
requirement to disclose information is coercive, with failure to disclose information 
constituting a criminal offence contrary to section 330(1) and paragraph 18 of Schedule 
7. Both offences are punishable by imprisonment. In many instances under section 330(1) 
and Schedule 7, there will not be an ongoing criminal investigation into the affairs of the 
person disclosing the information, although this does not necessarily follow in every case. 
 
Here, the similarities end. The engagement between the privilege against self-
incrimination and the mandatory self-reporting requirement pursuant to section 330(1) 
of POCA 2002 is distinguishable in form and substance from the circumstances in Beghal 
v DPP.  
 
8.5.4.1 Greater level of coercion 
 
First, the degree of coercion present in the obligation to disclose suspicious information 
relating to money laundering eclipses the coercive element which is present in the 
Schedule 7 requirement to answer questions. Under section 330(1), a person is subjected 
to a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. Under 
Schedule 7, a person is subject to three months imprisonment maximum. 
 
8.5.4.2 Higher risk of self-incrimination 
 
Secondly, the risk of criminal prosecution is qualitatively greater in the case of a 
mandatory disclosure under section 330(1) than answers to questions asked under 
Schedule 7. The information contained in a section 330(1) disclosure is specific and 
focused on the commission of specific criminal conduct or a type of conduct as well as 
the identity of the person(s) committing it. Schedule 7 is generic, with the topic of the 
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questions led by the interviewing officer. Also, knowledge, suspicion, or reasonable 
grounds for suspecting the commission of money laundering need to be present before a 
mandatory report is made. There is no precedential requirement which needs to be 
satisfied before a law enforcement officer stops a person at a port or border and asks 
questions. 
 
8.5.4.3 Enhanced privacy infringement 
 
Thirdly, in the balancing of competing public interests between an obligation to disclose 
on the one hand, and the engagement of the privilege against self-incrimination on the 
other, different considerations arise.  
 
Most obviously, where the mandatory reporting obligation under section 330(1) is 
engaged, there is no prior knowledge of suspected criminality on the part of the State; yet 
nonetheless, a person (individual or corporate) is required to take the initiative and inform 
the State about matters of which the State may know nothing. This is not necessarily the 
case under Schedule 7. Although the law enforcement authorities may exercise their 
power to stop and question on a random basis without any prior information, the Code 
of Practice offers guidance on the type of factors which should be considered. These 
factors suggest that the State may have some prior knowledge of the detainee’s 
background. In Beghal v DPP, it is not without significance that Mr Beghal had been 
convicted of offences associated with terrorism.  
 
Also, public policy in favour of eroding privacy rights under Article 8 of the ECHR is 
stronger under Schedule 7 since it involves risk to life. The mandatory reporting 
requirement in section 330(1) involves the disclosure of information relating to the 
handling of property which represents the benefit of criminal conduct. Whilst it is true 
that the predicate criminal offence producing the benefit may not be confined to financial 
crime, (such as, for example, profits from drug-trafficking and paedophilia rings), the 
focus of the disclosure fixes upon the handling of property, which is secondary to, and 
parasitical on, the commission of the predicate offence.  
 
Finally, whilst the recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination may neuter the 
requirement to answer questions under Schedule 7, this is not the case under section 330. 
252 
 
The mandatory reporting requirement continues to have significant application in cases 
where the reporter stands at arm’s length with, in the language of section 330(2), “another 
person engaged in money laundering”. 
 
8.5.4.4 Companies are included 
 
The mandatory reporting obligation in section 330(1) applies to a company whereas the 
requirement to answer questions under Schedule 7 does not. It follows that issues relating 
to the importance of maintaining corporate privacy arise under section 330(1) which are 
of no concern under Schedule 7.  
 
In these circumstances, the relevance of the views expressed by the majority in Beghal v 
DPP is limited and sheds little light on the considerations which apply to the engagement 
of the privilege against self-incrimination with the mandatory reporting requirement in 
section 330(1) of POCA 2002. In any event, Lord Kerr’s analysis of the principles 
underlying the application of the privilege against self-incrimination is much to be 
preferred. The analysis put forward by Lord Kerr accords with the proper basis for 
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and supports the argument that it should 
be capable of invocation where the self-reporting of criminal conduct by individuals and 




Recognition of the right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination in response to 
the mandatory reporting obligation in section 330(1) does not need to precipitate an 
argument that the case of Beghal v DPP was wrongly decided. But, on any view, the 
majority reasoning in Beghal v DPP is scarred by a striking internal contradiction.  
 
In the judgment delivered by Lords Hughes and Hodge, the judges referenced the view 
of the UK’s Independent Reviewer on Terrorist Powers (then David Anderson QC) on 
the value of the Schedule 7 power to the law enforcement authorities. The judges noted 





Sometimes this may trigger a train of inquiry which leads directly to a prosecution; 
on far more occasions it is the accumulation of individually small pieces of 
intelligence which, combined, may inform both particular and general responses 
to the terrorist threats confronting this country. It is a commonplace of detective 
or security work that a ‘jigsaw’ approach can yield vital results beyond the 
significance initially apparent from any single piece of information.694 
 
It is surprising that the Court proceeded to hold that the risk of prosecution was neither 
real nor appreciable when in previous cases the Schedule 7 power had been used to elicit 
a vital piece of incriminating information from a detained person. Moreover, the prospect 
of a criminal prosecution flowing from the exercise of Schedule 7 powers is directly 
referenced. In these circumstances, the reasoning of the majority judges is not sustainable, 
and it can be explained only by differing judicial perceptions over the balancing of 
competing public interests.  
 
8.6 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
 
Finally, and fundamentally, on its true construction that statutory wording of the 
mandatory obligation in section 330(1) of POCA 2002 suggests that the reporting 
requirement was directed at the disclosure of information concerning the activities of a 
third party and not the person making the report. The statutory focus on the criminal 
activities of a third party suggests that the legislator did not have the potential criminal 
exposure of the report-maker in mind, and recognition of the privilege against self-
incrimination is consistent with this understanding.  
 
Section 330(2) of POCA 2002 makes clear that the reporter’s knowledge or suspicion 
relates not to the reporter, but to “another” person who is engaged in money laundering. 
Under section 330(3) the information must have come to the person “in the course of a 
business” which the reporter is carrying out. The requirement that the information must 
have come to the reporter in this way suggests that it is not information which is already 
in his possession as a participant in crime. In 2005, Parliament added an additional 
requirement which had to be satisfied before a mandatory report was required to be made. 
 
694 Beghal (n 666) [22]. 
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Section 330(3A) stipulated that a report should not be made unless the report can identify 
the suspected money launderer, or at least disclose information which assists in 
identifying the suspected money launderer.695 Section 330(3A) aligns  with section 330(5) 
which makes clear from the outset that the disclosure must reveal the identity of the 
suspected money launderer, the whereabouts of the laundered property if known, and the 
information giving rise to knowledge or suspicion.  
 
8.6.1 Individual self-incrimination 
 
In the case of an individual, a question arises as to whether the wording of section 330(1) 
captures a failure to report where the person engaged in money laundering is the same 
person as the person who is obliged to make a mandatory disclosure. In its plain meaning, 
where section 330(2) uses the pronoun “he” to designate the person obliged to make a 
report in order to avoid committing an offence of failure to disclose, this person is clearly 
distinguishable from “another person” engaged in money laundering. There are two 
persons contemplated in section 330(2), not one. On this analysis, if an obliged individual 
is the sole criminal participant engaged in money laundering, no issue of self-
incrimination would arise since the mandatory obligation to make a disclosure would not 
be triggered.696 In this situation, there is no “other” person in respect of whom the report 
would be made.697  
 
In practice, this situation rarely occurs. Typically, more than one criminal participant is 
involved in money laundering activity. If a person working in the regulated sector handles 
proceeds of criminal conduct along with another person, the requirement to make a 
mandatory disclosure is engaged. There are two people involved in this scenario – the 
obliged individual, and another person with whom he has acted – and both are engaged 
in money laundering. When the person working in the regulated sector articulates the 
 
695 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s 104(3). 
696 A contrary argument can be founded on the wording of Art 33(1) of the EC Fourth Directive on Money 
Laundering which omits to reference that another person is engaged in money laundering. Rather, the 
reporting obligation requires a person working in the regulated sector to ‘[file] a report, on their own 
initiative, where the [person] … knows, suspects, or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds, 
regardless of the amount involved, are the proceeds of criminal activity or are related to terrorist financing’. 
Reference below. 
697 In Ashworth (n 10) 154–55, the authors questioned whether, in connection with the parallel mandatory 
reporting requirement under s 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000, this outcome was objectionable where, for 
example, the other person was the report-maker's sibling.  
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money laundering narrative, inevitably the reporter incriminates himself. As discussed in 
chapter 2, the factual circumstances arising in R v Jiaxin Finance Limited698 is a case in 
point.699 In this instance, the scope for the reporter’s potential criminal liability as a 
secondary participant is wide and can include responsibility for aiding and abetting money 
laundering, or encouraging or assisting money laundering contrary to sections 44 to 46 of 
the Serious Crime Act 2007.  
 
 
8.6.2 Corporate self-incrimination 
 
In any event, the prospect of self-incrimination in response to the reporting requirement 
in section 330(1) is placed beyond peradventure in the corporate context, where a 
company becomes obliged to make a disclosure. Here, as previously noted, the possibility 
of a company self-incriminating by reference to the acts or omissions of its officers and 
employees, and incriminating the same officers and employees simultaneously, remains 
extant. In this situation, the ability of the obliged person, individual or corporate, to assert 
the privilege against self-incrimination as an exemption to the mandatory reporting 
obligation is consistent with the tenor of the statutory requirement, with its emphasis on 
third party involvement. In this way, the mandatory reporting obligation is enabled to 
function in a manner which respects fundamental rights, such as the ability to assert the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
 
8.6.3 Respecting fundamental rights 
 
This analysis gives effect to the Parliamentary intention endorsed on the front page of 
the POCA 2002 that the statutory provisions are compatible with the provisions of the 
ECHR.700 It also coheres with Recital 65 of the EC Fourth Directive on Money 
Laundering701 which represents that the terms of the Directive, to include the mandatory 
reporting obligation, respect the fundamental rights and observes the principles 
 
698 R v Jiaxin Finance Limited [2020] NZHC 366. 
699 The factual circumstances of the case are set out in chapter 2 of the thesis at para 2.4.4. 
700 Pursuant to s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, a court is required ‘so far as it is possible to do so’, to 
apply s 330(1) of POCA 2002 in a manner which is consistent with the provisions of the European 
Convention.  
701 Directive (EU) 2015/849 (n 45). 
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recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which include 
the right to respect for private and family life, the right to the protection of personal data, 
and the presumption of innocence. Tangentially, Article 32(6) provides that law 
enforcement authorities can request access to information contained in a mandatory 
report, but there is no requirement for this information to be provided “where disclosure 
of the information would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a 
natural or legal person”.  
 
The earlier legislative and pre-legislative materials do not shed any light on the content of 
a natural or legal person’s “legitimate interests”, although some assistance can be derived 
from the wording in Article 46(6) of the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, agreed on 16 May 2005. 
With a similar objective, Article 46(6) stipulated that a request to provide information 
could be refused where it was not “in accordance with fundamental principles of national 
law of the requested party”. The concordance between a human and corporate person’s 
legitimate interests, fundamental principles of national law, and rights involving the 
protection of privacy, autonomy, and human dignity, which includes the privilege against 
self-incrimination, is duly noted. 
 
8.7 GIVING EFFECT TO THE PRIVILEGE 
 
Having established that the privilege against self-incrimination can be raised in response 
to the mandatory reporting requirement, the mechanism by which the law gives effect to 













8.7.1 Entitlement at common law 
 
The privilege at common law operates as an entitlement, and typically, when successfully 
claimed in legal proceedings by a witness while giving evidence or in answer to an order 
to answer questions or produce documents, the obligation to respond falls away.702 The 
position at common law was codified by Parliament in section 14(1) of the Civil Evidence 
Act 1968 which refers to the privilege as a right.  
 
Applying this analysis, a court would be obliged to recognise the privilege where a 
corporate defendant raises the risk of criminal prosecution as a shield to criminal liability 
in answer to a prosecution for failing to disclose a money laundering suspicion under 
section 330(1). As Lord Hoffmann explained in R v Herts CC, ex p Green Industries Ltd, “the 
expression ‘privilege against self-incrimination’ or ‘right to silence’ is used to refer to 
several loose rules or principles of immunity, differing in scope and rationale”.703 Noting 
that the privilege tended to be raised in cases where a person was giving evidence or 
responding to a compulsory questioning or production of documents order, Lord 
Hoffmann added that “[T]here is also a general privilege not to be compelled to answer 
questions from people in authority, based … upon the common view that one person 
should so far as possible be entitled to tell another person to mind his own business”.704  
 
In giving judgment, Lord Hoffmann drew heavily on Lord Mustill’s analysis of the 
privilege in R v Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex p Smith which had been decided seven 
years earlier,705 where Lord Mustill referred to the privilege as giving rise to “a general 
immunity, possessed by all persons and bodies, from being compelled on pain of 
punishment to answer questions.”706 In the case of mandatory reporting, the exercise of 
the privilege would give rise to a general immunity, which in this instance operates as a 
protection from prosecution. In R v King,707 where a defendant had been acquitted of 
misprision after concealing his involvement in a robbery, the Court of Criminal Appeal 
 
702 Hodge Malek (ed), Phipson on Evidence (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) paras 24–41. 
703 R v Herts CC, ex p Green Environmental Industries Ltd [2000] 2 AC 412, 419A. 
704 ibid 419D. 
705 R v Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex p Smith [1993] AC 1, 30–31. 
706 ibid. Lord Mustill’s view that immunity is possessed ‘by all persons and bodies’ is noted, with regard to 
the corporate form. 




treated the privilege against self-incrimination as operating as if it was a substantive 
defence to the charge.  
 
Any attempt to prosecute a person for failing to self-incriminate would be halted by the 
court for abuse of process. As the learned editors of Archbold explain, albeit with 
reference to entrapment, the doctrine of abuse of process will apply “when the 
proceedings result from executive action that threatens basic human rights or the rule of 
law".708 A court would not be acting in accordance with its obligations under the ECHR 
if it proceeded to try a defendant for failing to make a disclosure in circumstances where 
the privilege against self-incrimination had been engaged. Section 6(1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 stipulates that “[I]t is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which 
is incompatible with a Convention right”. Section 6(3) defines a public authority to 
include a court. 
 
8.7.2 Reasonable excuse 
 
Section 330(6)(a) of POCA 2002 does not provide a suitable alternative route for giving 
effect to the privilege against self-incrimination. This sub-section recognises reasonable 
excuse as a valid reason which can justify a person’s failure to make a disclosure in 
accordance with the terms of the mandatory requirement. Although the provision is 
expressed as an exemption from criminal liability and not as a defence to criminal liability, 
reasonable excuse operates as a justification for a person’s failure to make a disclosure 
which would otherwise have constituted the commission of a criminal offence. 
  
Section 330(6)(a) is silent as to the factual circumstances which may amount to a 
reasonable excuse, and it falls to magistrates in the Magistrates Court or a jury in the 
Crown Court to determine what constitutes an excuse which is reasonable in all the 
circumstances. The defendant bears an evidential burden to raise the issue of reasonable 
excuse,709 and the prosecution must disprove the existence of the reasonable excuse to 
the criminal standard of proof.710 The Law Society Anti-Money Laundering Guidance 
published in March 2018 notes that there is no guidance as to what constitutes a 
 
708 Archbold, Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell 2021) 403, para 4-96. See R v 
Looseley (AG Reference of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 2060. 
709 Rowland v Thorpe [1970] 3 All ER 195. 
710 R v Harling [1970] RTR 441. 
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reasonable excuse, and although it gives some examples of potential excuses, asserting 
the privilege against self-incrimination is not mentioned.711 To date, there is no reported 
case or anecdotal information on the application of section 330(6) in the courts. 
 
Whilst a person may put forward the existence of facts which may be excusatory in his 
mind, the requirement of the excuse to be reasonable injects an element of objectivity 
which must be present before the exemption from criminal liability is operative. If a 
person bases an excuse on a trivial matter which lacks reasonableness, the imposition of 
criminal liability will not be avoided. This is because there is an inextricable connection 
between the subjectivity of an excuse and the objective nature of justification for which 
Parliament has legislated. As John Gardner explained in Offences and Defences, [t]he 
structure of excuse derives … from the structure of justification, and this shares in its 
combination of subjective (explanatory) and objective (guiding) rationality”.712                                                                                                          
The concomitant impact is that the objective element invites the court to make its own 
assessment which calibrates the reasonableness of an excuse in terms of the balance to 
be struck between the competing interests of protecting individual rights and the interest 
of the State in discovering information to assist in the fight against economic crime. 
 
In performing this task, previous cases involving the use of compulsory investigation 
powers tend to suggest that the courts will construe the reasonableness of an excuse 
narrowly.713 In Marlwood Commercial Inc v Kozeny,714 the Court of Appeal held that the 
recipient of a production notice did not have a reasonable excuse to support his failure 
to produce documents where confidential documents had been brought to England for 
use in civil proceedings pursuant to a court order, and their use in the course of a criminal 
investigation had not been contemplated. The Commercial Court had reached the same 
conclusion at first instance, where the Court added that the police interest in investigating 
serious fraud took “priority over … almost all private rights of confidentiality, [including] 
the right against self-incrimination”.715  
 
 
711 Law Society, ‘Anti-Money Laundering Guidance for the Legal Sector’ (2021) para 16.4.3. 
712 Gardner (n 453) ch 5 ‘Justifications and Reasons’ 109. 
713 See R v Director of SFO, ex p Saunders [1988] Crim LR 837; Bank of England v Riley [1992] Ch 475; Re Arrows 
Ltd (No 1) [1992] Ch 545; Re Arrows Ltd (No 4) [1995] 2 AC 75. 
714 Marlwood Commercial Inc v Kozeny [2004] EWCA Civ 798. 
715 ibid [27] (Moore-Bick J). 
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The fundamental nature of the privilege against self-incrimination will be compromised 
if it is located within the “reasonable excuse” exemption.  Since in every case involving 
“reasonable excuse”, the issue is fact-specific and decided on a case-by-case basis,716 a 
court would be drawn into a repeated consideration of where the balance of competing 
public interests should lie. In each case a court would be required to assess a myriad of 
variant factors which were apparent at the time when the privilege was exercised. In 
balancing the competing interests, these factors would include a consideration of the 
seriousness of criminal conduct, the period over which the conduct took place, the extent 
to which the undisclosed self-incriminating information would have assisted the law 
enforcement authorities, the likelihood of prosecution for commission of the underlying 
predicate offence(s), and the value to be placed on a person’s entitlement to privacy and 
autonomy, whether an individual or a limited company. It is also unclear how a court 
would be provided with sufficient evidence, especially on behalf of the State, to make 
such a determination. The retrospective undertaking of this exercise in each case in which 
the privilege is raised would provide a recipe for uncertainty, with an absence of clarity 
over when a court would recognise a person’s refusal to make a mandatory report as 
reasonable within the statutory framework. The courts have long recognised in the 
context of administrative law that different decisions may rank as reasonable decisions, 
where in the exercise of discretion the decision-maker had acted rationally and taken the 
correct factors into account. 
 
The legal route for giving effect to the privilege against self-incrimination by operation of 
law should not be conflated with the notion of “reasonable excuse” written into the 
legislation as an excusatory ground. It does not matter whether a claim to exercise the 
privilege against self-incrimination is reasonable or not. Once recognised, the privilege 
operates as a matter of right. It is not an excuse which may or may not be objectively 
justified, depending on the particular facts of the case.  
 
8.7.3 Evidential exclusion 
 
There are instances where Parliament has chosen to limit the application of the privilege 
against self-incrimination, whilst stopping short of abrogating the privilege entirely. A 
 
716 For a discussion of the width of the discretion, see Garry v CPS [2019] EWHC 636 and DPP v Paterson 
[2004] EWHC 2744. 
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paradigm example is to be found in section 2(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 as 
amended, which provides that the Director of the SFO may serve a notice on a person 
under investigation requiring him to answer questions and provide documents. The 
requirement is coercive, and by section 2(15), failure to comply is punishable by a 
maximum of two years imprisonment. In an effort to balance the protection of suspect’s 
rights against the public interest in detecting serious fraud, section 2(8) stipulates that any 
statement made by a suspect may be used in evidence against him where he makes a 
statement which he knows to be false, or is reckless as to its falsity, or where on a 
prosecution for some other offence he gives evidence which is inconsistent with his 
earlier statement. The interests of the individual are protected by the inability of the SFO 
to adduce the incriminating statement as evidence against the suspect in any other case. 
 
Legislative intervention along these lines to reduce the jeopardy for an individual or 
company self-reporting criminal conduct pursuant to the mandatory reporting 
requirement would be manifestly inadequate. First, the effect of this exclusionary 
provision is not to preserve a suspect’s right to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination at all. The statutory provisions require the suspect to answer questions and 
produce documents, irrespective of whether they are self-incriminating or not. Rather, it 
is only the evidential use of the incriminating statement which is restricted. Secondly, the 
statutory provisions do not address the danger to the self-incriminator which flows from 
evidence which the SFO has been able to derive from the incriminating answers or 
documents. Thirdly, the balance between the competing interests of an individual and 
those of the State are quite different. In the case of a compulsory interview and 
production of documents, a criminal investigation will have been initiated and remains 
extant. In the case of mandatory reporting, the coercive requirement to disclose self-




In conclusion, there are strong arguments supporting the contention that a person 
working in the regulated sector is entitled to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination 
where the narrative of the report would admit his involvement in criminal activity or 
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implicate a spouse.717 More particularly, a company is similarly entitled where the narrative 
would incriminate the company, and/or one of its officers and employees. If the law did 
not treat a person as relieved from the mandatory reporting obligation in this situation, 
criminal jeopardy would follow. As such, this outcome would be wholly inconsistent with 
the statutory language in section 330(2) which requires a report to be made where the 
person making the report knows, suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or 
suspecting, “that another person is engaged in money laundering”. When the privilege 
against self-incrimination is raised, the law permits the privilege to stand as a defence. 
  
 
717 The privilege extends to include information incriminating a person's spouse. See Hoskyn v Metropolitan 








This research addressed the challenges which arise where a company operating in the 
UK’s regulated sector comes into possession of information giving rise to knowledge, 
suspicion, or reasonable grounds to suspect that one or more of its officers or employees 
is engaged in money laundering. As explained in chapter 2, the definition of money 
laundering is sufficiently wide to include the possession of property representing the 
benefit of criminal conduct. If a company makes a mandatory report pursuant to the 
coercive obligation contained in section 330(1) of POCA 2002, the narrative may reveal 
the criminal wrongdoing of the company’s officers or employees, and also, inextricably 
in some cases, the wrongdoing in respect of which the company is criminally responsible. 
The prospect of self-reporting incriminating information is inevitable, unless the 
company is relieved of its obligation to disclose by exercising the privilege against self-
incrimination as a shield, if it should choose to do so. The thesis comprehensively 
establishes that the law should recognise a company has a clear choice, whether to assert 
the privilege or make a self-incriminating disclosure. 
 
9.1.1 Mandatory disclosure 
 
The extent of a company’s exposure to making a mandatory report which is self-
incriminating has been demonstrated in chapter 2. Whether the legislature intended to 
establish a mandatory reporting requirement in the UK’s AML regime is doubted, since 
the focus of attention in section 330(1) rests on the fact that the reporting requirement 
applies only where a person knows, suspects, or has reasonable ground for knowing or 
suspecting, that “another person is engaged in money laundering”.718 But whatever the 




718 Section 330(2) of POCA 2002. 
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There is no suggestion in the pre-legislative materials that this consequence of the AML 
regime was considered either domestically or internationally, let alone identified as a 
possible complication. If Parliament had entertained any desire to treat the privilege as 
implicitly abrogated by the mandatory reporting requirement in section 330(1), it would 
not have been difficult for Part 7 of POCA 2002 to have expressly provided that self-
incriminating information set out in a SAR could not be used in evidence against a 
company if it were prosecuted for criminal wrongdoing which had been disclosed.719 The 
fact that the legislature made no provision to prevent the use of self-incriminating 
evidence suggests that application of a mandatory self-reporting requirement was not 
intended. 
 
The most likely explanation for the absence of any reference to the privilege against self-
incrimination is that the legislature simply overlooked the matter by failing to appreciate 
that, on the basis of section 330(1) as presently configured, a company in its capacity as 
an independent legal person had become duty-bound to make a SAR in circumstances 
where its officers or employees constituted “the other person” or “other persons” 
engaged in suspect money laundering which forms the substance of the disclosure report.  
 
As individuals whose lives are associated with a company’s activities, the idea that they 
may constitute “other persons”, with identities separate from that of the company, may 
seem strange at first blush. But the law on corporate personhood is clear. Independent 
legal status and capacities are borne by a company, quite separately from those of its 
officers and employees. There is no doubt that section 330(1) mandated a company to 
make a self-report of its criminal wrongdoing, whether the legislature intended this 
outcome or not. 
 
9.1.2 Theoretical perspectives 
 
Chapter 3 established that the imposition of criminal liability for conduct by omission is 
a normative outcome and uncontroversial, and the mandatory reporting of suspected 
criminal conduct is easily assimilated into the contemporary norms of criminal law theory. 
 
719 POCA 2002, s 14(2). Under s 2(8) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 as amended, self-incriminating 
answers given in a compulsory interrogation are not admissible in evidence unless exceptionally the case 
involves an allegation of making a false statement or the suspect has made a statement inconsistent with it. 
For the admissibility of evidence derived from an inadmissible confession, see s 76(5), (6) of PACE 1984.  
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The chapter also demonstrated that in so far as the mandatory reporting obligation in 
section 330(1) of POCA 2002 requires a company to report self-incriminating 
information, the legislative provision cannot be attacked as unprincipled or offensive to 
tenets of legality. The answer to a conflict between the mandatory reporting requirement 
and the disclosure of self-incriminating information lies in the ability of a company to 
assert the privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
9.1.3 Privilege against self-incrimination 
 
In chapter 4, the multiple rationales which support the privilege against self-incrimination 
were discussed. Concerns to prevent physical threats and ensure evidential reliability have 
been supported by an association between the right of silence and the importance of 
privacy, laced with considerations of human dignity and personal autonomy. Whilst 
threats of physical pressure have faded, the law has continued to evidence concern to 
constrain the State’s sharp edges where elements of coercion are employed to procure 
self-incriminating information in legal proceedings, or during the course of an 
investigation. In recent times, the judicial support for the privilege against self-
incrimination remains nuanced. When seeking to strike a balance between competing 
public interests involving the detection of criminal activity on the one hand, and 
considerations of human dignity, autonomy, and privacy on the other, it is clear that the 
privilege has a continuing role to play.  
 
Based on these principles, the chapter demonstrated that there is no reason why the 
privilege should not have a wide application, beyond the production of self-incriminating 
information in legal proceedings, or during the course of an investigation. Whether or 
not the application of the privilege is sufficiently wide to engage the mandatory reporting 
requirement in section 330(1) of POCA 2002 was considered in chapter 8. 
 
9.1.4 Corporate chapters 
 
Before reviewing the conclusion reached in chapter 8, there were two important issues to 
address. First, it was necessary to consider the basis on which corporate rights are 
recognised. These matters were the subject of consideration in chapters 5 and 6. Secondly, 
it was necessary to consider whether the law should recognise the privilege against self-
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incrimination as a right to which a company may lay claim. This was the subject of 
consideration in chapter 7. Collectively, these chapters form “the corporate chapters” in 
this thesis. 
 
Chapter 5 began with an exploration of the notion of legal personhood, and how 
corporate personhood has been recognised by company law theorists in three different 
models, known respectively as “contract theory”, “concession theory”, and “real entity 
theory”. The chapter established that whilst traditional approaches to corporate 
personhood have provided a sound structural footing for securing a theoretical 
framework for the creation and management of a company, they have been inadequate 
to support a holistic approach to the recognition of corporate rights beyond those which 
flow from (a) the contractual ontology of the company’s existence, or (b) are integral to 
a company’s business, or (c) serve to protect individual interests which would otherwise 
be exposed if a corporate right to take protective or remedial action was not 
acknowledged. 
 
The chapter included a consideration of a school of thought which sought to determine 
the nature and extent of corporate personality by reference to the internal workings of a 
company’s social organisation. The chapter demonstrated that although this approach 
emphasised the independent development of a company’s character, ultimately 
organisational theory is unable to escape its dependency on the acts and omissions of 
individuals such as directors and senior employees who guide the company’s conduct. 
 
In chapter 6, the second of the corporate chapters, the thesis established an alternative 
narrative for the formulation of corporate rights which moved away from traditional 
notions of contract, concession, and real entity theories. The narrative, which the thesis 
termed “corporate value theory”, delivered a coherent foundation for the recognition of 
corporate rights in a modern model which is fit for purpose. With this narrative, the thesis 
demonstrated a convincing basis for understanding why the law should extend its 
recognition of individual legal rights to a corporate person and enable a company to assert 
certain legal rights which facilitate the protection of its interests.  
 
The core of the narrative lies in conceptions of value which flow from the functions 
which companies perform. As a participant in the corporate sector, a successful trading 
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company contributes to the strength of the economy. It is the vehicle through which 
economic growth is generated, and when the value of the beneficial contribution of each 
company is aggregated, the positive contribution of the corporate sector to the national 
economy is immense. Alongside aggregate value, each company has individual intrinsic 
value to its officers and employees, whose lives are shaped by their involvement in the 
company’s activities. Therefore, in response to the question why the law should extend 
its recognition of individual rights to corporate persons, the answer is clear. The law 
should recognise a company’s ability to assert rights in order to facilitate the protection 
of the company’s interests and the value it delivers to the economy and individual 
interests.  
 
Although a narrative of corporate rights based on value does not depend on the 
conception of a company as a moral agent, recognition that a company delivers benefits 
worthy of protection suggests that a company represents something more than an 
artificial legal construct through which business is conducted. The chapter critiqued 
recent academic literature which presents a company as a moral agent, with implications 
for an understanding of the basis on which corporate rights can be founded. If a company 
has moral agency as an incident of its corporate personality, corporate moralists claim 
that recognition of a basket of moral rights should follow as a logical consequence. The 
law must then determine whether legal recognition should be afforded to some, or all, of 
these rights. The chapter suggested that an analysis of corporate moral rights through the 
prism of value assists in this determination. As an incident of corporate moral agency, the 
chapter demonstrated how a moral right may be enlivened by an application of a value-
based analysis which sustains the identification of a right deserving of protection in law. 
The narrative is consequentialist, and by virtue of the value they deliver, the State should 
treat companies with moral concern.  
 
In chapter 7, several reasons were presented as to why the law should recognise a 
company’s right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination by applying a value-based 
analysis. The value of the privilege lies in the prevention of harm which its assertion 
averts. The chapter demonstrated there is a sound basis for recognising that the privilege 
against self-incrimination falls into a basket of corporate rights which the law should 
acknowledge, within the terms of a modern morally based model which focuses on the 
value which the exercise of a corporate assertion of the privilege protects. A denial of a 
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company’s ability to assert the privilege against self-incrimination prevents a company 
from acting to protect its interests and undermines its right to privacy. Also, a company’s 
freedom to act in its best interests as determined by the directors would be substantially 
diminished.  
   
The participants benefitting from an assertion of the privilege are the company, its 
officers, and employees. Wider beneficiaries are the company’s other stakeholders such 
as its members and trading associates, and the State itself. The chapter concluded with a 
critique of conflicting judicial approaches and determined that arguments denying the 
corporate recognition of the privilege fail to withstand critical scrutiny.  
 
9.1.5. Engaging the privilege 
 
The final step in the thesis was established in chapter 8. In this chapter, the thesis 
demonstrated that the mandatory reporting requirement engages the privilege against self-
incrimination where a company is statutorily obliged to disclose information which 
incriminates the company. The chapter has shown how a consideration of multiple 
factors militate strongly in favour of the law’s recognition of the privilege against self-
incrimination as a valid response to the mandatory reporting requirement.  
 
There are two fundamental aspects which clinch the argument.  
 
First, the statutory structure employed to establish the mandatory reporting requirement 
makes clear that the legislature was concerned to promote the filing of SARs where a 
third party was suspected of involvement in money laundering. It is implicit in the 
formulation of the legislation that the self-reporting of incriminating information was not 
contemplated.   
 
Secondly, since in many cases the State is not be aware of the suspected criminal 
wrongdoing which forms the substance of a report before a SAR is made, the 
infringement of a company’s right to protect its interest would be colossally 
compromised. If a company could not assert the privilege against self-incrimination, its 
right to privacy in the conduct of its affairs would be infringed. In addition, the company 
would lose the ability to determine the course of action which it perceives as serving its 
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best interests and those of its stakeholders. The company’s right to determine its destiny 




In conclusion, the matter is clear.  A corporate claim to the privilege can be recognised 
in law as operating as substantive justification in answer to a charge that an offence 
contrary to section 330(1) has been committed. This conclusion can be given effect in an 
uncomplicated and pragmatic way. To this extent, the engagement of the privilege against 
self-incrimination with the mandatory requirement in section 330(1) of POCA 2002 is a 
proposition which may be simply expressed. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, difficult terrain has been traversed. The thesis has presented 
a coherent approach to the recognition of corporate rights by developing a corporate 
value theory which supports a company’s ability to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination when it should choose to do so.  
 
Borrowing from the language of science, the thesis presents as a double helix since it 
consists of two strands that wind around each other like a twisted ladder. The engagement 
between the privilege against self-incrimination and corporate mandatory reporting 
pursuant to section 330(1) of POCA 2002 is one strand. The recognition of corporate 
rights, to include the privilege against self-incrimination, is a second strand. The two 
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